South African Economy by Brixen, Peter & Tarp, Finn
THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY 
What are the macroeconomic prospects for South Africa from 
1994 until the new millennium? Two frameworks of macroeco-
nomic modelling, associated with the World Bank and IMF, are 
used here to generate three scenarios, believed to represent the 
range of possible future directions of the South African economy. 
The study demonstrates that there is room for a developmental 
state, addressing the legacies of Apartheid such as poverty and 
inequality, within the confines of a stable macroeconomy. 
Although the scenarios produced may seem specific to South 
Africa, the methodology outlined is just as applicable to the policy-
making process elsewhere. The IMF's Financial Programming and 
the World Bank's Revised Minimum Standard Model were central 
to many macroeconomic management studies of the 1980s, which 
focused on stabilization and structural adjustment. This study 
shows for the first time how they can be quantitatively applied 
and illustrates their strengths and weaknesses. 
Therefore, this volume can serve as a textbook in development 
economics courses. Moreover, the modelling skills acquired from 
this book will be equally relevant to those studying macroeconomic 
development and to government and aid practitioners involved in 
policy work. 
Finn Tarp is currently Associate Professor at the Institute of 
Economics at the University of Copenhagen. Formerly with the 
United Nations, he worked as an economist for almost a decade in 
Southern Africa. Peter Brixen is an Economist at the Danish 
Economic Council and has worked extensively on applied general 
equilibrium models and development economics. 
Routledge Studies in Development Economics 
1. Economic Development in the Middle East 
Rodnry Wilson 
2. Monetary and Financial Policies in Developing Countries 
Growth and Stabilization 
Akhtar Hossain and Anis Chowdhury 
3. New Directions in Development Economics 
Growth, Environmental Concerns and Government in the 
1990s 
Edited by Mats Lundahl and Benno J Ndulu 
4. Financial Liberalization and Investment 
Kanhqya L. Gupta and Robert Lensink 
5. Liberalization in the Developing World 
Institutional and Economic Changes in Latin America, Africa 
and Asia 
Edited lry Alex E. Ferntindezjilberto and Andre Mommen 
6. Financial Development and Economic Growth 
Theory and Experiences from Developing Countries 
Edited lry Niels Hermes and Robert Lensink 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
ECONOMY 
Macroeconomic prospects for the 
medium term 
Finn Tarp and Peter Brixen 
First published 1996 by Routledge 
Published 2017 by Routledge 
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 
711 ThirdAvenue,NewYork,NY 10017, USA 
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa 
business 
Copyright © 1996 Finn Tarp and Peter Brixen 
Typeset in Garamond by 
J&L Composition Ltd, Filey, North Yorkshire 
The Open Access version of this book, available at www.tandfebooks.com, 
has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non 
Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license. 
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data 
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library 
Library of Congress Cata!oging in Publication Data 
Tarp, Finn, 1951-
The South African economy: macroeconomic prospects for the medium 
term/Finn Tarp and Peter Brixen. 
p. cm. - (Routledge studies in development economics, ISSN 
1359-7884: no. 7) 
Includes bibliographical references and index. 
1. South Africa-Economic conditions-1991-Econometric models. 
2. South Africa-Economic policy-Econometric models. 
3. Economic forecasting-South Africa-Econometric models. 
I. Brixen, Peter, 1963- II. Title. III. Series. 




ISBN 9780415142601 (hbk) 
CONTENTS 
Figures vii 




1 INTRODUCTION 1 
2 GENERAL COUNTRY BACKGROUND 5 
Macroeconomic features and trends 5 
Socio-economic characteristics 7 
Legacies of apartheid in perspective 10 
Poliry frameworks 12 
3 ACCOUNTING FRAMEWORK AND BASE 
YEAR DATA 19 
Prices and exchange rates 20 
Material balance 21 
Balance of pqyments 22 
Monry market 26 
Government accounts 28 
Other variables 30 
Disaggregated GDP and export data 31 
Conclusion 32 
4 MODELLING FRAMEWORKS 34 
The financial programming approach of the IMP 34 




5 MODEL EXPERIMENTS 52 
Experiment 1: Exchange rate depreciation 53 
Experiment 2: Government external borrowing 59 
Experiment 3: Foreign reserves 62 
Experiment 4: Domestic inflation 67 
Experiment 5: GDP growth 71 
Experiment 6: Exporl quantity versus exporl price 75 
Conclusion 77 
6 BASE RUN 83 
Background 83 
Demand and supp!J 85 
Prices and exchange rates 90 
Balance if pqyments 93 
Government accounts 97 
Asset stocks 102 
Conclusion 105 
7 ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS 107 
Introduction 107 
Alternative assumptions 108 
Results 114 
Summing-up 127 
8 CONCLUSION 129 
APPENDIX A: MODELLING FRAMEWORKS 
IN GAMS 138 
A. 1 Introduction 138 
A.2 Financial Programming Framework 140 
A.3 The Revised Minimum Standard Model 154 
APPENDIX B: BASE RUN 170 
APPENDIX C: OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO 182 





5.1. Experiment 1: Causality structures with exogenous 
exchange rate 55 
5.2. Experiment 1: Government foreign debt (deviation 
from base run) 58 
5.3. Experiment 1: Real government consumption 
(deviation from base run) 58 
5.4. Experiment 2: Causality structures with exogenous 
government foreign debt 60 
S.S. Experiment 2: Real government consumption 
(deviation from base run) 61 
5.6. Experiment 2: International reserves (per cent 
of import value) 62 
5.7. Experiment 3: Foreign reserves (deviation from 
base run) 63 
5.8. Experiment 3: Exchange rate and government 
foreign debt (deviation from base run) 65 
5.9. Experiment 3: Real government consumption 
(deviation from base run) 66 
5.10. Experiment 4: Real government consumption 
(deviation from base run) 68 
5.11. Experiment 4: Government borrowing 
requirement (deviation from base run) 70 
5.12. Experiment 5: Causality structures with 
exogenous exchange rate 72 
5.13. Experiment 5: Real government consumption 
(deviation from base run) 73 
5.14. Experiment 6: Real private consumption 
(deviation from base run) 76 
-vii 
FIGURES 
5.15. Experiment 6: Real government consumption 
(deviation from base run) 76 
7.1. Gross domestic income (constant 1994 prices) 115 
7.2. Private consumption (constant 1994 prices) 116 
7.3. Government consumption (constant 1994 prices) 116 
7.4. Total investments (constant 1994 prices) 117 
7.5. Imports (constant 1994 prices) 118 
7.6. External resource balance (per cent of GDP) 119 
7.7. The exchange rate (annual changes in per cent) 121 
7.8. Current account (per cent of GDP) 122 
7.9. Total government interest payments (per cent of GDP) 123 
7.10. Government budget deficit (per cent of GDP) 124 
7 .11. Government credit ( constant 1994 prices) 124 
7.12. Private sector credit (constant 1994 prices) 125 
7.13. Money supply (constant 1994 prices) 126 
7.14. Total government debt (per cent of GDP) 127 
viii 
TABLES AND BOXES 
TABLES 
3.1. Prices and exchange rates (1994= 1) 20 
3.2. Material balance (constant 1994 billion rand) 22 
3.3. Current account (billion foreign currency units) 24 
3.4. Capital account (billion foreign currency units) 25 
3.5. Money supply (billion rand) 27 
3.6. Government budget (billion rand) 28 
3.7. Government finance (billion rand) 29 
3.8. Other data 30 
3.9. Sectoral GDP (constant 1994 billion rand) 31 
3.10. Export by category ( constant 1994 billion rand) 32 
5.1. Central qualitative effects of experiments 78 
6.1. Parameter values in base run 84 
6.2. Material balance (real annual growth rates) 86 
6.3. Sectoral GDP (real annual growth rates) 86 
6.4. Export (real annual growth rates) 89 
6.5. Prices and exchange rates (1994= 100 and per 
cent annual change) 92 
6.6. Current account (billion rand and share of GDP 
in per cent) 94 
6.7. Balance of payments (billion rand and share of GDP 
in per cent) 96 
6.8. Government budget (billion rand and share of GDP 
in per cent) 99 
6.9. Government finance (billion rand and share of GDP 
in per cent) 101 
6.10. Money supply (billion rand and per cent 
annual growth 103 
lX 
TABLES AND BOXES 
6.11. Debt stocks (share of GDP in per cent) 104 
7.1. Assumptions underlying the base run and the 
alternative scenarios 113 
BOXES 
4.1. Financial Programming Framework 36 
4.2. Revised Minimum Standard Model 43 
X 
PREFACE 
The motivation to write this study in which we develop and use 
basic macroeconomic modelling tools to explore the complex 
development problems and medium-term perspectives of South 
Africa draws on many sources of inspiration and experience. 
First, much has been said and written on the role of the IMF and 
the World Bank in the context of stabilization and structural 
adjustment programmes in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere dur-
ing the last 15 years. Yet, with a few notable exceptions, little effort 
has been made to putting the Financial Programming (FP) and 
Revised Minimum Standard Modelling (RMSM) approaches, asso-
ciated with the two Bretton Woods institutions, squarely into the 
public domain. This is surprising since these frameworks have 
played an important role and continue to inform at least some 
of the actors in country analytic work. We felt it was a challenge to 
help rectify this by (a) fully documenting how the two models can 
be operationalized, using GAMS as our basic computer language, 
and (b) applying the FP and RMSM tools in an inherently consis-
tent manner, which goes beyond standard practice. 
It is our hope that we have compiled a volume that can serve as a 
basic teaching text in quantitative development economics pro-
grammes and as a set of guidelines for practitioners involved in 
applied analytic macroeconomic work in third world countries. 
Once the modelling skills underlying this volume have been learnt, 
all that is required to get started analytically in another country 
context is to develop a consistent set of base year data. How this 
can be done is therefore also carefully explained in a step-by-step 
manner in this study. The programmes necessary to allow the reader 
to implement and start experimenting with the two models on a 
PC are included in appendix form, and a copy on a disk for 
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immediate use can also be obtained by contacting either of the 
authors. 
Second, we have over the past decade been actively involved in 
teaching and researching in the area of development economics. 
This field of enquiry has undergone significant changes in terms of 
general approaches and strategic outlooks. Many important new 
insights have been gained, including the realization that an enabling 
macroeconomic environment and striking a workable balance 
between the roles of the public and private sector are of essential 
importance in the development process. Thus we hope, on the one 
side, that this study will provide the reader with a better grasp of 
some of the most important building blocks of sound macroeco-
nomic management in a third world setting. 
On the other side, we also aspire to illustrate that lucid macro-
economic analysis can in actual practice be used to underpin pro-
developmental oriented approaches to overcoming poverty and 
inequality. This is contrary to what one is often led to believe in 
the public debate. Hence, it is recommended that economists and 
other social scientists be concerned about addressing jointly the 
momentous problems of the real world rather than about securing 
the hegemony of one or another scientific approach. Moreover, 
many basic issues and dilemmas of development remain unre-
solved. Studying South Africa as we do in this text offers a unique 
opportunity to challenge one's understanding of general develop-
ment theory and practice in a concrete country context. 
Third, we have for years worked to promote change in southern 
Africa and infuse research and debate about the future of this 
embattled region, which deteriorated for so long under apart-
heid's destructive sway. Hence, one of the most exciting develop-
ments on the African continent during the first half of the 1990s 
has in our view been the political transition in South Africa. One of 
Africa's poets, who was also President of Angola, once wrote about 
an African train: 
A train 
climbing from a difficult African vale 
creaking and creaking 
slow and absurd 
Xll 
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It shrills and shrills 
he who has strived has not lost 
but has not yet won 
Agostinho Neto 
This picture is very illustrative of the South African situation. A lot 
of battling has been going on. Yet it is seldom easy to reshape old 
designs, and one can therefore certainly add that the development 
struggle is still to be won in South Africa. People continue to suffer 
the consequences of the ill-designed policies and practices of an 
unjust political, social and economic regime. Hence, trying to (a) 
develop a quantified analytic input to the ongoing policy dialogue 
in South Africa and (b) demonstrate that there is indeed room for 
decisive action by the new government, in cooperation with the 
private commercial and non-commercial sectors just seemed to us 
a natural thing to do. 
xiii 
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The balance between the use of market forces and instruments of 
economic planning by the government in furthering the develop-
ment process in third world countries has moved decisively in the 
direction of the former approach during the past 15-20 years. Yet 
the conditions under which unfettered market forces can provide 
for an optimal allocation of resources are exigent. This is the case 
when reference is made to a particular point in time, but even more 
so when alternative development paths for the future are consid-
ered. Furthermore, it is generally accepted that governments must 
assume responsibility for macroeconomic management and stabi-
lity. Hence, governments continue to confront a series of routine 
and strategic planning issues, related, for example, to the need for 
systematic fiscal management and expenditure budgeting, on the 
one side, and the design of medium and longer-term production, 
investment and trade policies, on the other. 
It is a basic theme of this study that formal macroeconomic 
models can play an important role in helping governments con-
cerned with economic management and development planning. 
Economics is certainly not all that matters, when strategies for 
the future are analysed and designed in developing countries. 
Economic and non-economic factors are continuously interact-
ing, at times reinforcing and at times contradicting each other. 
Nevertheless, economic analysis and modelling can inter alia help 
in (a) testing the internal consistency among established goals and 
policy instruments, (b) assessing trade-offs in light of underlying 
assumptions and value premises, and (c) defining a research agenda 
for the collection of further information on relations and mechan-
isms, which have so far been poorly understood. It can, moreover, 
be added that quantified modelling has taken a giant step forward 
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due to the technological progress inherent in the computer revolu-
tion of the last 15 years. How such advances can be put into use in 
teaching and applied country economic work is another major 
concern of this volume. 
The topic of the optimal size of the public sector is a difficult and 
complex one, as witnessed by the intense debate on development 
issues during the 1980s and early 1990s (f oye, 1993). Nevertheless, 
an attempt is made throughout this book to distinguish between 
this theme and questions related to the desirability of macroeco-
nomic stability as measured by standard indicators such as the 
budget deficit, the inflation rate and the balance of payments. 
Public sectors can certainly over-expand, and in the past have 
frequently done so, causing economic instability. Yet, whether 
public expansion is possible without crowding out private activity 
and causing macroeconomic problems is an empirical question, 
which needs to be analysed rather than assumed. If space is, in 
reality, available, or can be created through government and private 
sector activity, it had better be used actively, provided of course that 
government is indeed committed to furthering the development 
process. The economic, social and political opportunity costs of not 
doing so may turn out to be very high in countries plagued by 
poverty and inequality. This thesis is particularly relevant to South 
Africa, which is the country case we are examining. As background, 
South Africa's economic and social characteristics are reviewed in 
Chapter 2, which also sets out in some detail the competing 
strategic policy frameworks, which influence policy making. 
It is an explicit aim of this study to provide a fully quantified 
macroeconomic input to the policy dialogue on the future pro-
spects for the South African economy, including inter alia the 
important tasks of constructing a medium-term expenditure 
framework. Accordingly, the particular focus maintained in the 
research presented is macroeconomic, although the importance 
of sector and micro level policies is duly recognized. What we 
have done is to construct three fully quantified and documented 
six-year medium-term scenarios in Chapters 6 and 7. It is believed 
that they capture essential differences between the many possible 
directions which the South African economy may take, and they 
can each be seen as representative of a much larger sub-set of 
specific development paths. The need for developing such projec-
tions has been alluded to on many occasions by both South African 
policy makers and scholars, and outside agencies such as the 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have also 
directed attention to the importance of this area of analysis in the 
context of policy formulation in South Africa. 
While the South African case is in focus in Chapters 2, 6 and 7, 
the organization of the data and the methodologies followed are 
easily replicated in other country contexts. Moreover, the scenarios 
generated have not been constructed on the basis of entirely new 
theoretical constructs. The approach taken in the choice of mod-
elling frameworks is the pragmatic one, that while aggregate 
models and quantified projections are indispensable, the theoreti-
cal frameworks do not have to be overly complicated. 
In deciding which modelling frameworks to use, account was 
also taken of the fact that the South African government has to 
deal with a range of influential international agencies, including in 
particular the World Bank and the IMF. The two Bretton Woods 
institutions, which have a direct impact through the disbursement 
of their own financial resources as well as indirect power in 
affecting private and bilateral capital flows, use a variety of analy-
tical tools in their policy-advisory work. Nonetheless, the so-called 
Financial Programming (FP) framework of the IMF and the 
Revised Minimum Standard Model (RMSM) of the World Bank 
have been important and widely used economy-wide tools in 
country economic analysis. Furthermore, they illustrate the type 
of economic reasoning and fundamental perceptions of macro-
economic causality upon which policy recommendations and con-
ditionalities of the two institutions are often based. To master the 
analytical constructs mentioned is therefore an important precon-
dition for making sure that the policy dialogue gets on a sounder 
footing than is often reported to have been the case elsewhere in 
Africa during the 1980s (Mosley et al., 1991). 
Hence, despite their critical theoretical shortcomings, which are 
reviewed in detail in Tarp (1993a), there appears to be plenty of 
reason to become well acquainted with the FP and RMSM frame-
works - even more so, because the two models can actually be 
used as macroeconomic accounting frameworks in a more flexible 
manner than often assumed. Finally, they certainly do meet the 
practical requirement of being relatively simple theoretical con-
structs. Yet, surprisingly little documentation is actually available 
in published sources on the IMF and World Bank models, and the 
same goes even more so for guidelines on how best to implement 
and use them in specific country cases. In addition, the FP 
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approach and the RMSM are seldom - if ever - implemented 
simultaneously in a consistent manner even if this is, in principle, 
fairly easy to do. 
To help fill the above gaps in a functional and reproducible 
manner, so that additional experiments and updating as well as 
training can be performed with relative ease and effectiveness, is 
another set of objectives of this volume. It therefore contains three 
methodological chapters in addition to the chapters dealing more 
directly with South Africa. Chapter 4 describes and discusses the 
modelling frameworks used, and the particular modifications made 
in order to ensure that relevant, compatible and consistent med-
ium-term scenarios could be constructed are also explained. Three 
types of data were required for the simulation exercises, including a 
complete data set for a base year. Chapter 3 documents and 
reviews how these data were generated, and how they fit into a 
standard national accounting framework. Chapter 5, on the other 
hand, contains a number of policy experiments, which are per-
formed in order to investigate the main economic mechanisms of 
the two models. 
The detailed base run, which is subsequently developed in 
Chapter 6, is based on the assumption that it is justified to be 
moderately optimistic about the economic future of South Africa. 
The modelling frameworks presented in Chapter 4 are used to 
ensure consistency among the economic variables considered and 
the various qualitative assessments made. Since the base run 
represents what appears as a realistic prognosis, it is used as a 
benchmark in Chapter 7, where two alternative scenarios are 
developed. They are based respectively on a more optimistic and 
a more pessimistic assessment of future perspectives, and demon-
strate how two different sets of changes in exogenous variables and 
parameters can affect the values of the endogenous variables. 
Finally both the Financial Programming framework and the 
Revised Minimum Standard Model were programmed and solved 
using the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) (Brooke et 
al., 1988). Appendix A contains the two GAMS programes used to 
generate the base run and the scenarios, as well as some metho-
dological background. Appendices B, C and D provide detailed 






MACROECONOMIC FEATURES AND TRENDS 
Based on average income measures, South Africa is a relatively rich 
country with a Gross National Product (GNP) per capita of close 
to US$ 3,000 (World Bank, 1995, p. 163). Thus, South Africa 
belongs to the World Bank category of upper-middle-income 
countries. Furthermore, South ·Africa is indeed a regional 'giant' 
with a GNP which is about three times as big as that of the 
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) countries 
together. Nevertheless, if the average annual income of the black 
South Africans in the former so-called homelands is used as a 
measure, South Africa would be categorized among the poorest of 
the low-income countries. Moreover, while the GNP is large by 
African standards, total GNP is after all only equal to about 11 per 
cent of, for example, the GNP of the United Kingdom. 
In terms of sectoral contributions to Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), industry (including mining and quarrying) accounted for 39 
per cent in 1993 according to World Bank data. Services such as 
finance, insurance, real estate and business services, public adminis-
tration and defence as well as trade, etc. added up to a total of 56 per 
cent. Agriculture, forestry and fisheries made a relatively small con-
tribution of around 5 per cent to GDP, but mining and agriculture are 
much more important to the economy than GDP figures suggest. 
These two sectors dominate the country's exports and provide 
essential inputs for manufacturing. Close to 60 per cent of agricul-
tural output is, for example, delivered to secondary industries for 
processing, and agriculture is also a major employment generator. 
Exports of goods and non-factor services account for around 
one quarter of GNP, and gold is by far the most important export 
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commodity, accounting in 1991 for almost one quarter of all 
exports. Other mineral products, base metals and chemicals 
amounted to more than 30 per cent, leaving about one-third for 
other commodities, including for example food, drink and tobacco 
as well as textiles. Machinery has been and remains the key import, 
followed by transport equipment and chemicals. Thus, the South 
African economy is open as well as highly dependent on fluctuating 
primary sector exports, and imported capital goods for the domes-
tic industry are essential for the level of activity. 
Traditionally, South Africa attracted substantial capital inflows, 
and international debt rose rapidly between 1970 and 1985. Yet, 
after 1985 the imposition of international financial sanctions forced 
the apartheid regime to run current account surpluses to finance 
external debt repayment and private capital outflows. Conse-
quently, debt started falling to a historic low in the early 1990s. 
The South African economy was dynamic during the 19 50s and 
1960s with annual growth rates in excess of 5 per cent. However, 
from 1973-4 stagnation and decline became characteristic. The 
growth rate started falling and by the end of the 1980s it was 
less than 2 per cent a year, and much more volatile than previously. 
In 1990 per capita output had actually fallen to only 85 per cent of 
the level reached in 1975, and GDP continued its downward trend 
until 1993. Per capita income in 1994 was therefore about the same 
as in the mid-1960s. 
Moreover, during the 1970s and 1980s the composition of 
expenditure changed towards greater private consumption and 
less fixed investment. Hence, while fixed investment grew by 
8-9 per cent a year during the 1960s, the increase was limited to 
only 2.2 per cent a year from 1972 to 1979, and during the 1980s 
investment fell by 1.5 per cent on an annual basis. Private con-
sumption, on the other hand, maintained an annual rate of increase 
of 3 per cent during the 1980s. Thus, the capital stock became 
smaller and 'older', and consumption grew more than GDP, so the 
basis for future growth was gradually undermined. 
All employment and labour statistics in South Africa must be 
interpreted with caution, but it is evident that South Africa is in the 
middle of a deepening and potentially explosive labour market 
crisis. The number of formal sector employees has stagnated since 
the mid-1970s, and while 80 per cent of new entrants on the labour 
market found formal sector employment at the end of the 1960s, 
the number is now less than 10 per cent (COSATU, 1992). The 
6 
GENERAL COUNTRY BACKGROUND 
only formal sub-sectors in which employment increased from 1980 
to 1988 were central government, local administration and home-
lands, and financial services. Thus, the build up of apartheid's 
administrative control structures created more jobs, but this 
increase was cancelled out by less employment in other sectors, 
and total employment continued to fall steadily from 1989 to 1994 
(SARB, September 1995). It is difficult to provide more precise 
estimates of unemployment, as it is unclear how many people have 
found at least part time employment in the informal sector. Yet, 
according to official statistics, 43 per cent of the economically 
active work force were either unemployed or occupied in the 
informal sector in 1994 as compared to 19 per cent in 1970 
(SARB, September 1995). This obviously underlines the need not 
only for growth, but also for sector and micro level policies to 
increase labour absorption. 
Public sector budgets have been in deficit ever since 1970. The 
increase in the number of public employees referred to above is 
one aspect hereof, but to this should be added increasing debt 
service obligations as well as military expenditures. The latter have 
fallen more recently, but nevertheless rose from 2 per cent of GDP 
in 1970 to 4 per cent during the 1980s. This, inter alia, led to a 
particularly sharp cut back in public investment. Hence, public 
expenditures, geared towards the realization of the national and 
international political and military objectives of the apartheid 
regime, contributed to undermining the basis for future growth 
and development. The levels of public expenditure and the tax 
burden are not by themselves worrisome, but the uncontrolled 
growth in the public sector and a public sector deficit, which 
grew rapidly to 8.9 per cent of GDP in 1992-3, certainly con-
tributed to the relatively high inflation (Gelb, 1991 ). South Africa 
joined much of the rest of the world in experiencing a jump in the 
inflation rate from 4 per cent to around 15 per cent a year during 
the period 1960-73. Yet, contrary to what happened elsewhere, it 
remained at this level until very recently. 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS 
It is not only the macroeconomic situation and trends which have 
caused concern in South Africa (COSATU, 1992). Poverty is 
widespread, and South Africa has one of the most unequal dis-
tributions of income in the world with a gini-coefficient of around 
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0.65 (Eckert, 1991 ). Furthermore, the high-income group is rela-
tively large compared to other developing countries (i.e. 20-25 per 
cent as compared to normally only a few per cent). Thus, much 
less is left for the poorest, and the number of absolute poor 
increased from around 15 million in 1980 to over 17 million in 
1990 (farp, 1993b). Poverty is, in addition, overwhelmingly con-
centrated among African people and is both more widespread and 
more severe in rural areas. 
It is generally held that inter-racial income inequalities, which are 
particularly pronounced in South Africa, were reduced as a con-
sequence of deregulations in the labour market over the past 
decade. However, intra-racial inequalities grew, according to 
some sources, especially among Africans. It would appear that 
while modest income gains have been achieved among the middle 
60 per cent of the black income scale, the top 20 per cent have 
experienced very rapid gains while the poorest 20 per cent have 
had no, or even negative, income growth. Thus, the poorest groups 
among the blacks have been marginalized, and widening income 
gaps between formal and informal workers constitute a growing 
distributional dilemma. 
Income inequalities are partly a legacy of race-determined inter-
vention in wage-formation, and the fact that many jobs have been 
exclusively reserved for whites. To this is added, however, the 
extremely unequal distribution of income generating assets. 
Thus, the 'gini-coefficient' for agricultural land ownership is over 
0.80, and the white share of property income around 75 per cent. 
Also the extreme degree of concentration in the manufacturing 
industry is relevant here. Four private conglomerates (Anglo-
American, Rembrandt, South African Mutual and Sanlam) control 
more than 80 per cent of the companies listed on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange, which is the financial and commercial power 
centre of the country. 
Discriminatory spending on health, education, pensions, hous-
ing, infrastructure and other social services was yet another of the 
apartheid characteristics. Annual per capita expenditure on health 
for whites was almost double that for blacks in 1990, and despite 
legal changes many medical facilities remain in practice segregated. 
Similarly, black education was grossly neglected, damaging the 
future of black economic advancement as well as the overall 
growth potential of the country. Adequate housing is a basic 
human need and is crucial to socio-economic development, the 
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improvement of the quality of life and the prevention of disease. 
Nevertheless, the distribution of basic infrastructure was also 
based on racial criteria in South Africa under apartheid. Estimates 
of the shortage of housing vary, depending on whether informal 
structures are conceived as housing or not, but whichever measure 
is used, the backlog is enormous. 
Moreover, blacks in South Africa have very inadequate access to 
water and sanitation. In rural areas only 53 per cent of the 
population have a safe and accessible water supply, and only 14 
per cent of rural people have access to adequate sanitation. In 
urban areas the situation is somewhat better, but it is notable that 
more than one-third (of the whole of the urban population) have 
only minimal sewerage facilities. Furthermore, while South Africa 
generates 60 per cent of Africa's total electricity production, 70 per 
cent of black South African households have no access to elec-
tricity. 
The social imbalances between urban and rural areas have 
become even more evident after the abolition of racially based 
legislation and the lifting of influx control. Pushed by poverty and 
opportunity people have flooded into the major metropolitan 
areas. Estimates of the numbers involved vary, but people have 
moved into cities which have been deliberately underdeveloped for 
decades on the grounds that black people belonged in homelands. 
Squatter settlements have therefore mushroomed, leading to an 
overburdening of the social and economic infrastructure. The 
conditions have been characterized as abhorrent and explosive as 
well as extremely dangerous, in particular since the majority of the 
population of South Africa depends on the urban-based formal 
economy for their livelihood. 
To this can be added the fact that the South African popula-
tion as a whole is growing rapidly at an annual rate of around 2.6 
per cent. Yet, there are large differences between the various 
racial groups. Hence, the composition of the population is shift-
ing. These demographic observations have important policy 
implications, in particular since the white population pyramid is 
rectangular in shape, whereas the structure of the African popu-
lation is broad-based with a high proportion of children under 
the age of 15. 
The striking racial imbalances in the demographic picture are 
also evident in the health and educational status of the population, 
reflecting the discriminatory spending patterns referred to above. 
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The infant mortality rate per thousand live births was around 66 in 
1990. This is exceptionally high. Furthermore, this figure is an 
average that does not reflect racial and regional differences. The 
infant mortality rate for blacks and coloureds is actually about five 
times as high as for whites, and rural coloureds and Africans have 
infant mortality rates which are two to three times higher than for 
those living in urban areas. Infant mortality rates as high as 130 per 
thousand were reported in some areas in the 1980s. This is 
equivalent to the level in Ethiopia in 1990. Furthermore, whites 
can expect to live about 14 years longer than blacks. Life expec-
tancy for white males and females are respectively 68 and 76 years, 
whereas the corresponding indicators for black men and women 
are 55 and 61. 
There are complex political, social and economic reasons behind 
these depressing indicators, but it is evident that the policy of 
apartheid pursued by the white minority has played a major role. 
Other aspects include an ill-conceived economic strategy and 
unfavourable international economic conditions. Further com-
ments on this are made in the following section. 
LEGACIES OF APARTHEID IN PERSPECTIVE 
International economic sanctions have been identified by some 
observers as the reason for the decline of the South African 
economy during the 1980s and early 1990s. This is a misconcep-
tion. Stagnation had already set in at the beginning of the 1970s, 
and the sanctions, imposed in 1985-6, can at most be said to have 
contributed to a process already underway. Inward-looking, 
import-substituting industrialization coupled with the exploitation 
of cheap black labour was at the core of the economic plan of the 
apartheid regime. It was, at the same time, the intention that South 
Africa would become a political and economic power house in a 
constellation of states in Southern Africa. Strategic rather than 
economic considerations therefore played a major role, and ineffi-
ciencies, generated by unviable project selection and a host of 
arbitrary apartheid laws and price controls, hindered an appropri-
ate allocation of economic resources. 
Moreover, despite the import-substituting strategy followed 
since the 1920s, South Africa remains a very open economy. 
Imports have remained around one quarter of the GDP, and 
they are essential for the level of economic activity. South Africa 
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is heavily dependent on western technology as a direct conse-
quence of the pattern of demand, which is closely linked to the 
unequal distribution of incomes and wealth. Exports, on the other 
hand, are based on primary products to which little value is at 
present being added domestically. 
In sum, apartheid was not only a political system in which a 
majority of the population had no legal right to vote, it was also an 
economic and social order, organized to benefit the white minority. 
Absurd legislation and social as well as political institutions and 
policies constrained the movement of people and economic 
resources, dislocated the economic system and created inequalities 
of enormous dimensions. These contributed to political instability 
as well as to an inappropriate pattern of economic development. 
By 1973-4, the previous growth strategy had become unsustain-
able. Production and prices of gold, which formed the backbone of 
the import-substitution strategy, began falling; and at the same 
time South Africa initiated a destructive policy in the region. 
Instead of concentrating on developing the economy, the apart-
heid regime (mis)used resources to sabotage and undermine neigh-
bouring states - and in fact South Africa itself. Hence, apartheid 
became an economic catastrophe. 
It follows that the Government of National Unity (GNU) in 
1994 took over an economy suffering from important structural 
weaknesses including 
(a) a typical developing country economic structure, highly depen-
dent on a variable international environment; 
(b) an industrial sector, which is not, in general, competitive by 
international standards; 
(c) a worn capital stock, which is technologically neither suited to 
making use of the large reserve of unemployed, low-skilled 
labour force nor geared to produce the goods, which the black 
majority of the population need; 
(d) a battered agricultural sector, which is in deep crisis; 
(e) an inefficient public administration; 
(f) a lack of skilled labour due to the low human investment in the 
black majority; and 
(g) an overwhelming concentration of economic power and capital. 
Thus, it should come as no surprise that the socio-economic 
situation on the ground in South Africa is characterized by 
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(a) political division, mistrust and violence; 
(b) absence of legitimate delivery mechanisms with capacity, re-
sulting in little outreach to the poorest of the poor, who 
continue to find it difficult to get even their legal entitlements 
in terms of social services, etc.; 
(c) competition at all levels for the control of resources and the 
development process itself with resulting duplication, lack of 
coordination and wastage of resources; 
(d) weak local government and fragmentation of authorities at 
local, regional and national levels; and 
(e) very high expectations that the political transition will result in 
a tangible material and social uplift. 
POLICY FRAMEWORKS 
Much of the attention of the outside world and the major domestic 
players in South· Africa has over the past decade focused on the 
need for bringing an end to violence and reaching an acceptable 
political compact. However, after the take-over of power in 1994 
by the GNU, the pressing economic and social issues have quickly 
moved to the very top of the policy agenda. The political settle-
ment cannot by itself bring about lasting peace and development, 
and what is required for the historically oppressed majority is not 
only a right to equal opportunity, but also a right to an equal start in 
a different social environment. Looking back, it is furthermore 
clear that 'the' multi-faceted process of thrashing out the elements 
of a workable growth and development strategy for the future of 
South Africa in fact started gaining momentum soon after the 
release of Nelson Mandela from the Pollsmoore prison in 1990. 
It is also evident that one fundamental result of the continuing 
policy dialogue has been that it is by now widely accepted that the 
key economic issues to be addressed by the new government 
revolve around the possibilities for making the two objectives of 
growth and redistribution compatible. Thus, the government must, 
on the one hand, give priority attention to redistribution of income 
and wealth and a reduction of unemployment to ensure social 
stability and progress. On the other hand, redistribution without 
growth and structural reform cannot ensure a sufficient increase in 
the purchasing power of the poor. Another common understand-
ing, which has emerged, is that South Africa will in future have a 
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mixed economy, in which market forces play an important role in 
the allocation of productive resources and income. 
Despite general agreement about the above policy principles, 
consensus is far from complete. There are, in other words, com-
peting analytical approaches as to how changes to past economic 
policies and the basic structure of the economy are to be imple-
mented in practice. The initial opening talks between the African 
National Congress (ANC) and the Nationalist Party (NP) on the 
country's economic options focused on a narrow rhetoric of 
privatization versus nationalization, and questions related to the 
extremely high degree of industrial concentration certainly remain 
unresolved. More recently, it would appear that the macroeco-
nomic development debate has crystallized into two broad lines 
of thought (Gibson and van Seventer, 1995a). The two basic policy 
frameworks, which are also known in the international develop-
ment debate elsewhere, focus respectively on orthodox fiscal 
discipline in combination with market-oriented policies together 
with a leaner government, on the one side, and broader based 
development policies, where less concern is attached to size of 
government per se, on the other side. 
The Nationalist Party and institutions such as the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB) are clearly in favour of giving priority 
attention to macroeconomic fiscal and monetary discipline as 
well as constraining the role of government. This is justified by 
references to what are perceived as basic lessons from the past 25 
years of policy making, often set out as follows: 
a) There is no durable trade-off between inflation, on the one 
hand, and output growth and employment, on the other; 
b) the costs of inflation in terms of lost output and job opportu-
nities are much more severe than ever thought before; and 
c) knowledge of the behavioural patterns of economic agents is so 
insufficient that it is difficult to predict with any significant degree 
of certainty the outcome of government policy interventions. 
Inherent in the last of these observations is obviously an attack on 
Keynesian inspired macroeconomic policy, which formed part of 
the original building blocks of development economics as tradi-
tionally conceived. However, this assault on government's ability to 
achieve stability in output and economic growth is coupled with a 
set of ambitious recommendations as far as the wider role of the 
government in economic development is concerned, which are 
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different in nature from the issues related to more short-run 
macroeconomic management. 
Thus, it is argued that the essential elements of a successful 
development strategy must include it being led by the private 
sector with a strong outward orientation and a dynamic export· 
sector, fully integrated into the world economy. Moreover, govern-
ment's role, in this strategic vision, is limited to providing the legal, 
social and physical infrastructure within the constraints of afford-
ability, and fiscal and monetary policies are merely perceived as 
instruments dedicated to achieving and maintaining macroeco-
nomic stability. Structural reforms in a variety of areas to reduce 
the relative importance of government in the economy are there-
fore also called for, and it is argued that even if inequality may 
initially increase, the benefits of growth will eventually 'trickle 
down' to the poorer segments of society. 
The ANC and collaborating partners within the framework of 
the mass democratic movement, on the other side, have over the 
years taken a much more interventionistic and development-
oriented position. Thus, the ANC aspires, according to its Policy 
Guidelines for a Future Democratic South Africa (ANC, 1992), to 
set the country on a sustainable and socially acceptable growth 
path, involving a revised set of economic and social policies and 
institutions. Hence, focus is not narrowly on economic growth. 
The need for economic progress is recognized, but is seen as an 
integrated component of what is perceived as a more complete 
vision of the future, which also includes the creation of a demo-
cratic state at national, regional and local levels. 
The 'developmental state' is, in other words, assigned a key role 
in building and implementing a new national development strategy. 
Moreover, it emerges from ANC policy statements that this is not 
meant to suppress the crucial role of the private business sector, 
and the maintenance of a sustainable macroeconomic position 
remains a key target. Nevertheless, the demand for meeting the 
basic needs of the South African population has been in focus, and 
the state is assigned a prominent role. Hence, the ANC perspective 
appears based on the assumption that growth, equity and sustain-
ability can reinforce each other, and that redistribution is a pre-
condition for social and political stability and progress. 
The official government strategy to address the social and 
economic backlogs is embodied in the Reconstruction and Devel-
opment Programme (RDP) originally formulated by the ANC 
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(1994). The RDP was designed as a coherent vision for funda-
mental transformation of South African society. Emphasis is put 
on six guiding principles set out in the so-called RDP White Paper 
according to which the RDP must 
a) be an integrated and sustainable programme; 
b) be a people-driven and people-centred process; 
c) promote peace and security for all; 
d) promote nation-building; 
e) meet basic needs and link reconstruction and development; and 
f) democratize the South African society. 
(Republic of South Africa, 1995, pp. 8-9) 
The White Paper has been the subject of considerable debate, and 
Nattrass (1994) has characterized the document as a shopping list 
of principles with no clear prices or priorities. She also laments the 
absence of hard-nosed statistical projections and consideration of 
trade-offs, and it is indeed correct that the RDP makes few 
concrete statements about fiscal and monetary policy. As such it 
appears concerned in particular with the overall developmental 
vision of the new government in addition to putting forward a 
number of ambitious programmes. These included, initially, a series 
of presidential lead projects directed at furthering rural develop-
ment, urban reconstruction and housing, capacity building, the 
promotion of health, and a range of public works initiatives. 
They have a distinct basic needs flavour, which is in contrast to 
the 'trickle down' philosophy referred to above. 
At the same time, however, it transpires from a variety of 
sources that the government is firmly committed to a policy of 
macroeconomic discipline in order to promote an enabling 
economic environment. Goals such as low inflation are often 
cited, and repeated references are made in public and academic 
debates to the dangers of what has been termed Latin American 
populism (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1991). Moreover, government 
non-interest recurrent expenditure is supposed to remain constant 
in real terms, and the government is explicitly aiming at a reduction 
from the present level of 21 per cent to 17 per cent in the ratio of 
general government consumption expenditure to GDP. In addi-
tion, only a modest increase in capital expenditure from its present 
level of 2 per cent of GDP is envisaged during the second half of 
the 1990s (Department of Finance, 199 5, p. 2.4), and a reduction in 
the fiscal deficit is foreseen. Yet no increases in the overall tax 
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burden are intended, and it is a stated aim that external debt should 
not be used to any large extent as a means of financing the national 
budget deficit. 
When considering the wide ranging targets of the RDP and the 
vision of an active government, on the one side, and the very stern 
macroeconomic targets just mentioned, on the other, a difficult 
dilemma, which reflects the inherent and fundamental conflicts in 
South African society, becomes conspicuous. The GNU has repeat-
edly stated that the RDP is not intended as an addition to existing 
public spending programmes, and that resources must be found by 
redirecting expenditures from elsewhere in order to make the RDP 
and the fiscal target compatible. Yet it is difficult to see how this can 
be done in practice. The room for redirecting public expense will in 
all likelihood be very constrained, given, in particular, the job 
guarantees issued to existing civil servants, combined with the 
need for making the expenditure side of the government budget 
more equal in racial terms (Nolan, 1995, p. 167). To this can be 
added the demand for public expenditure on measures to improve 
the supply side of the economy, including both research and 
technology development and the critical upgrading of human skills. 
Hence, it is far from evident that the above fiscal targets, which 
would constrain government activity unduly as demonstrated in 
this study, are appropriate and should be given priority over more 
development-oriented needs in the present situation. Expanded 
public outlays on education and health are in reality critical invest-
ments to build up social capital and boost the supply side of the 
economy through much needed human capacity development. 
Pent-up expectations among the disfavoured majority of the 
population are also a warning that an increase in recurrent expense 
may well be required to ensure social stability, which is, in turn, a 
precondition for growth. Similarly, the ruling out of permanent 
increases in the overall tax burden with a view to maintaining 
private sector incentives and confidence is questionable. Redistri-
butive demands are impressive, so it would probably be more 
sensible to recognize that at least some tax increases may be 
hard to contain in the medium-term, striving instead towards 
making sure that a high degree of predictability and transparency 
is established about what the private sector can expect. 
In sum, the development agenda facing South Africa's govern-
ment is intricate. Stable domestic macro balances and avoiding the 
private sector being crowded out by government activity will be of 
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critical importance as these difficult domestic policy dilemmas are 
approached. Yet it has to be realized that government spending on 
items with an investment nature should not necessarily be fully 
financed by current taxes, and this is so on efficiency as well as 
equity grounds. Investment tends to be lumpy, which is an argu-
ment for partial debt financing. The equity argument is that the 
beneficiaries of current investment spending are likely to be future 
tax payers. 
As pointed out in Chapter 1 this volume tries, inter alia, to come 
to grips with the quantitative dimensions within which this balan-
cing act must take place. In this context, the government must also 
ensure a reasonable degree of balance vis-a-vis the foreign sector. 
There is a considerable need for increased inflows of capital to 
finance imports, growth and renovation of the capital stock. Con-
sequently, running current account deficits to ensure this inflow of 
real resources may make both macroeconomic and social sense. 
The possibility of capital flight must at the same time be taken into 
account, and greater foreign direct investment and portfolio 
inflows will only materialize if the expectations of international 
investors are influenced in a favourable manner. 
The above issues and hazards - as well as the perils of deficient 
economic management in critical transitional phases of national 
reconstruction and development - are amply illustrated by the 
experiences of other countries. Illuminating developing country 
cases are, for example, reviewed in Dornbusch and Edwards 
(1991) as well as Taylor (1993). The lessons from these episodes 
should certainly not be overlooked, in particular since there is in 
South Africa a definite risk that the pressures on public spending 
will be difficult to curtail because of the pressing and very real 
social needs. Nevertheless, restraint alone cannot put South Africa 
on a higher and sustainable growth path, and it is clear from 
Chapter 6 that the new government does have at least some 
room for manoeuvre. It would appear sensible to use this room 
as actively as possible, while constantly keeping in mind that the 
space available may both expand and diminish in size, depending 
on the interplay among external and internal factors. Only in this 
way will the new South Africa be able to strike a proper balance 
between the need for redistribution and growth, on the one side, 
and the specific constraints which form part of the macroeco-
nomic framework, on the other. To manage this task is not easy, 
however, and there are many areas on which the new government 
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and South African society at large should focus attention. A vivid 
review of the broader requirements in the area of economic 
analysis and policy formulation can, for example, be found in 
IDRC (1991) from which it is clear that sector and micro level 
policies will have a critical role to play alongside the macro-




AND BASE YEAR DATA 
The basis of applied macro models is almost invariably a set of 
national accounting identities. Their role is to ensure that model 
solutions satisfy certain equilibrium conditions that hold by defini-
tion. For example, the material balance identity states that the 
supply of goods must be equal to demand, while the balance-of-
payments identity implies that the use of foreign exchange matches 
the amount of foreign exchange available. Although national 
accounting can be rather tedious, it is a thesis of this study that 
a consistent accounting framework is a valuable tool when working 
with applied macro models. First, it provides a natural link to 
national account data, which will generally be the starting point 
for exercises attempting to analyse economy-wide policy issues. 
Second, it imposes a set of constraints, which ensure that policy 
analysts cannot make predictions that are internally inconsistent, 
and therefore forces some discipline into discussions of the best 
choice of economic policies. 
A basic national accounting framework and the notation used in 
this volume are presented in this chapter, and they will reappear in 
various forms in subsequent chapters where the FP and RMSM 
frameworks are presented and applied. At the same time, the 
chapter documents how a base year data set, following the 
accounting framework, was derived from the South African 
national accounts. This data set was compiled for several rea-
sons. First, it will be the starting point for the base run and the 
scenarios constructed in Chapters 6 and 7. Second, some of the 
data can be used to calibrate certain parameters of the FP and 
RMSM models, ensuring that the models reproduce actual South 
African data in the base year. Third, the existence of a complete 
and consistent data set provides a means by which model checking 
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becomes straightforward, thereby reducing the possibility of spe-
cification errors. 
The year 1994 was chosen as base year. It is the most recent year 
for which data were available and the Quarter!J Bulletin, March 199 5, 
of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) is the main data source. 
However, it would be fairly easy to update this data set as new data 
become available. Although the data set was generated starting 
from an accounting framework, it was constructed so that it 
contains data values of all variables entering the PP and RMSM 
frameworks. In addition to 1994 values of all variables, 1993 values 
are also included for variables that enter lagged in at least one of 
the two modelling frameworks. 
Besides the base year data set, two other types of data are 
needed when simulating the two modelling frameworks. First, 
values of exogenous variables are required for every year of the 
forecast horizon for which the models are solved. Second, it is 
necessary to assign values to model parameters. These data will be 
documented when the base run is presented in Chapter 6. 
PRICES AND EXCHANGE RATES 
Before turning to the accounting framework, it is convenient to 
select a set of price normalizations, which will be used to distin-
guish developments in volumes from those of values. It was thus 
decided to normalize all prices and the nominal exchange rate to 
one in 1994, as shown in Table 3.1. The column labelled ~mbol 
shows the acronym used for the different variables in this book. 
On the other hand, the column labelled Code refers to the codes 
Table 3.1 Prices and exchange rates (1994 = 1) 
Variable Symbol 1993 
General price index p 
Domestic price index PD 
World price indices 
Export XPI 
Import MPI 1.024 










Source: SARB Quarterly Bulletin March 1995, Statistical Tables: Exchange Rates, Gold 
Price and Trade Financing Rates and Expenditure on Gross Domestic Product 
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assigned to the data series in SARB Quarter!J Bulletin, which were 
used when deriving the figures presented in the table. 
Having defined all prices and the exchange rate as one in 1994, 
the 1993 value of the exchange rate was derived from an index of 
the annual average of the effective nominal exchange rate given in 
the Quarter!J Bulletin. The import price index for 1993 was calcu-
lated from the implicit price deflator of imports, which was derived 
from the national accounts, and the value of the exchange rate 
given in the table. Since the remaining price indices do not enter 
lagged in the two models, their 1993 values were not calculated. 
MATERIAL BALANCE 
A central national accounting identity is the material balance, which 
concerns the demand and supply of commodities. Using the 
notation adopted in this study, this familiar equation can be 
written as: 
GDP+M= CP+ CG+IVP+IVG+X (3.1) 
The left-hand side shows that goods can either be produced 
domestically, GDP, or imported, M. On the other hand, demand 
consists of private and government consumption, respectively CP 
and CG, private and government investments, respectively IVP 
and IVG , and finally exports, X 
Table 3.2 contains values of the different components of the 
material balance in constant 1994 prices. All 1994 values were taken 
directly from the SARB Quarter!J Bulletin. It should be noted, 
however, that GDP in 1994 includes a residual item of 1.493 billion 
rand (code 601 lJ). This residual reflects the fact that more is 
expended on GDP than is available when calculated from the 
national product and income accounts. Thus, the figure for GDP 
at market prices shown in Table 3.2 is higher than the official figure. 
While the chosen price normalization rule implies that values and 
quantities are identical in 1994, it creates some problems when 
generating figures for quantities for 1993 as the SARB Quarter!J 
Bulletin presents real data in constant 1990 prices. It was therefore 
necessary to derive the 1993 figures in the table, but the SARB 
Quarter!J Bulletin still provided all the information required. 
Private and government consumption as well as export and 
import values were obtained using the corresponding real 1994 
growth rates calculated from the constant 1990 price data given in 
21 
ACCOUNTING FRAMEWORK AND BASE YEAR DATA 
Table 3.2 Material balance (constant 1994 billion rand) 
Variable ,r;imbol 1993 1994 Code 
Consumption C 338.661 347.669 6007] +6008] 
Private CP 250.617 256.320 6007] 
Government CG 88.044 91.349 6008] 
Investment IV 68.020 78.310 6009] +6010] 
Private IVP 57.840 68.690 6182]+6183] 
Government IVG 10.180 9.620 6181] 
Export X 102.100 102.682 6013] 
Import M -81.968 -94.415 6014] 
GDP GDP 426.813 434.246 6006]-6011] 
Source: SARB Quarterly Bulletin March 1995, Statistical Tables: Expenditure on Gross 
Domestic Product and Gross and Net Domestic Investment l!J Type of Organisation 
the SARB Quarter(y Bulletin. Similarly, private and government 
investments were calculated from current price 1993 investments 
and an implicit price deflator for total investments (including 
inventory changes). Thus, it was implicitly assumed that the price 
of private and government investments changed by the same 
percentage from 1993 to 1994. From these derived data, a value 
for real 1993 GDP was calculated. This resulted in a GDP growth 
rate in 1994 of 2.0 per cent, which is slightly higher than the official 
rate of 1.7 per cent. It was decided to maintain the official overall 
real GDP growth rate by adjusting all demand components pro-
portionally downwards. This procedure is, of course, rather crude, 
but the 1993 values of the variables do not affect the results of 
model simulations, and they are only included in the data set to get 
the simulations started. 
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
The balance of payments is at the core of both models applied in this 
study. This reflects both the role of the Bretton Woods institutions 
as providers, directly or indirectly, of foreign capital, and the fact that 
serious external imbalances have frequently haunted most develop-
ing countries. The national accounting identity relating the demand 
and supply of foreign exchange can be stated as: 
AR = CURBAL + !:!.NFDP + !:!.NFDG (3.2) 
All variables are here measured in foreign currency units, and AR is 
the change in international reserves. This is equal to the surplus on 
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current account, CURBA.L, and changes in the net foreign debt of 
the private sector and the government, respectively, !:!.NFDP and 
!:!.NFDG. In another version of this identity, the last two terms can 
be replaced by the surplus on the capital account. It then states that 
the change in foreign reserves corresponds to the sum of the 
surpluses on the current and capital accounts. Equation (3.2) 
provides a complete description of the capital flows that will be 
considered in this study. This means particularly that potential 
differences among various types of capital flows, for example 
foreign direct investments versus short-term portfolio invest-
ments, will be largely ignored, although Chapter 6 touches upon 
this issue. In contrast, the description of the current account is 
quite detailed. Thus: 
CURBA.L = RESBAL + NETFSY + N1RP + NTRG (3.3) 
where NTRP and NTRG represent net transfers from the rest of 
the world to the domestic private and government sectors, respec-
tively. The resource or trade balance is denoted by RESBAL and is 
defined as the difference between export revenue and import 
expenditures: 
RESBAL = XPI X - MPI M (3.4) 
where XPI and MPI are export and import price indices. NETFSY, 
on the other hand, represents net receipts of payments for factor 
services. They comprise interest payments on the external debt of 
the private sector and the government, INFP and INFG respec-
tively, as well as a range of other factor payments that are summar-
ized in the variable NFP. In sum, total net factor services from 
abroad are defined as: 
NETFSY = NFP - INFP - INFG (3.5) 
Table 3.3 contains the 1994 current account data of South Africa. 
Because of the price normalization, rand and foreign currency 
values as well as quantities are the same. However, the balance-
of-payments variables in the models are valued in foreign currency. 
Imports and exports, and thus the resource balance, follow directly 
from Table 3.2. Since the SARB Quarter!J Bulletin includes total 
interest payments from South Africa to the rest of the world only, 
an assumption was necessary to allocate them between the govern-
ment and private sector. It was therefore decided to make the 
allocation in proportion to the 1993 stocks of net external debt, 
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Table 3.3 Current account (billion foreign currency units) 
Variable .$),mbol 1994 Code 
Resource balance RESBAL 8.267 6013]-6014] 
Export XPI*X 102.682 6013] 
Import MPI*M -94.415 6014] 
Net factor services NETFSY -10.561 6015] 
Interest payments 5064] (Adjusted) 
Private INFP -2.443 Derived 
Government INFG -3.888 Derived 
Other factor payments NFP -4.230 6015 J - 5064] (Adj .) 
Net transfers to 5006] 
Private NTRP -0.067 -6233J+6243J-6248J 
Government NTRG 0.272 6253J-6258J 
Current account CURBAL -2.089 6013] 
Source: SARB Quarter!J Bulletin March 1995, Statistical Tables: Balance of Payments, 
Services and Transfers, National Income and Production Accounts of South Africa, 
Cu"ent Income and Expenditure of Incorporated Business Enterprises, Personal Income 
and Expenditure and Current Income and Expenditure of General Government 
which will be derived below. This procedure ignores the fact that 
debt stocks are net of foreign assets, whereas the interest payments 
are on a gross basis. Yet the foreign asset stocks of both sectors, as 
shown in the SARB Quarterfy Builetin, are small compared to the 
stocks of liabilities. Moreover, the ratio of assets to liabilities is 
about the same for both the government and the private sector. 
Hence, no serious bias is created, and the implicit interest rate on 
external debt appears reasonable. 
Net receipts of other factor payments were calculated as the 
difference between total net factor payments and interest payments 
abroad. Finally, net transfers from the rest of the world to the 
government and the private sector respectively were obtained from 
data in the SARB Quarter(y Bulletin on gross transfers to/from 
abroad. 
Table 3.4 contains all data related to the capital account, includ-
ing the underlying stocks of foreign assets and liabilities. Several 
problems were encountered in the construction of these data. First, 
the SARB Quarter(y Bulletin contains only stock data up to 1993. 
Second, it is not straightforward to reconcile data on asset stocks 
with the corresponding flows of assets, which appear in the 
balance-of-payments accounts. Consequently, several assumptions 
were required before the figures in Table 3.4 could be completed. 
It should be mentioned, however, that asset stocks only influence 
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Table 3.4 Capital account (billion foreign currency units) 
Variable Symbol Stock Flow Code 
Net foreign debt 
Private NFDP93 17.286 5162J+5166J +5170) + 
5172J-5212J-5216J 
- 5220) - 5224) 
NFDP94 17.695 Derived 
-~NFDP -0.409 Derived 
Government NFDG93 27.510 5163)-5213) 
NFDG94 32.311 Derived 
-~NFDG -4.801 5009) + 5017) 
Foreign reserves R93 10.982 Derived 
R94 14.103 5276M 
~R 3.121 5020) 
Current account CURBAL -2.089 5007) 
Source: SARB Quarlerly Bulletin March 1995, Statistical Tables: Balance of Payments, 
Foreign Assets and Liabilities of South Africa and Gold and Other Foreign Reserves 
the simulations of the FP and RMSM frameworks through their 
impact on interest payments. 
Starting with the net foreign debt of the government, the 1993 
value was derived from information on rand values of external 
assets and liabilities. This figure was then transformed into foreign 
currency units using the index of the effective nominal exchange 
rate given in Table 3.1. Subsequently, the 1994 value was obtained 
by adding the short- and long-term capital flows of the govern-
ment to the 1993 stock value. These flow data were taken from the 
balance-of-payments statistics of the SARB Quarterly Bulletin. Since 
the exchange rate was normalized to one in 1994, the rand values 
of the flows, shown in the SARB Quarterly Bulletin, are identical to 
their value in foreign currency units. The procedure should there-
fore give a reasonable estimate of the 1994 debt stock. 
Next, the 1994 stock of international reserves as well as the 
change in reserves during 1994 were taken directly from the 
SARB Quarterly Bulletin. The 1993 stock value was then calculated 
by subtracting the 1994 flow from the 1994 stock, using the 
exchange rate index to get the 1993 stock value in foreign currency 
units. 
This leaves the stock of private net external debt to be deter-
mined, and it is undoubtedly the most problematic of the data in 
Table 3.4. The following procedure was used. First, the 1993 net 
debt was calculated from stock data in the SARB Quarterly Bulletin 
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and transformed into foreign currency units using the exchange 
rate index from Table 3.1. Direct investments as well as financial 
assets and liabilities of all nongovernment sectors were included 
in the definition of private sector external debt. However, it was 
decided to leave out the short-term liabilities and assets of the 
monetary sector, as they are assumed to be captured by the 
foreign reserve variable. Next, the 1994 flow was obtained as a 
residual using the balance-of-payments identity (equation (3.2)). 
Consequently, the change in private sector net foreign debt has 
the right value under the assumption that all other items in Table 
3.4 were calculated correctly. Finally, the 1994 stock of private 
net foreign debt was obtained as the sum of the 1993 stock and 
the 1994 flow. 
The main problem in relation to these external debt data relates 
to unrecorded assets held by the private sector abroad. They are 
notoriously hard to assess, but informal estimates suggest that the 
private sector had net foreign assets worth 5.6 billion rand in 1990, 
as compared to net liabilities of around 15 billion rand in the 
official statistics. Independent of the actual size of the foreign 
assets, their existence will affect capital flows. As the private 
sector capital flows were calculated residually, they include inter 
alia the unrecorded foreign assets flows, contained in the balance-
of-payments statistics. This implies that the 1994 debt figure used 
in this volume will conform neither with the recorded net foreign 
debt nor with the true net external debt of the private sector. 
However, since the impact of stock values will be small in model 
simulations, it was decided not to pursue this issue further. It 
should, however, be kept in mind, whenever data on the net 
foreign debt of the private sector are interpreted. 
MONEY MARKET 
Having considered the markets for goods and foreign exchange, 
the third market is a highly aggregated financial market. It will be 
represented in the form of a market for a single domestic financial 
asset called money. Implicitly, all financial institutions are aggre-
gated into what is frequently referred to as a monetary survey, 
which intermediates between savers and borrowers by accepting 
financial liabilities, such as bank deposits, and extending credit to 
the private sector as well as the government. International reserves 
are also recorded as assets of the monetary survey. It is assumed by 
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Table 3.5 Money supply (billion rand) 
Variable ,$ymbol 1993 1994 Code 
Domestic credit DC 201.015 230.047 Derived 
Private DCP 186.060 214.560 Derived 
Government DCG 14.955 15.487 1367M (Adjusted) 
Foreign reserves E*R 9.963 14.103 5276M 
Money supply MS 210.978 244.150 1374M 
Source. SARB Quarter-!J Bulletin March 1995, Statistical Tables: Monetary Aggregates, 
Monetary Ana!Jsis and Gold and Other- Foreign Reserves 
way of definition that the liabilities of the monetary survey match 
the value of assets exactly. In the FP framework, an equilibrium 
condition ensures correspondence between money demand and 
supply, but since there is just one kind of money demand, only 
the supply of money is considered here. The following equation 
defines the supply of money, MS: 
MS= DCP+ DCC+ ER (3.6) 
Thus, the liability called money supply is matched on the asset side 
of the balance sheet of the monetary survey by credit extended to 
the private sector and the government, DCP and DCC respectively, 
and the stock of foreign reserves, valued in domestic currency units 
through multiplication by the exchange rate index, E. 
Table 3.5 contains the values of the money supply variables. 
Data for the total money supply and government credit were 
adopted from the SARB Quarter!J Bulletin. The former variable is 
defined as the M3 money aggregate, while the latter is defined as 
net credit extended by the monetary sector to the government. 
However, the 1993 stock of government credit was adjusted 
upwards by 7 .5 billion rand to account for a technical change in 
the relationship between the general government and SARB, cf. 
Quarter!J Bulletin March 1995, p. 16. 
International reserves were discussed previously, and the only 
feature to note here is that their 1993 value can be obtained by 
multiplying the exchange rate index in Table 3.1 by the 1993 value 
of international reserves in foreign currency units in Table 3.4. 
Given the values of money supply, foreign reserves and govern-
ment credit, the credit extended to the private sector as well as the 
value of total credit were derived residually. 
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GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTS 
The national accounting identities considered so far can be inter-
preted as market equilibrium conditions, while the remaining account-
ing framework relates to the income, expenditure and finance of the 
public sector. In this book, the public sector is defined as general 
government, excluding in particular public enterprises. The borrow-
ing requirement of government, ERG, is defined as: 
ERG= CG + IVG+ INDG + INFG 
+ GT- TG- NTRG 
(3.7) 
The expenditures of the government consist of consumption, CG, 
investment, IVG, interest payments on domestic debt, INDG, 
interest payments on foreign debt, INFG, and finally other expen-
ditures, GT. On the other hand, two kinds of revenue are distin-
guished: government revenue, TG, and net transfers from the rest 
of the world, NTRG. Due to the price normalization, prices and 
the exchange rate can be ignored at this stage, but it should be 
recalled that government consumption and investment are defined 
as quantity variables elsewhere, while interest payments on the 
external debt as well as net transfers from abroad are measured 
in foreign currency units. 
Government revenue and expenditures are shown in Table 3.6. 
Revenue is the sum of property income, including provision for 
Table 3.6 Government budget (billion rand) 
Variable ~mbol 1994 Code 
Revenue TG 118.055 6184] +6250] +6004] + 
6251]+6232]-6005] 
Transfers from abroad NTRG 0.272 6253J-6258J 
Consumption CG -91.349 6008] 
Investment IVG -9.620 6181] 
Interest payments 6255] 
Domestic debt INDG -21.193 Derived 
Foreign debt INFG -3.888 Derived 
Other expenditures GT -15.421 6257]-6252] 
Budget surplus -BRG -23.144 6202J+6184J-6181J 
Source: SARB Quarterly Bulletin March 1995, Statistical Tables: Gross and Net Domestic 
Investment i?:J Type of Organisation and Current Income and Expenditure of General 
Government 
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Table 3.7 Government finance (billion rand) 
Variable .$ymbol 1994 Code 
New domestic credit ADCG 0.532 1367M (Adjusted) 
Net new borrowing 
Domestic dNDDG 17.811 Derived 
Foreign ANFDG 4.801 5163J-5213J 
Borrowing requirement BRG 23.144 -6202J-6184J+6181J 
Source: SARB Quarler!J Bulletin March 199 5, Statistical Tables: Monetary Ana!Jsis, 
Foreign Liabilities and Assets of South Africa, Gross and Net Domestic Investment l?Y 
Type of Organisation and Current Income and Expenditure of General Government 
depreciation, indirect taxes net of subsidies, direct taxes and 
current transfers from incorporated business enterprises. Net 
transfers from the rest of the world amount to the difference 
between transfers received and transfers paid. Consumption is 
current expenditure of public authorities, whereas the investment 
figure is gross capital formation, i.e. including the change of 
inventories. The calculation of interest payments on the net exter-
nal debt was discussed above, while interest payments on the 
domestic debt were calculated as the difference between total 
and foreign interest payments. Finally, other expenditures consist 
of net transfers to the household sector. 
The other side of the borrowing requirement of the government 
is financing. Three types of government finance are distinguished. 
External borrowing and credit from domestic financial institutions 
were discussed previously, while the third source of government 
finance is net domestic debt, NDDG, covering private sector 
claims on government. Consequently, the borrowing requirement 
can also be written in terms of how it is financed: 
BRG = MJCG + M/DDG + M/FDG (3.8) 
Table 3.7 contains data on the flows of government finance. Since 
the borrowing requirement and changes in external debt and 
domestic credit can be derived from previous tables, it follows 
that the change in domestic debt can be calculated residually as 
indicated in the table. The stocks associated with domestic debt are 
discussed in the next section. 
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Table 3.8 Other data 
Variable ~mbol 1993 1994 Code 
Government domestic debt NDDG 151.379 169.190 Derived 
Interest rates 
Domestic IRD 14.0 Assumed 
Foreign IRF 14.1 Derived 
Gross domestic savings GDS 86.577 Derived 
OTHER VARIABLES 
Table 3.8 contains a few other variables that are required in the 
implementation of the FP and RMSM frameworks. The first is the 
domestic debt of the government. It was estimated indirectly from 
the interest payments, derived in Table 3.6, and an assumed value 
for the average interest rate on domestic debt, !RD. As shown in 
Table 3.8, the interest rate was set to be 14 per cent. Assuming that 
interest payments depend on the debt stock at the end of the 
previous year, the 1993 value of government domestic debt was 
assigned the value shown in the table. Subsequently, it was possible 
to calculate the 1994 debt stock by adding new government 
borrowing as shown in Table 3.7. This method of generating the 
debt stocks is admittedly quite crude, yet it proved difficult to 
obtain more satisfactory measures of the domestic debt of the 
government from the SARB Quarler!J Bulletin. One problem is that 
it is hard to reconcile the financial accounts of the different 
components of the public sector with those of the general govern-
ment as defined in the income and expenditure part of the national 
accounts. It would therefore in any case only have been possible to 
get an estimate of the domestic debt, and the indirect estimation 
procedure was therefore chosen for the present study. 
The remaining variables in Table 3.8 are the foreign interest rate 
and a figure for gross domestic savings. The former was derived by 
dividing the 1994 foreign interest payments of the government 
(private sector) by the 1993 external debt stock of the government 
(private sector). Gross domestic saving was also derived from 
information contained in previous tables, as it can be calculated 
as either the sum of total investments and the trade balance surplus 
or the difference between GDP and total consumption. 
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DISAGGREGATED GD~ AND EXPORT DATA 
The final data are disaggregated GDP and export data, which will 
enter the RMSM model. The notation is shown in two equations: 
GDP= I,GDPS; (3.9) 
where GDPS; is the value in market prices of output in sector i, and 
X= I,X~ (3.10) 
J 
where X~ is the market value of exports of category j. Four sectors 
are distinguished in domestic production, agriculture, mining, 
manufacturing and other sectors. There are also four export 
categories, agriculture, gold, basic metals and minerals and, 
finally, other exports. 
The disaggregated GDP figures were derived from the SARB 
Quarter!J Bulletin, which contains data on gross domestic product by 
kind of economic activity in current as well as constant 1990 prices. 
First, the figures for 1993 were transformed into 1994 prices in 
accordance with the procedures discussed previously. However, 
these data are only provided at factor costs, while market prices 
are used in this study. Adjustments were also required to account 
for the residual, which arises because GDP estimated from the 
production side is smaller than when estimated from the expendi-
ture side. A preliminary social accounting matrix (SAM) for 1993 
from the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) was used 
when making the adjustments, as it contains sectoral output values 
at both factor costs and market prices. The resulting values for 
sectoral output are shown in Table 3.9. 
The preliminary 1993 SAM was also used when deriving the 
Table 3.9 Sectoral GDP (constant 1994 billion rand) 
Variable ~mbol 1993 1994 Code 
Agriculture AGR 17.405 18.865 6031 J Adjusted 
Mining MIN 35.943 34.908 6032) Adjusted 
Manufacturing MAN 92.368 94.282 6034) Adjusted 
Other sectors 0TH 281.097 286.191 6035)-6037) Adj. 
GDP GDP 426.813 434.246 6003]+6011] 
Source: SARB Quarterly Bulletin March 1995, Statistical Tables: Gross Domestic Product 
by JGnd of Activity and Expenditure on Gross Domestic Product, DSBA: preliminary 
1993 SAM 
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Table 3.10 Export by category (constant 1994 billion rand) 
Variable ~mbol 1993 1994 Code 
Agriculture AGR 3.366 6.292 
Gold GOL 25.462 22.661 5001] 
Base metals and minerals MET 36.064 33.110 
Other export 0TH 37.208 40.619 
Total export X 102.100 102.682 6013] 
Source: SARB Quarter!J Bulletin March 1995, Statistical Tables: Balance of Pqyments and 
Expenditure on Gross Domestic Product, DSBA: Preliminary 1993 SAM; Central 
Statistical Service: Foreign Trade Statistics, Statistical Release P6161 
disaggregated export data, since the SARB Quarter(y Bulletin only 
distinguishes gold and non-gold exports. Having calculated the 1993 
values of gold and non-gold exports in constant 1994 prices from 
the SARB Quarter(y Bulletin, non-gold exports were allocated on the 
three remaining categories in proportions derived from the 1993 
SAM. For 1994, the value of gold exports was obtained directly from 
the SARB Quarter(y Bulletin. On the other hand, non-gold exports 
were distributed among the three categories based on foreign trade 
statistics published by the Central Statistical Service as shown in 
Table 3.10, which contains the disaggregated export data. 
CONCLUSION 
Having presented all base year data, a familiar national accounting 
identity will be derived in order to complete the chapter. The next 
step is to consider the income, expenditures and savings of the 
private sector, which can be derived from information in the 
previous section. Hence, define private sector income, YP, as: 
YP = GDP+ GT+ INDG + NFP + NTRG (3.11) 
which states that private sector income comprises GDP, transfers 
and interest payments from the government as well as other factor 
payments and transfers from the rest of the world. On the other 
side, private consumption, tax payments and interest payments on 
foreign debt are the components of private sector expenditures, 
BP, as shown in the following equation: 
BP= CP+ TC+ INFP (3.12) 
Since all terms on the right-hand sides of both (3.11) and (3.12) are 
included in the above tables, the values of both private sector 
32 
ACCOUNTING FRAMEWORK AND BASE YEAR DATA 
income and expenditures can easily be obtained. It is therefore also 
possible to derive the value of private sector savings, SP: 
SP= YP- BP (3.13) 
The last equation of the private sector relates to its capital account. 
It follows from the above that the private sector receives credit 
from domestic financial institutions and borrows from abroad, 
while its net acquisition of financial assets comprises government 
debt and money. Since private investments represent acquisitions 
of real assets, the following capital balance equation must be 
satisfied in equilibrium: 
SP + MJCP + 11.NFDP = IVP + 11.NDDG + dMD (3.14) 
A similar capital balance can be derived for the government from 
equations (3.7) and (3.8), if government savings are defined as the 
difference between investments and the borrowing requirement: 
SG + MJCG + 11.NDFDG + 11.NFDG = IVG (3.15) 
It is now possible to combine the capital balances of the private 
and government sectors, equations (3.14) and (3.15), with the 
balance-of-payments identity, equation (3.2). In this step, all fman-
cial claims between the two domestic institutions and the rest of 
the world disappear, leaving the terms in the following equation: 
SP + SG + MJCP + MJCG + l1R 
= lVP + WG + CURBAL + dMD (3.16) 
This expression can be simplified further by transforming the 
money supply function, equation (3.6), into first differences, and 
imposing equilibrium in the money market, i.e. the change in supply 
is equal to the change in demand. The result is the savings-
investment identity, known from standard national accounting: 
SP + SG - CURBAL = IVP + WG (3.17) 
Thus, given the definitions of private sector income, expenditures 
and capital transactions above, the accounting framework pre-
sented in this chapter encompasses the condition that domestic 
savings and the current account deficit equal domestic invest-
ments. Although this should come as no surprise at this stage, 
the accounting equations presented in this section become impor-





The macroeconomic perspectives of the South African economy are 
analysed in this volume using two modelling frameworks associated 
with, respectively, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank. Although both frameworks are relatively simple, they 
do illustrate the fundamental perceptions of macroeconomic caus-
ality that are implicit in the economic policy advice given by the two 
Bretton Woods institutions. Thus, while the framework of the IMF, 
known as Financial Programming (FP), puts emphasis on monetary 
factors in short-term economic stabilization, the Revised Minimum 
Standard Model (RMSM) of the World Bank is primarily focused on 
medium to long-term GDP growth and other real variables. Besides 
assessing the macroeconomic perspectives of the South African 
economy, this study is also aimed at reviewing these modelling 
tools through various applications. 
Since the models are applied jointly in the South African context, 
a few modifications were made to their standard representations in 
order to ensure that compatible and consistent medium-term 
scenarios could be constructed. These modifications are described 
below, but it is emphasized that they do not change the general 
spirit and overall properties of the models. 
THE FINANCIAL PROGRAMMING 
APPROACH OF THE IMF 
The policy analysis framework of the IMF, commonly known as 
financial programming, has in reality not been a mathematically 
specified and consolidated macroeconomic model per se. Instead, it 
has been based largely on an oral tradition comprising a variety of 
analytical methods. Thus, Robichek (1985) describes the various 
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steps in financial programming, while Swiderski (1992) provides a 
set of illustrative programming exercises in an actual application. 
However, recent studies ( e.g. IMF, 1987 and Khan et al., 1990) have 
formalized the approach in terms of a simple macro model in the 
tradition of Polak (1957). The model, as applied in this study of 
South Africa, broadly follows the outlines of financial program-
ming in Khan et al. (1990) and Tarp (1993a). 
In line with the IMF mandate to finance temporary balance-of-
payments disequilibria and ensure a stable world economy, the 
model focuses on financial variables and the monetary side of 
the economy. Sufficient international reserves as well as low infla-
tion are perceived as central conditions in order to create a 
sustainable external position of a given country. These two vari-
ables are therefore the main immediate targets, which the IMF 
wishes to influence. In the Meade-Tinbergen tradition, two instru-
ments are needed to influence two targets, and the IMF has 
traditionally identified the nominal exchange rate and the volume 
of domestic credit as the two most suitable. Since it is generally 
assumed, at least implicitly, that "the private sector uses credit more 
productively than the government, a limit is often set on the 
expansion of domestic government credit, forcing it to reduce 
expenditures. A theoretical foundation for these linkages is pro-
vided by the monetary approach to the balance of payments ( e.g. 
Frenkel and Johnson, 1976 and IMF, 1977). The links between 
domestic credit and the nominal exchange rate, on the one hand, 
and the balance of payments and inflation, on the other, are made 
explicit in the equations described below. 
The FP framework consists of 16 equations in the specification 
used here, and they are shown in Box 4.1. The notation of variables 
follows that introduced in Chapter 3, as is evident from the lists of 
variables and parameters referred to in the box. 
Real GDP is treated as an exogenous variable, whereas nominal 
GDP is defined in equation (2) as the product of real GDP and the 
price level. The latter variable is calculated as a weighted average of 
the domestic price level and the domestic currency price of 
imported goods, cf. equation (1). 
The money market is described by four equations. First, money 
demand is specified in the traditions of the quantity theory of 
money demand and the Cambridge equation. Thus, the demand 
for money, equation (3), is determined as a fixed proportion of 
nominal GDP, where the proportionality factor is the inverse of 
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Box 4.1 Financial Programming Framework 
A Prices and monetary sector 
(1) P, = (1 - 0) PD,+ 0 MPI, 
(2) GDPN, = P,GDP, 
1 
(3) MD, = W GDPN, 
(4) MS, - MS,- 1 = E,(R, - R,-1) + (DC, - DC,- 1) + (E, - E,-1) R,-1 
(5) DC, = DCG, + DCP, 
(6) MS,= MD, 
B Government accounts 
(7) JNFG, = IRF,NFDG,_ 1 
(8) INDG, = IRD,NDDG,- 1 
(9) BRG, = P,(CG, + IVG,) + GT,+ INDG, + EJNFG, - TG, - E,NIRG, 
(10) BRG, = (DCC, - DCG,- 1) + (NDDG, - NDDG,- 1) 
+ E,(NFDG, - NFDG,- 1) 
C Balance of pqyments 
E 1MPI1 (11) logM, = a0, + at, log GDP, + a2, log PD, 
(12) RESEAL,= XPI,X, - MPI,M, 
(13) INFP, = IRF,NFDP,- 1 
(14) NETFSY, = NFP, -INFG, - INFP, 
(15) CURBAL, = RESEAL, + NETFSY, + NIRG, + NIRP, 
















Government borrowing requirement 
Government consumption - constant 1994 prices 
Current account surplus 
Total domestic credit 
Government domestic credit 
Private sector domestic credit 
Nominal exchange rate - 1994 = 1.000 
Real GDP - constant 1994 prices 
GDP - current prices 
Other government expenditures 
Government interest payments on domestic debt 
Government interest payments on foreign debt 
Private sector interest payments on foreign debt 
Domestic interest rate 
36 
MODELLING FRAMEWORKS 
Box 4.1 continued 





















Government investment - constant 1994 prices 
Imports - constant 1994 prices 
Money demand 
Import price index - 1994 = 1.000 
Money supply 
Net factor services from abroad - foreign currency 
Government domestic debt 
Government foreign debt - foreign currency 
Private sector foreign debt - foreign currency 
Other net factor services from abroad - foreign currency 
Net transfers to government from abroad - foreign currency 
Net transfers to private sector from abroad - foreign currency 
General price index - 1994 = 1.000 
Domestic price index - 1994 = 1.000 
International reserves - foreign currency 
Trade balance - foreign currency 
Government revenue 
Exports - constant 1994 prices 
Export price index - 19_94 = 1.000 
aO Constant in import function 
al GDP elasticity of imports 
a2 Real exchange rate elasticity of imports 
0 Weight in price index 
u Velocity of money circulation 
the velocity of money circulation. Since money is the only liability 
of the financial sector, it is, as discussed in Chapter 3, by definition 
equal to the total asset value in the balance sheet of the sector. 
They consist of domestic credit and international reserves as 
shown by the money supply function, equation (4), which is 
specified in first differences. Consequently, the change in money 
supply equals the change in international reserves, valued at the 
nominal exchange rate in the current period, and the change in 
credit extended to domestic sectors. Moreover, a third term 
appears on the right-hand side of the equation. It accounts for 
valuation changes in the international reserves due to variations in 
the exchange rate. 
It can be argued that capital gains should not affect the money 
supply, but instead be treated as an increase in the accumulated 
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savings of the financial system. This seems to be the correct 
specification if capital gains (losses) are not realized, but only 
appear in the net worth accounting of the Central Bank and other 
holders of international reserves. If capital gains, by contrast, are 
realized through sale and purchase of foreign currency, it will 
influence the money supply and should be included in its specifica-
tion. For moderate exchange rate changes, however, this term has 
only limited impact on the total change in the money supply. 
Equation (5) is a simple identity stating that total domestic credit 
consists of credit granted to the private and the government 
sectors. The description of the money market is then completed 
by an equilibrium condition, equation (6), which implies that 
money demand always equals money supply. 
Turning next to the government, most components of the 
expenditures and revenues of this sector are specified as exogen-
ous variables. Yet interest payments on government domestic and 
foreign debt are determined in equations (7) and (8) by interest 
rates in the current period and debt stocks, which have been lagged 
by one period. Equation (9) defines the borrowing requirement of 
the government as the difference between expenditure and 
income. The expenditure types distinguished in this book are 
consumption, investments, and interest payments on domestic 
and foreign debt as well as other expenditures. Since government 
consumption and investments are specified as real variables, cur-
rent values are obtained by multiplying with the general price 
index. Similarly, the rand value of foreign interest payments is 
calculated by multiplying with the exchange rate. Two types of 
income appear in the equation, total domestic income and net 
transfers received from the rest of the world. 
The government can satisfy its borrowing requirement through 
foreign borrowing, by borrowing from domestic capital markets 
and by increasing its domestic credit from domestic monetary 
institutions. Accordingly, the budget constraint of the government 
can be written as in equation (10). Domestic debt finance is 
frequently not an option for governments in the developing 
world. In South Africa, however, this source of finance is substan-
tial, and its inclusion is therefore a necessary extension of the 
framework when used in the present context. 
The six remaining equations of the FP framework relate to the 
balance of payments. Thus, equation (11) determines the import 
quantity as a function of real GDP and the real exchange rate, 
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which is defined as the domestic price of import divided by the 
price of domestic output. The function is specified in natural 
logarithms, which implies that the coefficients of the two explana-
tory variables are elasticities. Equation (12) defines the trade or 
resource balance as the difference between export and import, 
both valued at their foreign currency price. Corresponding to the 
interest payments of the government, equation (13) specifies the 
external interest payments of the private sector as a function of the 
international interest rate and its net foreign liabilities. Net factor 
income from abroad is defined in equation (14) as interest pay-
ments on government and private sector external debt and net 
other factor payments received from the rest of the world. All 
these variables are specified in foreign currency values. Next, the 
current account surplus is equal to the sum of the trade balance, 
net factor income and net transfers received by the public and 
private sectors from abroad, cf. equation (15). Finally, the balance-
of-payments identity is imposed on the system in equation (16). 
The change in international reserves thus equals the current 
account surplus plus net new foreign borrowing by the govern-
ment and private sectors, respectively. 
Considered as an applied macroeconomic model, the FP frame-
work is simple. It contains only two behavioural equations, the 
money demand and import functions, and two equilibrium condi-
tions relating to the money market and the balance of payments. 
The remaining 12 equations are either national accounting identi-
ties or relations that hold by definition. Consequently, it is fairly 
easy to describe the structure of the framework for a given choice 
of endogenous and exogenous variables. The partitioning of vari-
ables into endogenous and exogenous is required because the 
model contains more variables than equations, and is referred to 
as the closure of the model. Since the two models applied in this 
volume include few relationships among the various variables, it is 
necessary to specify a relatively large number as exogenous, and the 
actual choice will have a significant impact on model results, as 
discussed in Chapter 5. Nevertheless, the standard model closure 
of the FP framework is to specify domestic prices and international 
reserves as exogenous targets, and the exchange rate and govern-
ment domestic credit as endogenously determined instruments. 
Given a target for the international reserves and fixed values for 
government and private sector foreign capital flows, the exchange 
rate adjusts, first, to ensure balance of external payments through 
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variation in the import level. Second, given the target for the price 
level and the change in domestic credit to the private sector, 
domestic credit to the government is determined residually in 
the money market. This results in a constraint on the size of the 
budget deficit, since changes in both the domestic and foreign debt 
of the government are set exogenously. Finally, this restricts the 
level of government consumption in the set-up used here. 
It should be noted, however, that other components of the 
government budget could take the adjustment. For example, the 
government may wish to maintain a planned level of consumption 
and therefore decide to change its revenue in response to changes 
in conditions on the domestic credit markets. Yet it is fully in the 
spirit of financial programming to emphasize expenditure cuts 
rather than revenue increases. At least, this is how the policy 
prescriptions of the IMF are normally perceived. 
A final comment related to this example of policy analysis using 
the FP framework is that the model closure leads to the calculation 
of the appropriate values of the policy instruments, given values 
for the target variables. Alternatively, the framework can be used to 
calculate the outcome in terms of target values, taking the policy 
instruments as exogenous variables. This type of analysis is fre-
quently applied in standard macroeconomic textbooks, which, for 
example, investigate how increased taxes influence the level of 
output. 
If the FP framework in Box 4.1 is compared to the accounting 
framework, presented in Chapter 3, the most striking features are 
that the material balance identity is not included in the FP frame-
work and the absence of most aspects of private sector behaviour. 
This implies particularly that it is only possible to infer total 
absorption of the private sector, but not the allocation between 
consumption and investments. One concern often raised in this 
relation is that the exogenous assumption about GDP growth can 
potentially be inconsistent with the underlying investment beha-
viour. Although this issue may not appear very important in the 
short-run stabilization perspective normally adopted by the IMF, it 
is crucial for the medium-term growth outcome, which should also 
be central in any advice on economic policy. 
Given the relatively simple structure of the FP framework and 
the important role played by the IMF in the stabilization efforts of 
numerous developing countries, it is not surprising that the mod-
elling framework has been scrutinized critically in several studies 
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(e.g. Taylor, 1988 and Edwards 1989). One issue is the dichotomy 
between the real and financial sectors, which implies that GDP 
growth will not be affected by the credit and exchange rate policies 
suggested by the FP framework. Exports are not, for example, 
influenced by change in the exchange rate, and credit to the private 
sector can be changed in real terms without affecting the level of 
investments and, subsequently, economic growth. Another set of 
problems relates to the portfolio behaviour of the private sector. 
Recalling the capital balance of the private sector, equation (3.14) in 
Chapter 3, both the external borrowing and the acquisition of 
domestic government debt are specified as exogenous variables in 
the FP framework. Yet there are no mechanisms in the model to 
ensure that the private sector would actually behave in this way. 
Generally, it should be expected that portfolio behaviour is deter-
mined by variables such as the level of inflation and interest rates and 
influenced by intertemporal considerations, including expectations 
and uncertainty. It is therefore not clear that the implicit assumptions 
concerning private sector behaviour will be consistent with a pre-
scribed set of economic policies. There are other reservations related 
to the FP framework, but since they also apply to the RMSM, a review 
is postponed to the concluding section of this chapter. 
THE REVISED MINIMUM STANDARD MODEL OF 
THE WORLD BANK 
Contrary to FP programming framework, the Revised Minimum 
Standard Model (RMSM) of the World Bank emphasizes the real 
sector and economic growth. Consequently, it is occasionally 
referred to as a growth programming framework (Tarp 1993a). 
The RMSM is in the tradition of two-gap models, which focus on 
estimating the required levels of investments, imports and external 
borrowing, given that a target for real GDP growth is to be 
satisfied (Chenery and Strout, 1966). It is, however, important to 
be aware of the scope of analyses the RMSM can be used for. The 
model does not, for example, prescribe the economic policies that 
can generate a given GDP growth rate. Instead, it shows that if an 
economy is to grow at the predetermined rate, then constraints are 
imposed on certain variables. This interpretation also makes clear 
why the RMSM is to be considered more as an accounting frame-
work than as a full-scale applied economic model, which can lead 
to clear policy prescriptions. 
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This section describes the RMSM as it was implemented in this 
study. The specification is based on Addison (1989), but modifica-
tions were required to obtain the above-mentioned correspon-
dence with the FP approach. In particular, the balance-of-
payments block was adopted directly from the FP framework. 
The World Bank version includes a more detailed description of 
capital flows, but it was chosen to opt for a simpler framework here 
as the focus will be more on overall balance problems than on the 
exact sources of external finance. It should also be mentioned that 
work has been undertaken in the World Bank with the aim of 
extending the RMSM. One result is the so-called RMSM-X (Ever-
aert et al., 1990). One important difference between the RMSM and 
RMSM-X is that the latter introduces exchange rate sensitivity into 
import demand. This effect was also included in this study, 
whereas more recent attempts in World Bank modelling such as 
mark-up pricing in the structuralist tradition were not included. 
The same accounts for the various contributions to the three-gap 
literature, such as Taylor (1989), Bacha (1990) and Ndulu (1990). 
The RMSM specification can be found in Box 4.2, which also 
contains lists of parameters and variables. The model consists of 23 
equations that can be divided into three blocks: (a) the real sector, 
(b) terms-of-trade effects on income aggregates, and (c) the 
balance of payments. These three blocks will be outlined below, 
and the section will be completed with some remarks on the choice 
of model closures. 
Equation (1) determines real GDP as the sum of value added in 
the various production sectors. Four sectors are, as pointed out in 
Chapter 3, distinguished here, namely agriculture, mining, manu-
facturing and other sectors. Sectoral GDP is determined by exo-
genously specified growth rates in equation (2). Exports are 
similarly specified in equations (3) and (4). However, the disaggre-
gation is different from that of GDP with the following four types 
of export being identified: agriculture, gold, basic metal and 
minerals and other exports. 
Total gross investments are determined in equation (5), which 
shows that the ratio of investments to GDP depends upon a 
constant and the GDP growth rate in the current period. This 
specification was derived from an assumption of a constant capi-
tal-output ratio and an identity that links the capital stock, gross 
investment, the lagged capital stock and a constant rate of physical 
depreciation. It is, moreover, straightforward to show that the 
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Box 4.2 Revised Minimum Standard Model 
A Real sector 
(1) GDP,=!, GDPS;,, 
; 
(2) GDPS;,, = (1 + <1';,,) GDPS;,,-1 
(3) x, = !, xsj,t 
j 
(4) x~,, = c1 + 'YJ,t) x~,t-1 
(5) Iv, = KO + K1 GDP, - GDP,-1 
GDP, t I GDP, 
(6) log M, = aO, + a1, log GDP, + a2, log E,MPI, 
PD, 
(7) C, = CP, + CG, 
(8) IV, = IVP, + IVG, 
(9) P,CP, = (1 - (3,) (P,GDY, - TG, + GT,) 
(10) C, = GDP, - IV, - X, + M, 
B. Income effects from terms-of-trade changes 
(11) XTTADJ, = ~ X, 
(12) TTADJ, = XTTADJ, - X, 
(13) GDY, =GDP,+ TTADJ, 
(14) CDS,= GDY, - C, 
(15) RG, = M, - XTTADJ, 
C Balance of payments 
(16) RESEAL,= XPI,X, - MPI,M, 
(17) INFG, = IRF, NFDG,- 1 
(18) INFP, = IRF, NFDP,_ 1 
(19) NE1FSY, = NFP, - INFG, - INFP, 
(20) CURBAL, = RESEAL, + NE1FSY, + NTRG, + NTRP, 
(21) R, - R,- 1 = CURBAL, + (NFDG, - NFDG,- 1) 
+ (NFDP, - NFDP,-1) 
(22) R, _ R,-t = MPI, M, - MPI,_ 1 Mt--1 
B, 
23 P, = (1 - 0) PD,+ 6E, MPI, 
43 
MODELLING FRAMEWORKS 














































Total consumption - constant 1994 prices 
Government consumption - constant 1994 prices 
Private sector consumption - constant 1994 prices 
Current account surplus 
Nominal exchange rate - 1994 = 1.000 
Real GDP - constant 1994 prices 
Sectoral GDP - constant 1994 prices 
Gross domestic saving - constant 1994 prices 
Gross domestic income - constant 1994 prices 
Other government expenditures 
Government interest payments on foreign debt 
Private sector interest payments on foreign debt 
Foreign interest rate 
Total investment - constant 1994 prices 
Government investment - constant 1994 prices 
Private sector investment - constant 1994 prices 
Imports - constant 1994 prices 
Import price index - 1994 = 1.000 
Net factor services from abroad - foreign currency 
Government foreign debt - foreign currency 
Private sector foreign debt - foreign currency 
Other net factor services from abroad - foreign currency 
Net transfers to government from abroad - foreign currency 
Net transfers to private sector from abroad - foreign currency 
General price index - 1994 = 1.000 
Domestic price index - 1994 = 1.000 
International reserves - foreign currency 
Trade balance - foreign currency 
Resource gap - foreign currency 
Government revenue 
Terms of trade adjustment 
Exports - constant 1994 prices 
Export price index - 1994 = 1.000 
Exports by commodity - constant 1994 prices 
Terms of trade adjusted exports 
Constant in import function 
GDP elasticity of imports 
Real exchange rate elasticity of imports 
Private sector saving propensity 
Ratio of international reserve to import changes 
Export growth rates by category 
Constant in investment function 
Capital-output ratio 
Sectoral GDP growth rates 
Weight in price index 
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coefficient on GDP growth corresponds to the capital-output 
ratio, whereas the constant is approximately equal to the product 
of the physical depreciation rate and the capital-output ratio. Yet it 
should be noted that the capital-output ratio used here relates 
output changes to net investments. It is therefore in the base 
run assigned a lower value as compared to studies where it 
describes a linkage between output changes and gross invest-
ments. This functional form differs from that in Addison (1989), 
but was chosen because it proved convenient to work with in 
model simulations. 
The aggregate import function in equation (6) is identical to the 
one used in the financial programming framework. It was decided 
to use the same specification because it simplified the construction 
of consistent scenarios based on both the RMSM and FP frame-
works. However, this implies that only aggregate imports appear in 
the model. In the standard RMSM, on the other hand, import is 
disaggregated by domestic use, i.e. final consumption, intermediate 
demand and investments. Consequently, the issue of which import 
types that need to be compressed in a situation with limited 
availability of foreign currency cannot be addressed formally in 
this study. Another advantage of this simplification is that the 
concerns about 'guestimates' of the different elasticities, necessary 
to apply the model with import disaggregation, disappear. 
Equations (7) and (8) take care of the disaggregation of total 
consumption and total investment between the public and private 
sectors. Equation (9), determining private sector consumption, is 
not included in Addison (1989), but appears in other representa-
tions of the RMSM ( e.g. Khan et al., 1990). The functional form is 
very simple, specifying nominal consumption as a fixed proportion 
of nominal disposable income, which is defined as nominal gross 
domestic income less public sector domestic revenue, net of 
government transfers to the private sector. Since government 
revenue and transfers are nominal variables and the real exchange 
rate enters the import function, it is necessary to introduce both 
the general and the domestic price levels into the RMSM model. 
The former is determined in equation (23) as a weighted average of 
the exogenous domestic price level and the domestic price of 
imported commodities as in the FP framework. The general price 
level is used in equation (9), assuming that the deflators for gross 
domestic income and private consumption are identical. Finally, 
equation (10) is the material balance national accounting identity, 
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which in the standard closure of the RMSM determines the level of 
total real consumption. 
The role of equations (11 )-(15) is to calculate various national 
accounting aggregates that take care of income effects arising from 
changes in the terms of trade. Thus, the foreign currency value of 
export is deflated by the import price index in equation (11), while 
the difference between this figure and the export quantity is 
calculated in equation (12). Next, gross national income is calcu-
lated in equation (13) as the sum of the gross national product and 
the terms-of-trade adjustment. Finally, gross domestic saving and 
the external resource gap are calculated in equation (14) and (15), 
respectively. Without terms-of-trade changes, the resource gap 
equals the trade balance deficit in real terms. 
The standard RMSM model (e.g. Addison 1989) contains a fairly 
detailed balance-of-payments block, focusing on the external 
financing gap. However, for the purpose of this study it was, as 
already noted, decided to adopt the balance-of-payments equations 
exactly as they appear in the financial programming framework. The 
motivation for this choice is that it makes comparisons between the 
two models more straightforward and that considerable resources 
would have been required to forecast the different types of exogen-
ous capital flows. Nevertheless, one equation of the standard RMSM 
was maintained. It appears as equation (22) and lets the change in 
foreign reserves be endogenous in the RMSM, depending upon the 
change in the foreign currency value of imports. 
The partitioning of RMSM variables into endogenous and exo-
genous variables is fairly straightforward with a few exceptions. 
First, the external sector can be closed by exogenizing either the 
exchange rate or the external borrowing of the government. It is in 
the spirit of the RMSM, however, to exogenize the exchange rate, 
since this variable does not appear at all in the standard version of 
the model. In Chapter 5, experiment results will be presented for 
both model closures. 
The second closure issue concerns domestic consumption and 
investment. With respect to the former, this problem was solved 
by the inclusion of a private consumption function, which makes it 
necessary to have government consumption as an endogenous 
variable. Finally, it seems reasonable to exogenize government 
investment, leaving private investments to be determined residu-




With this closure, the functioning of the RMSM is easily 
described. An exogenous exchange rate implies that the balance-
of-payments identity must be satisfied through variations in capital 
flows, and this is mostly thought of as government borrowing 
abroad. The first question raised by the RMSM is therefore: is 
the necessary external finance available, so the external gap can be 
closed? Next, the material balance provides with the chosen 
closure the feasible level of government consumption. Since this 
can be interpreted as a constraint on the deficit of the public 
sector, the fundamental question asked here is if there is sufficient 
domestic savings to match the required level of investments. This 
is the domestic gap. 
The RMSM has not been subjected to the same degree of 
critique as the FP framework, probably because its use does not 
lead to explicit policy prescriptions, as discussed in, for example, 
Mills and Nallari (1992, pp. 99-118). This can, on the other hand, 
be considered a main weakness of the model. It may not be very 
useful to know the levels of investments and capital inflows needed 
to obtain the targeted growth rate, if they cannot be realized by 
applying reasonably realistic and feasible economic policies. One 
frequently mentioned problem of the RMSM does not feature in 
the version presented here. Thus, while government consumption 
is taken as the residually determined variable of the material 
balance above, this role is often played by private consumption 
in applications of the RMSM. In this set-up, it is implicitly assumed 
that there exist mechanisms ensuring consistency between private 
sector savings and the required level of investments. Stated slightly 
differently, additional foreign capital inflows are assumed to be 
used for investments, and not more private consumption. 
Compared with the accounting framework of Chapter 3, the 
RMSM ignores completely the domestic financial markets, includ-
ing the potential link from government deficits to inflation that was 
central in the FP framework. In fact, a solution for the level of 
government consumption can imply a large budget deficit, which 
can only be financed through additional money creation, resulting 
in inflationary pressures, or through unrealistic reductions in pri-
vate sector credit, which in turn may render the required level of 




Before turning to a discussion of the FP and RMSM frameworks, 
the complementarity of the two models is worth noting. Thus, the 
FP framework does not incorporate the material balance, which is 
central in the RMSM, while it includes the monetary sector, which 
is absent from the RMSM. It might therefore be considered a 
logical and easily made improvement to combine them into a 
single model, and this was done by Khan et al. (1990). The 
combined model will thus comprise the central monetary and 
material balance national accounting identities and the key 
linkages between the monetary and real side of an economy. 
However, the merged version of the FP and RMSM frameworks 
does not in any case address most of the critique mentioned above 
as well as below, since important economic behaviour and institu-
tional information remain unspecified. Moreover, the marriage 
between the FP and RMSM is in many ways an uneasy one. In 
particular, the FP model was originally conceived as a simple 
representation of the analytics underlying the financial program-
ming of the IMF, and not as an applied macro model per se. It has 
therefore been argued that it does not make much sense to merge 
the FP and RMSM models (Polak, 1990). Nonetheless, these 
reservations against the FP framework as an applied model do 
not change the fact that it appears to describe actual IMF policy 
advice adequately, although admittedly in a rather simplified way. 
Nevertheless, this study relied in reality on a combined version of 
the FP framework and the RMSM when the base run and scenarios, 
which will be presented in Chapters 6 and 7, were constructed. 
Although a formal integration was not undertaken, an iterative 
procedure during which all variables and parameters were effectively 
treated as endogenous was used. This ensured that the base run and 
the scenarios adhere to all national accounting identities, outlined in 
Chapter 3, and are consistent in the sense that variables appearing in 
both models have the same values. By treating all variables and 
parameters as endogenous, many of the problems discussed above 
are avoided. Thus, the specified behavioural equations are only used 
as guiding points of reference, which can be changed accordingly, 
while omitted relationships among variables are taken into account by 
relying on information outside the two frameworks. 
Besides the critical remarks mentioned already, the FP and 
RMSM frameworks have come under attack for a number of 
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other reasons, which can be classified roughly into two categories. 
Although both modelling frameworks are, as already discussed, 
little more than consistent accounting frameworks, the FP frame-
work having two and the RMSM three behavioural equations, they 
are essentially one-sector macro models. Therefore, the first set of 
critique questions whether they are good macro models. However, 
it can also be discussed whether aggregate macro models are 
appropriate tools for analysing the economic problems facing 
third world countries, and this question leads to the second set 
of issues dealt with in the literature. 
Starting by considering the underlying macroeconomic theory, 
there are no supply-side specifications in the FP, while the RMSM 
specifies only one link from investments to GDP. Consequently, 
both models ignore important factors that can potentially influence 
output, including the degree of capacity utilization. Monetary 
variables are among those factors as there is plenty of evidence 
that lack of investment and working capital finance, as well as very 
high real interest rates, have had substantial negative effects on 
production in many developing countries. Similarly, there are 
several examples of situations where output has been suppressed 
because imports of necessary raw materials and capital goods were 
crowded out by imports of consumption goods, when foreign 
capital was in short supply. However, it must be noted here that 
some versions of the RMSM address this problem by distinguish-
ing among different types of imports and letting consumption 
goods be the variable determined residually. 
A more recently recognized problem of the theoretical founda-
tion of the FP and RMSM frameworks relates to the capital 
account of the balance of payments. Thus, both models take 
private capital inflows as exogenous, while the external borrowing 
by government is perceived more as a policy variable than as being 
determined by market forces. Although these may be appropriate 
assumptions in the context of poor African countries, they become 
questionable if the country in question has relatively well-devel-
oped domestic financial markets and a liberalized capital account. 
In these circumstances, it is crucial to account for the endogeneity 
of capital flows and to distinguish between the various types of 
private capital flows when assessing the sustainability of the overall 
balance-of-payments situation. The experience of Mexico in 1995 
illustrates this point clearly, and is also highly relevant for the South 
African policy debate. 
49 
MODELLING FRAMEWORKS 
As far as macroeconomic theory is concerned, it is evident from 
the sources mentioned that the theoretical foundations of the FP 
and RMSM frameworks are relatively old, both being based on 
contributions from the 1950s. Yet economic theory has progressed 
substantially since then, and Edwards (1989) lists a wide range of 
recent developments that could be incorporated in the specifica-
tions especially of the FP framework. These include issues related 
to the intertemporal nature of portfolio choices, including the 
capital account transactions, the role of time consistency and pre-
commitments in economic policy and, finally, the notion of rational 
expectations. Although the list could easily be extended, it is at this 
stage sufficient to note that neither the FP framework nor the 
RMSM are very advanced as far as aggregate macro• models are 
concerned. 
The second type of argument frequently used against the FP and 
RMSM frameworks focuses on the one-sector structure of the 
model, and will as such apply to all aggregate macro models applied 
to issues of economic development. By specifying just one market 
clearing condition for the goods market, i.e. the material balance 
equation, the importance of differential sectoral responses to price 
signals, for example, the exchange rate, are ignored. Similarly, it is 
implicitly assumed that imports and domestic output as well as 
exports and domestic supplies to domestic markets are perfect 
substitutes. By contrast, the fundamental idea behind, for example, 
the dependent-economy model, is that a satisfactory description of 
the goods markets must at least recognize the heterogeneity of 
imported and domestic production as well as the difference 
between traded and non-traded domestic output. This becomes 
particularly important in economies where market forces are partly 
curtailed by price controls and other types of government regula-
tions. Economic policies can under such circumstances lead to very 
different outcomes from those predicted when assuming perfectly 
competitive and price-clearing markets. More generally, both the FP 
and RMSM frameworks are criticized for not taking due account of 
specific structural and institutional characteristics when applied by 
the Bretton Woods institutions in country analyses. 
Although economic growth and macroeconomic stability are 
certainly important elements, it must finally be acknowledged 
that issues such as employment, urban-rural divisions and income 
distribution, as well as many non-economic factors are just as 
crucial as measures of the development process and for the well-
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being of the population. To cover these issues in the analysis, 
applied macro models are obviously not appropriate tools. 
Instead, other analytical frameworks such as applied general equili-
brium models, for example, are required. In the context of South 
Africa, this alternative modelling strategy has been pursued by, for 
example, Naude and Brixen (1992, 1993) and Gibson and van 
Seventer (1995b). It is beyond the scope of this study to cover 
these alternative modelling strategies, yet their existence as well as 
the limitations of the PP and RMSM frameworks should be fully 
appreciated. 
Although both the PP framework and the RMSM can be criti-
cized for being old-fashioned and too simple, their simplicity is also 
a significant strength. Thus, they require few data, and they are 
simple to use and understand (farp, 1993a, p. 155). In addition, a 
model that simultaneously took into account all the above-men-
tioned features would probably be impossible to implement for 
many developing countries, where lack of data is a serious con-
straint. Moreover, it is questionable if it would add much to the 
policy dialogue as the complexity would be likely to give it the status 
of a black box, where the underlying mechanisms and results would 
only be understood by a few experts. It is therefore an underlying 
thesis of this study that different models are required to answer the 
many questions related to economic development, and even simple 
models can be useful as long as their limitations are duly acknowl-
edged and taken account of in drawing up policy advice. 
It is in this light that the applications of the PP framework and 
RMSM in this study should be seen. In the following chapters, the 
frameworks are used in two fundamentally different ways in order 
to illustrate how they can be both used and abused. In the first 
application, the models are used as proper macroeconomic models 
for policy analysis in Chapter 5. This means that the effects of 
changing an exogenous variable or a parameter are analysed, 
keeping all other exogenous variables as well as parameters con-
stant. Second, the models are, as already discussed, used primarily 
as consistency frameworks in the construction of a medium-term 
base run of the South African economy in Chapter 6 and two 
alternative scenarios in Chapter 7. In this application, their primary 
function is to support three perspectives about the medium-term 




All macro models can, as discussed in Chapter 4, be applied for 
two fundamentally different purposes. First, they can be used to 
generate economic forecasts or scenarios, and Chapters 6 and 7 
will show how the FP and RMSM frameworks can usefully be 
applied for this purpose. This chapter will, on the other hand, 
illustrate the second type of application, where the two models are 
put into use in a number of model experiments. The aim of this 
exercise is to reveal the marginal properties of the two frameworks, 
which can then be compared both with each other and with results 
from the general economic literature. 
Seven experiments are reviewed in this chapter, and they will 
provide quite a comprehensive picture of the differences between 
the two models, their strengths and weaknesses as well as the 
importance of the choice of model closure. Although not 
described in detail, seven more experiments were carried out and 
the central qualitative effects of all 14 experiments are summarized 
in Table 5.1 at the end of the chapter. 
The outcomes of experiments are generally described in terms 
of deviations from the base run, which will be discussed in Chapter 
6. Since both the FP and RMSM frameworks are nonlinear, their 
marginal properties are not independent of the actual choice of 
base run values of variables and parameters. Consequently, the 
numerical results presented in this chapter are conditional on the 
base run. However, the focus of the chapter is more on the 
qualitative properties of the two models, and they will generally 
be independent of the underlying base run. Whenever the base run 
matters for the results presented below, the relevant features will 
be outlined briefly. 
The issue of the external model closure was introduced in 
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Chapter 4 in relation to the specifications of the FP and RMSM 
frameworks. Standard practice in applications of the FP framework 
is to assume an endogenous exchange rate and exogenous capital 
flows, reflecting the role of the first variable as a policy instrument. 
In contrast, the RMSM is normally specified with the opposite 
closure, i.e. an exogenous exchange rate and endogenous external 
borrowing by the government. As shown below, these different 
model closures influence significantly the properties of the two 
models, which makes it difficult to compare them. It was therefore 
decided to carry out all experiments on the two models using both 
closures. To distinguish the different model versions, the following 
notation is applied below. FP-1 refers to the FP framework with 
exogenous exchange rate and endogenous government external 
debt, while FP-2 has endogenous exchange rate and fixed govern-
ment external debt. Similarly, RMSM-1 and RMSM-2 refer respec-
tively to closures with exogenous and endogenous exchange rates. 
EXPERIMENT 1: EXCHANGE RATE 
DEPRECIATION 
This experiment can, of course, only be carried out using the 
external closure with exogenous exchange rate and endogenous 
government net foreign debt. Similarly, it is only possible to change 
the net external debt of the government exogenously under the 
alternative closure. That experiment is considered in the next 
section, while the current section reviews the effects of exogenous 
changes in the exchange rate. Based on these two initial experi-
ments, differences between the two models are analysed, whereas 
the importance of model closure will become apparent in subse-
quent experiments. 
The nominal exchange rate depreciates by 2. 9 per cent annually 
in the base run, maintaining a constant real exchange rate. In the 
first experiment the annual rate of depreciation was increased to 
3.9 per cent, which implies that the nominal exchange rate has 
increased by 6.2 per cent, compared to its base run value, in the 
sixth and final year of the time horizon under consideration. 
Given the relative simplicity of the RMSM and FP frameworks, 
their causality structures can be described in diagrams. Figure 5.1 
shows how the frameworks work in the exchange rate experiment, 
while subsequent figures will highlight how the causality structures 
depend on model closure as well as the experiment. The acronyms 
53 
MODEL EXPERIMENTS 
used in the figure correspond to the variable names introduced in 
Chapters 3 and 4. Solid lines are used to indicate the quantitatively 
most important channels of transmission, whereas the less impor-
tant linkages are shown as dotted lines. 
Beginning with the RMSM, one central chain of effects is that 
the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate leads to falling 
imports in response to a depreciating real exchange rate. Since 
fewer commodities are imported, less external finance is required 
to maintain the balance of payments, so external borrowing by the 
government is reduced. Second, the lower quantities of imports 
also lead to a smaller total supply of commodities. Consequently, 
real government consumption has to be adjusted downwards to 
maintain the material balance. This improves the government 
budget or, equivalently, decreases its borrowing requirement. 
Although the borrowing requirement of the government does 
not appear explicitly as a variable in the RMSM model, cf Box 4.2, 
it was decided to refer to it in this chapter as it summarizes a range 
of different effects. A comparison of the government budget 
equation in the FP model and the variables in the RMSM model 
will show that the latter contains all but one variable necessary to 
calculate the budget deficit. The exception is interest payments on 
the domestic debt of the government. In order to calculate the 
borrowing requirement of the government in the RMSM, it was 
therefore assumed that these interest payments remain at their base 
run values throughout the simulation horizon. 
Turning to Figure 5.1 (a) again, five smaller stories unfold besides 
the main chain of effects already mentioned. First, lower imports 
are associated with a fall in the required amount of international 
reserves, further reducing the need for the government to borrow 
abroad. Second, a reduced government external debt leads to lower 
interest payments with a lag of one period, which constitutes an 
additional improvement in public sector finances. Third, the bor-
rowing requirement of the government is measured in nominal 
terms. It is therefore influenced directly by changes in the 
exchange rate since interest payments on foreign debt and net 
receipts of transfers from abroad are fixed in foreign currency 
values. The size of this effect depends on the net value of the 
foreign transactions of the government. Yet since interest pay-
ments always exceed net transfers in this study, the depreciation 
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The last two smaller effects work through the increase in the 
general price level that results from a currency depreciation as the 
rand price of imports increases. The fourth effect is that the higher 
price level increases real private consumption. This mechanism is 
caused by the nominal rigidity in the tax system implied by domestic 
tax revenues and other government transfers to the private sector 
being fixed in nominal terms. Hence, increasing prices raise the real 
disposable income and, consequently, the consumption of the 
private sector, thereby reducing government consumption even 
more than is required due to the fall in imports. The fifth and final 
effect is that the price level affects the government budget directly 
in the RMSM, as the costs of both consumption and investment 
increase as the price level goes up. It can be seen in Figure 5.1 (a) that 
the borrowing requirement is influenced through four channels, 
working in opposite directions. Yet the reduction in the financing 
requirement, implied by falling real consumption and interest pay-
ments, outweighs by far the worsening that follows from the 
depreciated exchange rate and higher price level. In sum, the 
borrowing requirement is reduced by 31.8 per cent as compared 
to the base run in the last year, and the deficit of the government has 
fallen from 4.3 per cent of GDP to 2.9 per cent. This completes the 
picture of the qualitative effects of an exchange rate depreciation. 
Further observations on the absolute size of these effects are made 
below, while the effects of the experiment within the financial 
programming framework are described next. 
A depreciation of the exchange rate has two immediate effects in 
the FP framework, which also occurred in the RMSM. Imports fall 
and the general price level goes up. The lower imports are as 
before countered by falling government borrowing from abroad, 
but the effect on the government budget now works directly 
through the finance constraint causing reduced government con-
sumption. The second effect on government finance goes through 
the money market. Thus, the increase in the price level leads to 
higher money demand, so money supply has to adjust. Part of the 
required adjustment follows directly from the exchange rate depre-
ciation, which has increased the rand value of foreign reserves. 
However, this only corresponds to a share of the increased money 
demand, and the remaining increase in money supply is obtained 
through increased government credit. This effect is contrary to the 
one working through the balance of payments, and this is also true 
for the third channel that affects the borrowing requirement of the 
56 
MODEL EXPERIMENTS 
government. Thus, the depreciation increases the rand value of the 
foreign borrowing by the government. Yet, as indicated in Figure 
5.1(b), the dominating effect is the previously identified fall in the 
external borrowing of the government. Finally, real government 
consumption also falls. This mainly happens because of the 
reduced value of the available financing, but both the exchange 
rate depreciation and the higher domestic price level pull in the 
same direction, while the lower debt service on foreign debt 
reduces the need to cut government consumption slightly. 
Comparing the results of the experiment in the RMSM and FP 
frameworks, it follows from the discussion above that most of the 
qualitative effects are the same. Government external borrowing, 
imports and real government consumption decrease, while the 
general price level goes up, and both models lead to a smaller 
public sector borrowing requirement. There are, however, differ-
ences in both the size of the effects and the channels through 
which they occur. 
In Figure 5.2, the time paths of the government external debt 
following the exchange rate depreciation are shown, measured as 
percentage changes from base run levels. Although the external 
debt is falling continuously in both models, it has by year six fallen 
by around 31 per cent in the RMSM, but only by around 27 per 
cent in the FP framework. Returning to Figure 5.1, the explanation 
of this deviation is that the fall in imports, which takes place in 
both models, leads to a fall in the required international reserve 
accumulation in the RMSM, but not in the FP model. 
Despite this effect of differences in model specifications, it 
should probably not be over emphasized. Although international 
reserves are specified exogenously as a target variable in the FP 
framework, it would not represent a fundamental break with the 
approach to specify it as a target in terms of import values as in the 
RMSM. Similarly, the international reserves could be treated as an 
exogenous variable in the RMSM model as discussed in Chapter 4. 
A more significant deviation is the difference between the two 
model approaches when it comes to the explanation of the fall in 
real government consumption. Figure 5.3 reveals that government 
consumption declines almost equally in both models and is down 
by 6 per cent in the sixth year. Yet in the RMSM, this reduction is 
caused by the fall in imports and the constraint imposed by the 
material balance, whereas it is a consequence of reduced govern-
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Figure 5.3 Experiment 1: Real government consumption (deviation 
from base run) 
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results is due to the fact that the dominating effect in both models 
works through the balance of payments. Thus, the reduction in real 
government consumption is caused mainly by the fall in imports in 
the RMSM, whereas it is the subsequent fall in government 
external borrowing that plays the dominating role in the FP. 
This completes the description of the first experiment. Real 
government consumption was in focus, and this indicator gener-
ally reflects almost identical changes in the budget deficit. Since all 
other components of the government budget are effectively fixed 
in nominal or real terms, consumption must bear the main burden 
of adjustment within both models. However, the government 
could alternatively choose different patterns of adjustments such 
as, for example, changing its investments, transfer payments to the 
private sector or the revenue it raises from taxes. Although govern-
ment consumption is used here as a measure of the overall state of 
the government budget, the exact use of available resources and 
the structure of the public budget will depend upon political 
decisions not discussed in this chapter. 
EXPERIMENT 2: GOVERNMENT EXTERNAL 
BORROWING 
In the alternative external model closure of the RMSM and FP 
frameworks, the exchange rate is endogenous while the net foreign 
debt of the government is fixed. This experiment will therefore 
analyse model responses to changes in net foreign debt of the 
government using this closure. In practice, the foreign currency 
value of the debt was fixed so its annual growth rate is approxi-
mately five percentage points higher than in the base run. Figure 5.4 
shows causality diagrams for the two models in this experiment. 
Comparing the causality diagrams for the two models with the 
corresponding diagrams in Figure 5.1, there are several similarities, 
although the changes of all variables have the opposite sign due to 
the experiment design. In the RMSM, increased external borrowing 
by the government requires an appreciation of the exchange rate in 
order to reestablish the balance of payments through increased 
imports and reserve accumulation. The dominating consequences 
of the increased imports are a rise in real government consumption 
and a deterioration of the public budget. Real government con-
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Figure 5.5 Experiment 2: Real government consumption (deviation 
from base run) 
but the linkage is more direct as the increased borrowing in itself 
enables the expansion of government consumption. 
Figure 5.5 shows for both models the changes in real government 
consumption relative to its base run levels, and the similarity between 
the two curves is notable. Also the gradual increase in government 
consumption as compared to the base run stands out. This is, 
however, an outcome caused by the base run profile of government 
external debt and the experiment design in combination. The net 
foreign debt of the government is increasing in the base run, which 
implies that increases in its growth rate result in the absolute annual 
changes getting larger over time. Moreover, since government con-
sumption in both models depends on government borrowing, i.e. the 
flow equivalent of debt, this variable must also gradually increase 
more as compared to the base run as time progresses. 
Whereas the remaining effects of the experiment follow directly 
from the descriptions of Experiment 1, the difference between the 
RMSM and FP frameworks in their specification of international 
reserves is illustrated in Figure 5.6. As mentioned above, the 
changes in reserves depend on import changes in the RMSM, 
while the stock of reserves is exogenous in the FP framework. 
Both results are included in the figure together with the reserve 
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Figure 5.6 Experiment 2: International reserves (per cent of import 
value) 
international reserves are accumulated quite rapidly in the first 
three years of the base run in order to reach a targeted level of 
25 per cent of the import value, corresponding to three months' 
worth of imports. Second, the figure shows that the reserve to 
import ratio exceeds its base run level in the RMSM, and this result 
is once more caused by a combination of model specification and 
the profile of base run data. Since the RMSM links the change in 
reserves to the change in import value, the fast accumulation of 
reserves in the beginning of the period implies that an extra unit of 
imports is followed by extra reserves, which exceed the 25 per cent 
level. In fact, the choice of parameter values in the base run implies 
a marginal reserve accumulation amounting to almost 50 per cent 
of the import increase in the first year. Although a rather technical 
feature, it does affect the results here as well as in the following. 
The third feature revealed by Figure 5.6 is that the fixed interna-
tional reserves in the FP framework imply a falling ratio of reserves 
to import values when the latter increases. 
EXPERIMENT 3: FOREIGN RESERVES 
Whereas the two experiments described so far were specific to the 
chosen model closure, the remaining experiments are carried out in 
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the RMSM as well as the FP framework using both closures. In the 
first of these experiments, the effects of higher international 
reserves are analysed. Focus will in particular be on the impor-
tance of the choice of external closure, but other differences in the 
specifications of the RMSM and FP frameworks will also be 
highlighted. 
The international reserve is a target variable in the financial 
programming framework, so it is straightforward to implement 
the experiment as an increase of 10 per cent in the target value 
for all years of the forecast horizon. This experiment design 
implies that most of the necessary adjustment takes place in the 
first year, where reserves are accumulated to reach the new 
required level, cf Figure 5.7. In the RMSM, the experiment imple-
mentation is different since the international reserve is an endo-
genous variable, linked to the foreign currency value of imports. 
Hence, it was decided to specify the experiment as a first year 
decrease in the ratio of import change to reserve change. The new 
value of the ratio was selected such that the reserves would be 10 
per cent higher as compared to the base run value, given 
unchanged imports. If all variables maintained their base run 
values during the forecast horizon, this experiment would approx-
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Figure 5.7 Experiment 3: Foreign reserves (deviation from base run) 
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the implied changes in international reserves are shown in Figure 
5.7 for all four versions of the experiment. 
Whereas the experiment in the FP framework results in inter-
national reserves that are in every year 10 per cent higher than their 
base run value, increases are in general smaller in the RMSM. In 
RMSM-1, where the exchange rate is exogenous, this is, however, 
caused by experiment design rather than by differences in model 
specification. Since there are increasing international reserves in 
the base run as the import value increases over time, the annual 
reserve accumulation required to maintain a constant ratio of 
reserves to import value also grows over time. Yet the required 
reserve accumulations are unchanged in this experiment, except in 
the first year, and they will consequently be smaller relative to the 
stock in the experiment than in the base run. The percentage 
increase in the stock of international reserves will therefore 
decline over time as reflected by the profile of the RMSM-1 curve 
in the figure. Finally, the figure shows that international reserves in 
all years increase by less than 10 per cent as compared to their base 
run level in the RMSM-2 version of the experiment. The reasons 
for this will become clear in the following. 
Returning now to a more thorough description of experiment 
outcomes in the various model versions, they are particularly simple 
in RMSM-1 where the exchange rate is kept fixed and external 
borrowing by the government is endogenous. Hence, the need to 
accumulate reserves is met by increased government borrowing, cf 
Figure 5.8, and in the first year, the additional borrowing precisely 
matches the change in international reserves. Increased government 
debt does, however, lead to higher interest payments in the follow-
ing years, thus further expanding external borrowing. Nevertheless, 
the figure shows that the resulting external debt of the government 
converges to its base run level from the second year. This profile of 
the change in government external debt is caused by the base run 
developments of imports and foreign debt, and the actual path 
taken should be interpreted carefully. Apart from the changes in 
net government foreign debt and interest payments, the only other 
affected variable is the government budget deficit, which grows due 
to higher debt service. 
Using the alternative closure with fixed government external 
borrowing and an endogenous exchange rate, the effects of the 
higher reserve requirement become more interesting, since addi-
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Figure 5.8 Experiment 3: Exchange rate and government foreign debt 
( deviation from base run) 
Note: For RMSM-1 and FP-1, the figure shows the percentage deviations of 
government net foreign debt, whereas it is the percentage changes in the 
exchange rate shown for RMSM-2 and FP-2. 
increases in government borrowing. Instead the exchange rate 
depreciates, as shown in Figure 5.8, in order to maintain the 
balance of payments through a reduction in imports. The fall in 
imports has two additional effects. First, it reduces the required 
international reserves by less than the initial increase, so the net 
effect becomes an increase of around 6 per cent in the first year, cf 
Figure 5.7. Second, lower imports imply that fewer commodities 
are available for domestic absorption, so government consumption 
has to go down. This process is reinforced by a small expansion in 
private consumption caused by increased nominal GDP, which 
follows from the exchange rate depreciation and subsequent gen-
eral price level increase. The total effect of the experiment on real 
government consumption is a decline of 1.6 per cent in the first 
year as shown in Figure 5.9. The effects described so far relate 
mainly to the first year of the forecast horizon, but from the 
second year onwards the economy gradually converges to its 
base run path. Accordingly, the changes of all real variables are 
virtually zero from year four as can be seen in Figures 5.8 and 5.9, 
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Figure 5.9 Experiment 3: Real government consumption (deviation 
from base run) 
and only the international reserves continue to deviate from their 
base run level, cf Figure 5.7. 
The effects of higher international reserve requirements are 
small in the FP framework when the exchange rate is exogenous, 
as was the case in the RMSM. Thus, increases in international 
reserves are offset by more government external borrowing. This 
does not, however, lead to increased government consumption as 
the higher international reserves need to be countered by a similar 
reduction in government credit in order to maintain money supply 
at the level dictated by money demand. Although this in principle 
should neutralize any effect on government consumption, Figure 
5.9 shows a small drop in real government consumption. This is 
caused by the term in the money supply equation that takes care of 
the changed rand valuation of international reserves. Since the 
stock of reserves has grown and the exchange rate depreciates in 
the base run, further reductions in government credit and conse-
quently in consumption are necessary. It was argued in Chapter 4 
that this term in the money supply function can be omitted if it is 
assumed that capital gains are not realized by the holders of 
international reserves. Figure 5.9 confirms also the point made 
in Chapter 4 that the importance of the valuation term is modest 
in the context of this study. 
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The last version of the experiment is made using the FP frame-
work in its standard set-up with endogenous exchange rate and 
fixed government external borrowing. One effect of increasing 
international reserves is once again a decrease in government 
credit through the money supply equation. However, under the 
present closure, additional reserves cannot be accumulated by 
more government external borrowing. Instead the necessary cur-
rent account improvement is obtained by an exchange rate depre-
ciation and lower imports, just as in the RMSM-2. As shown in 
Figure 5.8, the required depreciation is larger in the FP framework 
than in the RMSM because there is no linkage between interna-
tional reserves and imports. The second important effect in this 
experiment is the contraction of government credit occurring for 
the same reason as in FP-1. Increased international reserves cause 
a reduction in domestic credit to maintain the money supply at the 
level of money demand. This variable expands slightly, however, as 
the exchange rate depreciation implies a modest increase in the 
general price level. This effect, _as well as the higher rand value of 
foreign borrowing by the government, has the opposite effect on 
the nominal budget deficit. However, both effects are small, and a 
budget improvement is therefore necessary, leading to a compres-
sion of real government consumption in the first year, cf Figure 
5.9. 
The most interesting feature apparent in Figure 5.9 is probably 
how the change in real government consumption depends more on 
the choice of model closure than on the choice of model. When 
the exchange rate is exogenous, hardly any change is required in 
government consumption in either model, while an endogenous 
exchange rate framework leads to an initial fall in response to the 
increased foreign reserves in both the RMSM and FP. Moreover, 
the basic profiles of the responses are similar. 
EXPERIMENT 4: DOMESTIC INFLATION 
Like international reserves, the domestic inflation rate is a standard 
target in the FP framework, and in Experiment 4 the annual 
inflation rate was increased from its base run level of 6 per cent 
to 8 per cent. Figure 5.10 reveals that the choice of model closure 
has again a significant impact on the result. Real government 
consumption expands in both the FP and RMSM frameworks, 









0 2 3 4 5 6 
Year 
( --- RMSM-1 --- RMSM-2 ........ FP-1 --FP-2 
Figure 5.10 Experiment 4: Real government consumption (deviation 
from base run) 
an endogenous exchange rate leads to falling government con-
sumption in both models. Focus will first be put on the two cases 
with fixed exchange rates. 
The first chain of effects of the increased inflation rate is almost 
identical in both models. Higher inflation implies deteriorating 
competitiveness and consequently more imported goods. By the 
sixth year, imports exceed their base run level by 8.5 per cent in 
both models. Higher imports require more external financing, and 
the public external debt has gone up by 53. 7 per cent in the final 
year when the FP framework is used, and by 61.1 per cent in the 
RMSM. The difference is caused by the endogenous international 
reserves in the RMSM. 
Besides this common effect, each model has one additional 
major line of effects. In the RMSM, this is that the private sector 
consumes more as higher domestic prices imply increased real 
disposable income because taxes, net of transfers from the govern-
ment, are fixed in nominal terms. The larger supply of commod-
ities resulting from increased imports is thus divided between 
private and government consumption, and in the sixth year the 
former has increased by 3.0 per cent and the latter by 2.1 per cent, 
cf Figure 5.10. Real government consumption also goes up in the 
FP framework, but the explanation is different, as it is the 
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increased external borrowing of the public sector that directly 
enables it to expand consumption. Yet another effect is at work 
through the money market. Higher inflation increases the demand 
for money and consequently the ability of the monetary system to 
extend credit to the government. This source of deficit finance 
accounts for 1.2 per cent of GDP in the sixth year as compared to 
nothing in the base run. Similarly, the new external borrowing of 
the government is up to 4.3 per cent of GDP from 1.8 per cent. 
However, while the deficit finance obtained abroad increases 
gradually to this level, most of the adjustment in domestic credit 
finance occurs in the first year. This difference is reflected in 
Figure 5.10 where the curve for the FP framework, FP-1, jumps 
by almost four percentage points in the first year, while the 
increase is much slower afterwards. On the other hand, the 
RMSM-1 curve exhibits a gradual rise over the entire time horizon. 
Turning now to the closure with endogenous exchange rate, 
Figure 5.10 shows that real government consumption declines in 
the medium-term in both moqels. Also the balance-of-payments 
effects of the experiment are the same. Thus, increased domestic 
inflation causes a matching depreciation of the exchange rate, 
leaving all components of the balance of payments unaltered in 
foreign currency values. In the RMSM, the only real effect is 
therefore that private consumption expands in response to higher 
real disposable income, which crowds out real government con-
sumption. This effect cumulates progressively over time, and 
government consumption has fallen by 9.4 per cent in the sixth 
year. In the medium-term government consumption also falls in 
the financial programming framework, but initially it jumps to a 
level that is 2.6 per cent higher than in the base run. The explana-
tion of this feature is as before found in the domestic money 
market, which responds instantaneously to the increased inflation 
level by enabling more credit to be extended to the government. 
However, the shift in the inflation level is transformed into a 
cumulative increase in the price level, so the government is forced 
to reduce its real consumption since the base run level cannot be 
sustained by the available increase in finance. 
Focus has until now been on real consumption as far as the 
government is concerned. Although this is an important variable in 
any policy discussion, so is the government borrowing require-
ment, which together with the current account are key indicators 
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Figure 5.11 Experiment 4: Government borrowing requirement 
(deviation from base run) 
applied in this study, Figure 5.11 clearly illustrates that government 
consumption is only one part of the story. Thus, the budget deficit 
measured in per cent of GDP deteriorates in all four versions of 
this experiment, despite the fall in real government consumption 
that occurred in both models when the exchange rate was assumed 
to be endogenous, i.e. RMSM-2 and FP-2. 
Although the qualitative effects depend on whether government 
consumption or the budget deficit is considered, there are still 
notable similarities between Figures 5.10 and 5.11. First, the 
budget deficit increases more in the fixed exchange rate regime, 
which was also the closure that resulted in increased real govern-
ment consumption. Second, the jump in government consumption 
which appeared in the first year of both financial programming 
experiments is mirrored in the budget deficit. Comparing all four 
versions of the experiment, the worst outcomes are obtained in the 
FP framework, which yields larger increases in the budget deficit as 
well as a higher level of government consumption than the corre-
sponding RMSM versions of the experiment. This difference is due 
to the different reactions of the private sector to higher inflation in 
the two frameworks. In the RMSM the private sector expands 
consumption, thereby constraining the rise in government con-
sumption. By contrast, in the FP framework it expands money 
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demand, allowing more credit to be extended to the government 
sector. While this difference in specifications does influence the 
effects of all experiments in this chapter, it is especially important 
when the inflation rate is increased directly. In the other experi-
ments, the general price level only changes in response to varia-
tions in the exchange rate, because the domestic price is 
maintained at its base run level. These price changes tend more-
over to be relatively small and dominated by other linkages in the 
two frameworks. This observation implies that a fall in government 
consumption will generally lead to an improvement of the budget 
deficit. 
EXPERIMENT 5: GDP GROWTH 
The differences between the modelling approach taken in the 
RMSM and FP frameworks are clearly illustrated in this experi-
ment, where the annual real GDP growth rate is increased by one 
percentage point in all years. Thus, real GDP is increased by 6 per 
cent in the sixth year as compared to the base run. In the RMSM, 
this was achieved by a uniform increase in the sectoral growth 
rates. 
Figure 5.12 contains the causality structures of the two models 
in this experiment, when the exchange rate is exogenous. The 
figure immediately reveals that the story needed to explain the 
effects of higher growth is far more complicated in the RMSM 
than in the FP framework. 
Higher GDP growth initially has three effects in the RMSM. 
Since an increase in real GDP corresponds to a rise in real income 
more imports are demanded, and private consumption increases. 
Moreover, the increase in GDP can only be realized through 
increased investments, which means more private investment as 
government capital formation is fixed in real terms. It is notable 
that the initial change in GDP and these three effects work in 
opposite directions as far as government consumption is con-
cerned. In sum, total supply is increased, both through more 
domestic production and higher imports, and this leads to a higher 
level of real government consumption. This effect is countered, 
however, by the expansion in private sector absorption. 
The net effect is that government consumption falls in the first 
year compared to its base run level, because the required change in 
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Figure 5.13 Experiment 5: Real government consumption (deviation 
from base run) 
first year of the projection period. Therefore, the effects from 
increased domestic supply start to work from year two, and real 
government consumption has almost returned to its base run level 
in the final year, cf Figure 5.13. This qualitative shift in the change 
of government consumption is also found in the budget deficit, 
which improves in terms of GDP in each of the first five years, but 
is higher in the sixth year. Finally, the growth experiment also 
results in the by now familiar effect working through the balance 
of payments. Higher imports and the associated increase in inter-
national reserves are financed by more government borrowing, 
which leads to additional interest payments. 
Turning to the FP framework, the first effect of higher GDP 
growth is an expansion of the demand for money. This enables the 
government to extract more domestic credit without changing the 
rate of inflation. Second, more import follows from the increased 
GDP, and since it is financed through government borrowing, this 
further increases the amount of finance available for the govern-
ment. Consequently, government consumption increases in all 
years. Although the gap between the curves for the two models 
appears to be converging slowly, the FP framework results in a 
substantially higher level of government consumption. Since GDP 
and imports increase by the same amount, and as real government 
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investments are identical in the two models, absorption by the 
private sector must be compressed more in the FP framework 
than in the RMSM. Consequently, if the investment hypothesis of 
the RMSM is accepted, private consumption will implicitly be 
lower in the FP framework than in the RMSM. 
Figure 5.13 shows that the medium-term effect on government 
consumption of higher growth changes substantially when the 
external closure is altered, and the foreign debt of government is 
maintained at its base run level. The relative change of government 
consumption is almost the same from the second year onwards, 
and this is so both in the RMSM and the FP framework. This can 
be compared with the result under the fixed exchange rate regime, 
where government consumption increased more in real terms as 
time progressed. The explanation for this difference follows 
directly from the causality diagrams in Figure 5.12, since the 
increase in domestic commodity supply is not supported by 
more imports when the net foreign borrowing of the government 
is fixed. Instead, the required adjustment of the balance of pay-
ments is obtained through a depreciation of the exchange rate. 
Apart from this major difference in the results under the alter-
native closures, the remaining effects, illustrated in Figure 5.12, 
are generally the same, although some additional effects arise 
when the exchange rate depreciates and the price level changes. 
They will not, however, be described further, because they 
appeared in a similar way in the previous experiments and are 
relatively small. 
Although not obvious from the discussion so far, this experi-
ment implicitly reveals an important feature of the RMSM through 
the initial negative relationship between GDP and government 
consumption. If the RMSM instead had been closed in a Keynes-
ian fashion with exogenous government consumption and GDP as 
an endogenous variable, an exogenous increase in government 
consumption, or any other component of autonomous demand, 
would lead to a fall in GDP. This result is, of course, opposite to 
the outcome in macro models based on Keynesian macroeco-
nomics, but complies with growth models in the tradition of 
Harrod-Domar, Solow and others. The difference in model results 
depends on the difference in the marginal saving and investment 
responses to increases in output. Thus, if the marginal savings rate 
exceeds the marginal investment rate, then there would be a 
positive relationship between autonomous spending and GDP, 
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and vice versa. It can therefore be concluded that the RMSM as a 
growth programming framework exhibits some of the features 
normally associated with economic growth theory. 
EXPERIMENT 6: EXPORT QUANTITY VERSUS 
EXPORT PRICE 
The differences between the two models as well as between the 
two external closures have been discussed in detail in relation to 
the previous experiments, so the sixth and last experiment has a 
different layout. What will be done is to compare the outcomes of 
changes in the export quantity and the price of exports, respec-
tively. Yet, both experiments will only be analysed using the RMSM 
with endogenous exchange rate. The effects of the alternative 
experiment versions, which can be seen in Table 5.1, follow 
directly from the discussions above and in this section. 
The experiment with increased export quantity (RMSM-2) was 
implemented as a one percentage point addition to the annual 
growth rate of all export categories, whereas the export price 
experiment (RMSM-1) consisted of a one percentage point increase 
in the annual growth of the export price index. Therefore, the two 
experiments resulted in approximately the same expansion of export 
revenue, valued in foreign currency. This implies that the balance-of-
payments effects of the two experiments are almost identical, and 
the increased export revenue leads to an appreciation of the 
exchange rate and an increase in imports, which in the sixth year 
are approximately 5.5 per cent larger than in the base run. 
The interesting features concern, therefore, the domestic vari-
ables, and the changes in private and government consumption are 
shown in Figure 5.14 and 5.15, respectively. Beginning with the rise 
in export quantity, total domestic supply is almost unchanged in 
the experiment as exports and imports are increased by the same 
amount. However, the exchange rate appreciation feeds into falling 
domestic prices, which through the consumption function causes a 
decrease in real private consumption, cf Figure 5.14, leaving more 
goods for government consumption. Figure 5.15 reveals at the 
same time that the modest decline in domestic supply occurring in 
the beginning of the period dominates this effect, causing real 
government consumption to go down as well. As time passes, 
the fall in private consumption becomes larger, and government 
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Figure 5.15 Experiment 6: Real government consumption ( deviation 
from base run) 
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Turning to the export price experiment, the key difference 
relative to the increased export quantity is that the increase in 
imports translates into more domestic supply, enabling simulta-
neous increases in government and private consumption. Since 
government consumption is determined residually, it needs to be 
explained why private consumption goes up, contrary to what 
happened in the export quantity experiment. First, private con-
sumption is once more affected negatively by the fall in domestic 
prices, occurring because of the exchange rate appreciation. How-
ever, there is now an additional effect working in the opposite 
direction, namely increased gross domestic income induced by 
improved terms-of-trade resulting from higher export prices. 
This effect dominates the effect originating from the fall in 
prices, and private consumption increases, cf Figure 5.14. There 
is, however, still room for an expansion of government consump-
tion, as is evident from Figure 5.15. 
CONCLUSION 
The aim of this chapter was to demonstrate how the FP and 
RMSM frameworks work in terms of economic transmission 
mechanisms. Although other experiments could have been inves-
tigated, most would have effects that are qualitatively identical to 
those described above in one or more experiments. Table 5.1 
summarizes the central effects of experiments reviewed in this 
chapter as well as of some additional experiments. These experi-
ments were chosen with the construction of two alternative sce-
narios in mind. Thus, most exogenous variables and parameters for 
which experiments were carried out appear among the changing 
assumptions used to generate the optimistic and pessimistic sce-
narios presented in Chapter 7. 
The experiments show, first, that the results depend crucially on 
the choice of model closure. Several qualitative effects have dif-
ferent signs under the alternative closures. Hence, it is important to 
be aware that the FP framework is normally presented with 
endogenous exchange rate, while the standard version of the 
RMSM assumes an exogenous exchange rate. Second, the models 
generally yield similar qualitative results, but the channels are 
different, and the quantitative effects often deviate substantially. 
It can also be emphasized once more that both modelling frame-
works, as illustrated by the causality diagrams, are very simple. This 
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Table 5.1 Central qualitative effects of experiments 
Net government Nominal General price Private Government Government Current account 
external debt exchange rate level consumption consumption budget 
(Foreign (Constant rand) (Constant rand) (Per cent of (Per cent of 
currency) GDP) GDP) 
1 Exchange rate 
depreciation 
RMSM-1 + + + + 
FP-1 - + + + 




FP-1 - + 
3 Increased foreign 
reserves 
RMSM-1 + 0 0 0 
RMSM-2 +/0 +/0 +/0 -/0 + +/0 
FP-1 + 0 0 
FP-2 + + - + + 
4 Increased domestic 
inflation 
RMSM-1 + + + + 
RMSM-2 + + + - 0 
FP-1 + + + 
FP-2 + + +/- - 0 
5 Increased GDP 
growth 
RMSM-1 + 0 + -/+ +/-
RMSM-2 + + + - + 
FP-1 + 0 + 
FP-2 + + + 
6 Increased export 
growth 
RMSM-1 - 0 0 - + + 
RMSM-2 - - - -/+ + + 
FP-1 - 0 - + + 
FP-2 - - -/+ + + 
7 Increased export 
price 
RMSM-1 - 0 + - + + 
RMSM-2 - - + + +/- + 
FP-1 - 0 - + + 
FP-2 - - -/+ + + 
Table 5.1 continued 
Net government Nominal General price Private Government Government Cu"ent account 
external debt exchange rate level consumption consumption budget 
(Foreign (Constant rand) (Constant rand) (Per cent ef (Per cent ef 
currenry) GDP) GDP) 
8 Increased public 
investments 
RMSM-1 0 0 0 0 - 0 
RMSM-2 0 0 0 0 - 0 
FP-1 0 0 - 0 0 
FP-2 0 0 - 0 0 
9 Increased tax 
revenue 
RMSM-1 0 0 - + + 0 
RMSM-2 0 0 - + + 0 
FP-1 0 0 + 0 0 
FP-2 0 0 + 0 0 
10 Increased private 
foreign debt 
RMSM-1 - 0 0 0 + 0 
RMSM-2 - - - + 
FP-1 - 0 - + 0 
FP-2 - -/+ + 
11 Increased private 
credit 
FP-1 0 0 - + 
FP-2 0 0 - + 
12 Increased money 
velocity 
FP-1 0 0 - + 
FP-2 0 0 - + 
13 Inc. constant in 
investment 
RMSM-1 0 0 0 - + 
RMSM-2 0 0 0 - + 
14 Increased savings 
propensity 
RMSM-1 0 0 - + -
RMSM-2 0 0 - + -




indicates increase initially followed by decreases, and similarly for other combinations 
indicates no change 










implies necessarily that many important economic linkages are 
absent. This relates not only to the relatively limited sets of 
variables, appearing in each of the two models, but also to the 
relationships lacking among variables that are actually present. 
Chapter 4 reviewed the most crucial omissions, but the experi-
ments in this chapter have demonstrated that neither the FP 
framework nor the RMSM are very suitable for applied policy 
analysis. It would, for example, be hard to justify the quantitative 
results of the exchange rate experiment as even an approxima-
tion to what would happen if South Africa was to devalue the 
rand. Nonetheless, the experiments provide illustrations of some 
of the central economic transmission mechanisms that should be 
taken into consideration by any policy-maker. Moreover, the 
combined structure of the FP and RMSM frameworks can be 
used for constructing consistent scenarios, as demonstrated in 





Restraint cannot by itself restructure the economy of South Africa 
and ensure social stability in the transition phase. Nevertheless, it is 
equally correct, as pointed out in Chapter 2, that unless the much 
needed redistribution and satisfaction of basic human needs go 
hand in hand with renewed growth, the necessary increase in the 
purchasing power of the African population cannot take place. The 
base run put forward in this chapter therefore involves a shift to a 
new growth path. Hence, it is assumed that South Africa will be 
able to pursue a successful growth strategy. Higher growth requires 
as a critical precondition a substantial increase in existing physical 
capital as well as investments in human resource development. 
Consequently, domestic savings-investment balances are bound 
to come under pressure in the medium-term, in particular since 
the government must play an active role in the transition and 
restructuring process. South Africa will therefore have to rely on 
foreign savings. Nevertheless, the base run demonstrates that such 
a result is not in contradiction with the goal of keeping macro-
economic balances in check provided the underlying moderately 
optimistic assumptions are fulfilled. 
The base run was composed from projections generated within 
the FP and RMSM frameworks. Yet it is highlighted that these two 
pillars of the joint base run were developed in an iterative and 
consistent manner. Hence, all variables which appear in both 
models have the same value in the two original projections, 
although some minor differences occur due to rounding. More-
over, values of the exogenous variables were selected in a way 
which leads to reasonable projections in the medium-term. Yet as 
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Table 6.1 Parameter values in base run 
Parameter iiJmbol Year 0 }ear 1 }ear 2 rear 3 }ear 4 rear 5 Year 6 
Investment - constant KO 0.142 0.124 0.135 0.140 0.142 0.142 0.142 
Capital-output ratio Kl 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 
Import - constant ao -2.74 -2.69 -2.66 -2.64 -2.64 -2.64 -2.64 
Import - GDP elas. al 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 
Import - RER elas. a2 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 
Savings propensity ~ 0.227 0.230 0.233 0.236 0.240 0.243 0.245 
Reserve-import ratio 8 3.36 2.01 2.23 2.49 2.66 3.05 3.28 
Weight in price index 0 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Velocity of money V 1.78 1.78 1.78 1.78 1.78 1.78 1.78 
BASE RUN 
some of the chosen values would imply rather large changes as 
compared with the base year, they were phased in gradually over 
the time horizon studied. 
Only summary results are presented in this chapter, but detailed 
results are available in the tables in Appendix B. The base year 
appears as Year 0, and these data are actual historical data, while 
Years 1-6 refer to the medium-term six-year forecasting horizon. 
Reference is made to Years 1-6 rather than to years 1995-2000 as 
this book is concerned with the transition to a new growth path 
rather than focused on short-run fluctuations around medium-
term trends. Consequently, the base run data for Year 1 were, in 
particular, chosen with a view to incorporating already known 
developments in 1995 as well as to ensure a smooth transition to 
medium-term paths. Similarly, the base run values of all model 
parameters, defined in Chapter 4, are summarized in Table 6.1. 
They were either based on outside information or calibrated from 
the base year data described in Chapter 3. Some parameters were, 
however, adjusted during the forecast horizon of the models to 
generate a reasonable base run as discussed in detail below. 
DEMAND AND SUPPLY 
Projecting real output growth is complex in the South African case, 
for political and economic reasons. Some improvement due to 
efficiency gains and the return to a more stable political environ-
ment can be expected. However, substantial and sustainable 
growth, which is socially equitable, presupposes as noted above 
not only an increase in existing physical capital, but also invest-
ments in broad based human resource development. By their very 
nature, such investments have a long gestation period. Thus, even 
if human capital investments are of strategic importance in the 
longer term in South Africa, as elsewhere, they are unlikely to yield 
immediate results. Moreover, while private sector confidence and 
investments are expected to continue recuperating, political and 
economic uncertainties are bound to persist for some time to come 
and will only gradually give way to a more stable environment. 
In sum, there seems to be widespread agreement that annual 
GDP growth of around 3.5 per cent is a likely outcome in the 
medium-term in South Africa (McGrath and Holden, 1994). Con-
sequently, this rate was relied on in the construction of the base 
run. It was, in addition, assumed that this GDP growth level is 
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Table 6.2 Material balance (real annual growth rates) 
Variable ~mbol Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Consumption C 2.8 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 
Private CP 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.7 
Government CG 2.0 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.0 4.0 
Investments IV 15.1 9.0 6.1 4.2 3.5 3.5 
Private IVP 16.8 9.7 6.6 4.3 3.5 3.5 
Government IVG 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Exports X 3.0 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 5.5 
Imports M 10.0 7.5 5.6 4.2 4.2 4.2 
GDP GDP 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
reached in the first year as shown in Table 6.2, which is based on 
values in constant 1994 rand. The table also provides a summary of 
the South African material balance as projected in this volume, and 
the aggregate GDP growth prediction, which forms part of the 
base run, is consistent with the sectoral real growth rates presented 
in Table 6.3. 
It can be seen from Table 6.3 that the output of the mining 
sector remains at its base year level, while agriculture was set to 
grow at a slower rate than overall GDP. Other sectors were 
estimated to grow in parallel with the aggregate rate. By con-
trast, a relative expansion of the manufacturing category was 
assumed. The rationale behind this assessment of sectoral perspec-
tives is two-fold. Existing structural problems are severe in agri-
culture and mining, and it is expected that they will constrain 
future growth relatively more than is the case on average. Further-
more, it is generally assumed in this study that growth will have to 
have a manufacturing base, and that expansion in the other sectors 
category must be close to average GDP as this sector accounted 
for two thirds of GDP in the base year. 
Table 6.3 Sectoral GDP (real annual growth rates) 
Variable ~mbol Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Agriculture AGR 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Mining MIN 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Manufacturing MAN 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Other sectors 0TH 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.4 
GDP GDP 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
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For the above reasons, the first two sectors mentioned are 
bound to grow at a rate which is lower than is the case in the 
remainder of the economy. The actual choice of growth rate for 
the other sectors was calculated on a residual basis in order to 
ensure consistency with overall growth. Finally, the different sec-
toral growth rates will modify the sectoral composition of GDP 
over the period considered, so the distribution in the final year is as 
follows: agriculture 4.1 per cent, mining 6.5 per cent, manufactur-
ing 23. 7 per cent, and other sectors 65. 7 per cent. 
The elasticities, which appear in the import function as shown in 
Table 6.1, are both based on estimates presented in Kahn et al. 
(1992). The real exchange rate elasticity was adopted directly, while 
it was decided for the purpose of this study to increase the GDP 
elasticity from the estimated value of 1.13 to 1.20. One justification 
for this adjustment is that the original estimation period includes 
the years from 1985 when sanctions were in place. It can therefore 
be argued that involuntary import compression caused a downward 
bias in the estimate. Moreover, real imports were as shown in Table 
6.1 given an additional boost during the first few years of the base 
run projection through increases in the constant in the import 
equation. The value of the constant in the base year was calibrated 
from 1994 data, but the adjustment is sensible in view of the widely 
recognized and severely pressing rehabilitation needs, and the fact 
that the existing import protective system is being reformed in 
accordance with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) (Hirsch, 1994). In sum, real imports are growing, with 
10 per cent in the first year falling gradually to an annual increase of 
4.2 per cent. As a share of GDP, imports rise from 21.7 per cent in 
the base year to 25.0 per cent at the end of the forecasting period. 
It cannot be expected that South Africa will be able to replicate 
the performance of the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) in 
the immediate future. South African industries will have to undergo 
a major and difficult overhaul to become competitive, and one of 
the most significant effects of the GATT Agreement on South 
Africa is that export subsidies are to be phased out, including the 
General Export Incentive Scheme. Moreover, it is by no means 
certain that international markets will be buoyant in general, so the 
process of reviving exports is bound to be gradual at best. 
This is underlined by the fact that the importance of structural 
and demand related problems in the various sectors should - as 
already alluded to - not be underestimated. While mining is an 
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important source of foreign exchange, it is an extremely vulnerable 
sector, and technological constraints are becoming increasingly 
severe, as extraction has to take place deeper down. Agriculture is 
largely uncompetitive in international markets in a number of major 
crops, and will not be able to compete without substantial invest-
ment and a completely modified system of economic incentives. 
Manufactured exports performed well during the 1980s with 
annual growth rates reaching a level of 10 per cent in some 
years, and as such, manufactured exports have increased their 
importance in the South African economy. Yet a major factor 
behind this development was declining domestic demand and 
accompanying low rates of capacity utilization. Contrary to this, 
local demand for manufactured products can be expected to grow 
significantly during the coming years. Finally, international compe-
tition has by no means become less stringent over the past decade. 
For these reasons, annual growth in export quantity was 
assumed to increase gradually from 3 per cent in the first year to 
5.5 per cent in the last year of the forecasting period as shown in 
Table 6.2. This reflects a respectable average rate of increase of 4.6 
per cent, and in the base run real exports therefore increase from 
23.6 per cent of GDP in the base year to 25.2 per cent at the end 
of the period. 
The procedure followed in disaggregating the overall export 
performance was similar to the procedure used in disaggregating 
GDP growth. More specifically, it was assumed in Table 6.4 that 
agricultural and gold exports grow at rates below average. Basic 
metals and minerals, however, may grow more or less around 
average growth if the present policy of adding value to South 
Africa's natural resource products through further beneficiation 
(such as in the area of stainless steel) starts giving results. Whether 
this potential will be realized depends on growth in global primary 
product demand, and it must be acknowledged that the present 
situation is not particularly encouraging given the existing sluggish 
demand and excess capacity. However, a moderately optimistic 
position is taken here. Finally, calculating the growth rates for 
other exports on a residual basis, it follows that they must gen-
erate a significant contribution. This is consistent with the inter-
pretation that the engine of future exports must be located in 
manufactured exports, which make up the major part of other 
exports. This underlines the need to address the structural pro-
blems of this sector as a matter of urgency. 
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Table 6.4 Export (real annual growth rates) 
Variable &mbol Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Agriculture AGR 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Gold GOL 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Basic metals 
and minerals MET 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Other 0TH 4.8 6.8 7.5 8.1 9.0 8.9 
Total exports X 3.0 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 5.5 
It follows from the above observations that the composition of 
exports will change, so the distribution in the final year of the 
projection is as follows: agriculture 5.3 per cent, gold 16.9 per cent, 
basic metals and minerals 31.2 per cent and other exports 46. 7 per 
cent. Thus, other exports are the only category which increases its 
share over the forecasting period. 
As pointed out in Chapter 4, only government investment enters 
as a variable in the PP model, whereas total investments (i.e. the 
sum of private and public investment) are determined by the 
aggregate investment function in the RMSM model. Hence, the 
use of the latter model requires that the level of investment is 
consistent with the overall 3.5 per cent annual growth rate referred 
to above. Accordingly, it was decided to put the capital-output 
ratio at 2.25 for the whole of the projection as shown in Table 6.1. 
It is reiterated, however, that the capital-output ratio used in this 
book relates output changes to net investments, and not gross 
investments as discussed in Chapter 4. This implies a stable 
aggregate investment level of 21.8 per cent of GDP from the 
fourth year onwards. Compared with historical data in Kahn et 
al. (1992), this seems reasonable, though probably somewhat on 
the low side. The chosen value of the capital-output ratio results in 
a calibrated constant term of 0.142 in 1994. This implies that 
investments of 14.2 per cent of GDP are required if GDP is to 
remain unchanged. The investment level in the base run was in 
addition adjusted downwards, as is clear from Table 6.1, through 
variations in the constant in the investment function in the early 
years of the forecast period to account for excess capacity. Based 
on the path of government investments, to be further reviewed 
below, the above choices imply that private investments grow 
quickly from around 15.8 per cent of GDP in the base year to 
19.6 per cent in the fourth year of the forecast period, staying at 
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this level for the remaining three years. Thus private confidence in 
future developments and willingness to invest is relied on in 
accordance with the moderately optimistic underpinning of the 
base run. 
As pointed out in Chapter 4, real private consumption is normally 
determined on a residual basis in growth programming exercises 
carried out within the RMSM framework. This is possible from the 
material balance equation since GDP, real imports and exports as 
well as investment (private and government) follow from the 
assumptions already made, and since government consumption 
can be determined from the government finance side using the 
PP framework. Nevertheless, the version of the RMSM used in this 
study includes a private consumption function, where private con-
sumption is determined in proportion to disposable private income, 
i.e. nominal GDP less taxes net of transfers from government. 
Consequently, the marginal propensity to save was technically set 
in such a way that consistency is ensured, and it is recalled that all 
variables were, in fact, treated as endogenous in the review process 
in line with the methodology outlined in Chapter 4. 
Thus, the marginal savings propensity was calculated in each year 
from the nominal GDP and tax variables from the PP base run, 
reflecting that private consumption will have to take the major 
brunt of adjustment when investment and government consump-
tion are given. However, the constant term in the investment 
function, as already noted, was adjusted downwards in the early 
years, and this helps ensure a more sensible growth rate in private 
consumption than would otherwise have been the case. Hence, as 
shown in Table 6.2, private consumption is expected to grow by 3.1 
per cent in real terms in the first year and by around 2.5 per cent in 
the rest of the period. The resulting movement in the private sector 
savings propensity corresponds as indicated in Table 6.1 to a steady 
increase from the calibrated 1994 value of 0.227 to 0.245 in the final 
year. This reflects that the private sector will respond to assump-
tions behind the base run by increasing its propensity to save, in 
contrast to what has been the case over the past decade. 
PRICES AND EXCHANGE RATES 
In constructing the base run, it was assumed that SARB will 
manage its foreign reserves in such a way that the real exchange 
rate remains constant during the whole period under consideration. 
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It is admittedly difficult to make fully reliable predictions in this 
area, and keeping the real exchange rate constant implies some 
modification of policies pursued during the second half of the 
1980s. From 1985 until 1988, the desire to ensure that rand prices 
received by the mining sector were kept stable at a high level 
dominated. In accordance with the falling international gold 
price, the rand was allowed to depreciate in nominal terms, which 
also pushed the real rate below its historical level. A policy where 
the real exchange rate is kept constant, as in the base run presented 
here, implies that rand prices received by the mining companies 
will fluctuate substantially more than in the past, since variations in 
the gold price vis-a-vis the general world price level tend to be 
significant. 
Nevertheless, a constant real exchange rate would help establish 
much needed stability for exporters of manufactured goods, mak-
ing this an attractive reason to pursue a stable real rate of exchange. 
In addition, since 1988 SARB has shown definite concern about 
the level of the real rate and intervened to maintain a relatively high 
degree of stability (Kahn, 1995). Given the independence of 
SARB, which was maintained after the GNU take-over, a stable 
rate appears a sensible reference point. Furthermore, this would in 
any case appear the most useful assumption given the medium-
term nature of the present exercise, where short-run exchange rate 
policy is not in focus, and the lack of in-depth studies of whether 
the rand is at its long-run equilibrium level or not. 
As far as the domestic price level is concerned, it was, as shown 
in Table 6.5, set to grow by 6 per cent on an annual basis. This is 
approximately the domestic inflation actually realized in 1995, and 
is a level which should be easily acceptable to policy makers, when 
experiences elsewhere are brought to mind. Trying to opt for a 
lower rate of inflation does not seem warranted as this could affect 
the real economy adversely, unless more optimistic assumptions 
than those underlying the base run materialize. It can, in fact, be 
argued that a higher level might well be manageable. However, it 
was decided to use the low inflation option in building the base 
run, so as to demonstrate how much room for manoeuvre this 
would imply in terms of fiscal and monetary policy, and this is in 
any case more in line with the distinctly anti-inflationary policy 
approach pursued by SARB. 
Both import and export prices were assumed to grow by 3 per 
cent on an annual basis. Hence, terms of trade remain constant, 
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Table 6.5 Prices and exchange rates (1994=100 and per cent annual change) 
Variable Symbol Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
General price index p 100 106 112 119 126 134 142 
Inflation 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
Domestic price index PD 100 106 112 119 126 134 142 
Inflation 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
Export price index XPI 100 103 106 109 113 116 119 
Inflation 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0. 3.0 3.0 
Import price index MPI 100 103 106 109 113 116 119 
Inflation 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Nominal exchange rate E 100 103 106 109 112 115 119 
Depreciation 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 
BASE RUN 
and both export and import prices increase to a level which is in 
the final year of the projection about 20 per cent above the base 
year price level. Some variation in the terms of trade will no doubt 
occur in practice over the coming years, but constant terms of 
trade do appear a useful starting point for the analysis because of 
the inherent complexities of projecting the relevant price series. A 
constant real exchange rate and the assumed rates of inflation 
imply an annual depreciation of the nominal exchange rate of 2.9 
per cent, and an annual rate of growth of 6 per cent in the general 
price level. The former result follows from the definition of the 
real rate, and the latter from the way in which the overall price level 
is determined (i.e. as a weighted average of the domestic price level 
and the domestic currency price of imported goods). It can be 
noted here that the weight of import prices in the price index as 
shown in Table 6.1 was set at 0.20 so as to reflect the estimated 
share of imports in domestic supply. Consequently, the exchange 
rate rises by approximately 20 per cent during the projection 
period, and nominal GDP is assumed to grow by 9.7 per cent 
during the whole forecast. 
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
The surplus on the trade balance disappears in the second year of 
the base run, yet it reappears in the final year. It can also be noted 
that export and import values as a share of nominal GDP are equal 
to the real shares referred to above due to the assumed constancy 
of the real rate of exchange of the rand. Year-to-year developments 
are shown in Table 6.6. 
Interest payments on the foreign debt of the private sector and 
government, which are fully endogenized using an imputed nom-
inal foreign rate of interest of 14.1 per cent from Table 3.8, 
increase from a level of 1.5 per cent of GDP in the base year to 
3.7 per cent at the end of the period. In annual growth terms, 
interest payments grow by around 15 per cent in the first year. 
Hereafter the build-up of foreign debt implies that annual growth 
in foreign interest payments increases gradually to 35 per cent in 
the third year before starting to fall again towards a rate of 25 per 
cent in the last year. 
It was also assumed that other factor payments and net transfers 
from abroad as shares of GDP remain at their base year levels 
throughout the period. Given South Africa's high per capita GDP 
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Table 6.6 Current account (billion rand and share of GDP in per cent) 
1/ariable Symbol Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
Billion rand 
Exports X 102.7 112.1 123.6 136.9 152.4 170.4 190.6 
Imports M -94.4 -110.0 -125.4 -140.3 -155.0 -171.2 -189.1 
Trade balance RESBAL 8.3 2.1 -1.8 -3.4 -2.6 -0.8 1.5 
Interest payments INTP+INTG -6.3 -7.3 -9.8 -13.3 -17.5 -22.4 -27.9 
Other factor services NFP -4.2 -4.6 -5.1 -5.6 -6.1 -6.7 -7.4 
Total factor services NETFSY -10.5 -11.9 -14.9 -18.9 -23.6 -29.1 -35.3 
Net transfers NTRP+NTRG 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 
Current account CURBAL -2.1 -9.6 -16.5 -22.0 -26.0 -29.7 -33.4 
Per cent of GDP 
Exports X 23.6 23.5 23.6 23.9 24.2 24.7 25.2 
Imports M -21.7 -23.1 -24.0 -24.5 -24.6 -24.8 -25.0 
Trade balance RESBAL 1.9 0.4 -0.4 -0.6 -0.4 -0.1 0.2 
Interest payments INTP+INTG -1.5 -1.5 -1.9 -2.3 -2.8 -3.2 -3.7 
Other factor services NFP -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 
Total factor services NETFSY -2.5 -2.5 -2.9 -3.3 -3.8 -4.2 -4.7 
Net transfers NTRP+NTRG 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Current account CURBAL -0.5 -2.0 -3.2 -3.8 -4.1 -4.3 -4.4 
Note: Due to rounding, the figures do not in all cases add up 
BASE RUN 
most aid flows are expected to be on loan terms, and as such they 
are included in government net foreign borrowing. Yet it is obvious 
that if aid transfers on grant terms increase more than expected, 
the net transfer figure should be adjusted upwards. Similarly, to the 
extent that loans have, for example, a longer grace period than 
assumed above, net interest payments will be lower. The overall 
effect of such modifications is likely to be rather limited, however, 
given the magnitude of the variables involved. Consequently, the 
current account is projected to deteriorate steadily from a deficit of 
0.5 per cent of GDP in the base year to a deficit of 4.4 per cent of 
GDP at the end of the period. This should not give rise to 
particular concern, however, provided a socially just and sustain-
able growth path is established in the process, and it is highlighted 
that the deficit is projected to stabilize. In this manner, the need for 
continued borrowing from international capital markets should 
eventually disappear. 
As far as the capital account is concerned, the level of external 
debt reached very low levels in the early 1990s due to financial 
sanctions. With the admission of post-apartheid South Africa to 
international financial markets, both the government and the 
private sector again have access to foreign savings. It was there-
fore assumed, on the one side, that the annual net capital inflow 
caused by government foreign borrowing increases from 1.1 per 
cent of GDP in the base year to 2.2 per cent in the middle of the 
projection. Then the ratio starts falling to 1.8 per cent of GDP 
towards the end of the time horizon. As regards private capital 
flows, it can be noted that private direct foreign investment has 
traditionally played a significant role in the South African economy, 
and over 130 new foreign investments were already made during 
the three-year period prior to mid-1993 (ODI, 1994). If the 
government manages to curtail social unrest and clarify existing 
uncertainties regarding future economic policy and investment 
incentives in a convincing manner, the expectations of domestic 
and foreign investors can no doubt be influenced favourably. Hence, 
it is possible that direct foreign investments may speed up, while the 
risk of capital flight is at the same time being minimized. Moreover, 
South Africa is well placed to benefit from the recent surge in 
international liquidity in search of profitable emerging markets. 
Such inflows could provide an injection of foreign resources in 
the short- to medium-term, although the inherent mobility of 
such flows must obviously be taken into account at all times. 
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Table 6.7 Balance of payments (billion rand and share of GDP in per cent) 
Variable Symbol Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 }ear 3 Year 4 Year 5 }ear 6 
Billion rand 
Current account CURBAL -2.1 -9.6 -16.5 -22.0 -26.0 -29.7 -33.4 
Net new borrowing: 
Government iiNFDG -4.8 -7.2 -10.6 -12.7 -14.0 -13.9 -13.5 
Private sector iiNFDP -0.4 -8.8 -11.3 -13.8 -16.0 -19.6 -23.8 
Change in reserves iiR 3.1 6.4 5.4 4.5 4.0 3.8 3.9 
Per cent of GDP 
Current account CURBAL -0.5 -2.0 -3.2 -3.8 -4.1 -4.3 -4.4 
Net new borrowing: 
Government iiNFDG -1.1 -1.5 -2.0 -2.2 -2.2 -2.0 -1.8 
Private sector iiNFDP -0.1 -1.8 -2.2 -2.4 -2.6 -2.8 -3.1 
Change in reserves iiR 0.7 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.5 
Note: Due to rounding, the shares do not in all cases add up 
BASE RUN 
The above capital account items in the models used in this study 
are captured through changes in the net foreign borrowing by the 
private sector, which therefore includes all net private flows 
whether they are debt creating or not. Thus, annual private net 
capital inflows are expected to increase steadily from hardly any-
thing in the base year to 3.1 per cent of GDP in the final year, 
reflecting the important role private foreign borrowing will have to 
play in the medium-term. Table 6. 7 provides details on year-to-year 
fluctuations. In relation to this table, it is emphasized that the 
capital inflow must be seen in relation to the projected increase 
in investments. If increased foreign borrowing is siphoned off to 
finance unproductive consumption, the current account deficits 
would be undesirable and probably unsustainable. 
The change in foreign reserves in the RMSM is determined by 
the change in the foreign currency value of imports and calibration 
of the ratio of foreign reserves to imports using 1993 and 1994 
data, resulted in the value shown for Year O in Table 6.1. Moreover, 
since reserves are rather low in the base year, the reserve-import 
parameter was set rather low in the first year so as to ensure that 
additional reserves are built-up. Subsequently the reserve-import 
ratio was gradually adjusted upwards during the forecast horizon in 
order to ensure a reasonable level of reserve accumulation, leading 
to a stock of reserves which is equivalent to three months of imports 
in the last year. Foreign reserves as a share of GDP grow steadily from 
3.2 per cent in the beginning to 6.2 per cent at the end of the period. 
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTS 
To address the economic and social legacies left behind by apart-
heid, fiscal policy is going to play a crucial role. To meet basic 
human needs and achieve the twin goals of economic growth and 
redistribution, government must aim at reviving investments in 
physical and social infrastructure and implementing other pro-
grammes, which imply a tangible up-lift of the African popula-
tion. This must, however, be done without compromising the 
confidence and dynamism of the business sector. Avoiding lagging 
private investment and capital flight are, as already noted, two of 
the preconditions which must be fulfilled if South Africa is to 
break decisively out of the stagflationary, vicious circle. 
The centrality of fiscal policy is further underscored by the fact 
that public debt has grown significantly during the first half of the 
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1990s. Whereas the government borrowing requirement to GDP 
ratio was in the order of 1.5 per cent at the beginning of the 
decade, the ratio had risen to 8.6 per cent of GDP in 1992-3 due 
to rapidly increasing public sector budget deficits. Thus, it is crucial 
to be aware of the financial constraints under which the govern-
ment will operate in the coming years, if the desire to maintain 
macroeconomic balance and avoid crowding out private sector 
investment is to be realized. It follows that prospects for the 
government's sources of deficit finance as well as its incomes 
and expenditures have to be established. 
Given the need to revive investment in physical and social 
infrastructure, it is tempting to target a considerable increase in 
this expense. Yet, taking account of widely reported problems with 
implementing the RDP (Financial Mail, April 1995), which are 
unlikely to disappear quickly, it has to be expected that govern-
ment will find it difficult to ensure a growth rate of government 
investments above that of GDP. Accordingly, it was assumed that 
government investment will remain at its base year level of 2.2 per 
cent of GDP throughout as shown in Table 6.8. As far as other 
government expenditures and transfers to government from the 
rest of the world are concerned, they were also fixed as percentages 
of GDP (i.e. increasing by 3.5 per cent each year in real terms). 
Interest payments on domestic and foreign public debt were 
linked to the respective debt stocks. The rate of interest on 
foreign debt has already been discussed above, and the underlying 
assumption regarding the rate of interest on domestic debt is that 
the real rate initially increases considerably from 5 to 8 per cent as 
inflation drops from 9 per cent in the base year to 6 per cent in the 
first year. This corresponds well with what actually happened in 
1995 and reflects the nominal rate of 14 per cent shown in Table 
3.8. This assumption is left unchanged in the second year, where 
the real rate remains at 8 per cent, but it is then assumed that the 
nominal rate starts tapering off by half a percentage point each 
year. Thus, the underlying real rate of interest on government 
domestic debt gradually falls to 6 per cent in the final year, 
corresponding to a nominal rate of 12 per cent. 
The only remaining variable on the expenditure side is govern-
ment consumption which increases as a share of GDP from 20.7 
per cent in the first year to 21.8 per cent in the final year. This may 
not appear significant, but it does imply an expansion of the public 
sector by 23.9 per cent in real terms when consumption and 
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Table 6.8 Government budget (billion rand and share of GDP in per cent) 
Variable Symbol Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
Bi/lion rand 
Revenue TG 118.1 129.6 143.2 158.8 177.4 198.1 219.6 
Net transfers from ROW NTRG 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 
Consumption CG -91.3 -98.8 -108.9 -120.6 -134.2 -149.4 -164.7 
Investment IVG -9.6 -10.4 -11.3 -12.3 -13.5 -14.9 -16.3 
Foreign interest payments INFG -3.9 -4.7 -5.9 -7.6 -9.7 -12.0 -14.4 
Domestic interest payments INDG -21.2 -23.8 -26.2 -27.5 -28.7 -29.7 -30.7 
Other expenditures GT -15.4 -16.9 -18.6 -20.4 -22.3 -24.5 -26.9 
Budget surplus -BRG -23.1 -24.7 -27.3 -29.3 -30.7 -31.9 -32.8 
Per cent of GDP 
Revenue TG 27.2 27.2 27.4 27.7 28.2 28.7 29.0 
Net transfers from ROW NTRG 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Consumption CG -21.0 -20.7 -20.8 -21.0 -21.3 -21.6 -21.8 
Investment IVG -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 
Foreign interest payments INFG -0.9 -1.0 -1.1 -1.3 -1.5 -1.7 -1.9 
Domestic interest payments INDG -4.9 -5.0 -5.0 -4.8 -4.6 -4.3 -4.0 
Other expenditures GT -3.6 -3.6 -3.6 -3.6 -3.6 -3.6 -3.6 
Budget surplus -BRG -5.3 -5.2 -5.2 -5.1 -4.9 -4.6 -4.3 
Note: Due to rounding, the figures do not in all cases add up 
BASE RUN 
investment are added. It is, finally, highlighted that the actual 
composition of government investment and consumption may, 
of course, vary and the classification will in many cases be rather 
arbitrary if due account is taken of the productive impact of social 
expense, registered as current items. 
As far as government revenue is concerned, there is in South 
Africa an indispensable need as well as some scope for increasing 
taxation as a share of GDP. The Katz Commission has, for 
example, pointed out that improvements in tax administration 
and collection could yield a significant amount of additional 
revenue (Department of Finance, 1995, p. 2.27). Thus, tax rev-
enue is estimated to increase from 27.2 per cent of GDP in the 
base year to 29.0 per cent in the final year. This implies an annual 
growth rate, which increases in real terms from 3.6 per cent in the 
first year to 5.4 per cent in the fourth year. Then the real growth 
rate falls to 4.6 per cent in the last year, and this is also equal to the 
average annual growth ·rate for the whole period. Given that the 
base run is built around a growing economy, the higher tax rate and 
government revenue do not undermine real private consumption. 
Moreover, the assumptions concerning expenditures and revenue 
result in a deficit, which decreases from 5.3 per cent of GDP in the 
base year to 4.3 per cent in the last year of the scenario. Although 
this is higher than the strict targets of the GNU, a deficit of this 
size, is as documented here, fully' compatible with a stable macro-
economic performance. It can also be noted that the government 
estimates that the budget deficit will fall to 4 per cent of GDP in 
1998-9 under the present· fiscal stance (Department of Finance, 
1995, p. 2.3). However, the definition of the deficit used in this 
study differs from that of the government. Thus, while the official 
deficit was 6.3 per cent of GDP in 1994-5, the corresponding 
1994 figure used here is 5.3 per cent. 
The finance of the government deficit from the rest of the world 
was referred to above, and the easing up of the external capital 
constraint is an encouraging aspect of the future development 
outlook for the South African economy. As far as domestic credit 
is concerned, this source of finance, contrary to what has been 
typical in many other developing countries, is not expected to 
contribute at all to government deficit financing. This would 
seem an appropriate assumption given the concern in South 
Africa with the undesirable inflationary consequences of excessive 
monetization of fiscal deficits. The remaining deficit is therefore as 
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Table 6.9 Government finance (billion rand and share of GDP in per cent) 
Variable Symbol Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Billion rand 
Domestic credit Af)CG 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Domestic borrowing 11NDDG 17.8 17.4 16.7 16.5 16.7 18.0 19.3 
Foreign borrowing 11NFDG 4.8 7.2 10.6 12.7 14.0 13.9 13.4 
Borrowing requirement BRG 23.1 24.7 27.3 29.3 30.7 31.9 32.8 
Per cent of GDP 
Domestic credit Af)CG 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Domestic borrowing 11NDDG 4.1 3.7 3.2 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.6 
Foreign borrowing 11NFDG 1.1 1.5 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.0 1.8 
Borrowing requirement BRG 5.3 5.2 5.2 5.1 4.9 4.6 4.3 
Note: Due to rounding, the figures do not in all cases add up 
BASE RUN 
shown in Table 6.9 covered by borrowing in domestic financial 
markets. 
This will provide an amount of finance to the government which 
is equal to 3.7 per cent of GDP in the first year, but then the share 
falls gradually to a medium-term level of only 2.6 per cent of GDP. 
The corresponding medium-term annual growth rate of this source 
of finance is 7.2 per cent, i.e. less than the expected growth rate of 
nominal GDP of 9.7 per cent, but higher than the annual rate of 
inflation of 6 per cent. The underlying behavioural assumption 
would appear reasonable given the moderately optimistic position 
taken as far as growth and stability are concerned, which makes it 
sensible to assume that the private sector is willing to increase its 
stock of government debt in real terms. It is noted, however, that 
the issue of making sure that the private sector is willing to hold 
sufficient government stock is a complex one, which is, inter alia, in 
interplay with the interest policy the government decides to opt for. 
In sum, total available credit from the three sources identified 
above (i.e. borrowing from the rest of the world, the banking 
system and the private sector through the issuance of domestic 
debt) corresponds with the projected decrease in the government 
budget deficit from 5.3 per cent in the base year to 4.3 per cent in 
the last year of the scenario. 
ASSET STOCKS 
With the assumed constant velocity of money circulation, shown in 
Table 6.1, which was caliorated from the 1994 data for money 
demand and nominal GDP, the growth rate of nominal GDP 
translates directly into money demand. Thus, money demand 
and supply grow by 9. 7 per cent on an annual basis during the 
whole period. It follows that the money stock as a share of GDP 
remains constant at the base year level of 56.2 per cent as indicated 
in Table 6.10. 
With regard to domestic credit, the stock of domestic credit 
extended to the government as a share of GDP drops consistently 
to 2.0 per cent in the last year as this source of deficit financing is 
not used. In addition, given the assumptions about international 
reserves and public sector credit already discussed above, credit 
extended to the private sector can be determined residually. Hence, 
private credit grows at rates slightly below those of nominal GDP 
in the early years. The result is that private credit as a percentage of 
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Table 6.10 Money supply (billion rand and per cent annual growth) 
Variable Symbol Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
Billion rand 
Private sector DCP 214.6 231.5 251.4 274.6 301.0 330.4 363.0 
Government DCG 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 
Foreign reserves E*R 14.1 20.9 27.0 32.3 37.2 42.1 47.3 
Money supply MS 244.2 267.9 293.9 322.4 353.7 388.1 425.7 
Per cent annual growth 
Private sector DCP 7.9 8.6 9.2 9.6 9.8 9.8 
Government DCG 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Foreign reserves E*R 48.3 28.9 19.7 15.3 13.2 12.2 
Money supply MS 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.7 
Note: Due to rounding, the figures do not in all cases add up 
Table 6.11 Debt stocks (share of GDP in per cent) 
Variable Symbol rearO rear 1 rear 2 rear 3 rear4 }ear 5 rear 6 
Government domestic credit DCG 3.6 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.0 
Government domestic debt NDDG 39.0 39.2 38.9 38.3 37.6 36.9 36.2 
Government foreign debt NFDG 7.4 8.5 10.0 11.6 13.1 14.3 15.2 
Total government debt 50.0 51.0 51.9 53.2 53.2 53.4 53.4 
Private sector foreign debt NFDP 4.1 5.7 7.5 9.4 11.4 13.5 15.8 
BASE RUN 
GDP drops a little from 49.4 per cent in the base year to its 
medium-term level of 47.9 per cent. On the other hand, private 
credit growth rates are larger than price inflation, so this represents 
a real increase in private credit of almost 20 per cent in the final 
year as compared to the base year. Thus, private sector expansion is 
supported by making additional credit available at an average 
annual rate of growth in real terms of 3 per cent. 
The stock of government borrowing in domestic financial mar-
kets grows at an annual rate of 10.3 per cent in the first year after 
which it falls to a medium-term level of 7.6 per cent. Consequently, 
the stock of government domestic debt is as shown in Table 6.11 
projected to decrease from 39.2 per cent in the first year to 36.2 
per cent of GDP in the final year, since the economy grows and 
inflation decreases the real value of existing government debt. 
As far as the stock of foreign debt is concerned, net government 
foreign debt will increase during the whole period in line with 
developments in the financing of the government deficit. Over-
all, the stock of government foreign debt increases as a share of 
GDP from 7.4 per cent in the base year to 15.2 per cent in the last 
year as shown in Table 6.11. This reflects an average annual rate of 
growth of 20.1 per cent in rand terms. All in all, this implies that 
total government debt as a percentage of GDP increases from 50.0 
per cent in the base year to 53.4 per cent. Thus, there are no signs 
of the government running into a debt trap, in particular since 
interest payments remain more or less at the base year level of 5.8 
per cent of GDP and annual growth rates in the debt show a 
declining trend from the second year. 
Finally, it follows from the assumptions made about the capital 
account of the balance of payments that the stock of private sector 
foreign debt increases at an average annual rate of growth in 
foreign currency terms which amounts to 33. 7 per cent. This 
corresponds to 4.1 per cent of GDP in the base year and to 
15.8 per cent in the final year, which can be considered a fairly 
low ratio. 
CONCLUSION 
The base run established in this chapter demonstrates that the 
government of in South Africa is not without room for man-
oeuvre. Thus, it may well succeed in promoting growth as well as 
greater equity, if appropriate policy measures are taken. There is 
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macroeconomic space to implement a substantial investment and 
social rehabilitation programme to the benefit of the disadvantaged 
group of the population, and this can be done without crowding out 
the private sector and disturbing macroeconomic balances exces-
sively. There is some excess productive capacity, and the access to 
international capital markets will also provide a welcome boost to 
the economy, if used judiciously. South Africa is, after all, potentially 
a very rich economy due to its impressive natural resource base. 
In conclusion, however, it must be stressed that growth will not 
by itself ensure that the moderately optimistic path put forward in 
this chapter is socially just and sustainable. The growth strategy of 
South Africa must, as pointed out by Gibson and van Seventer 
(1995a) be consistent both in the accounting sense and in regard to 
the objectives being pursued. Thus, an explicit set of micro level 
policies designed to promote employment creation and avoid a 
worsening of the income distribution will be indispensable in 





The dual needs for redistribution and growth are, as is clear from 
previous chapters of this study, no longer an issue in South Africa. 
It is, moreover, apparent that South Africa will in future have a 
mixed economy, in which market forces play a major role in the 
allocation of resources in productive activity. Thus, the basic 
approaches to economic policy have been converging "in recent 
years as compared to the positions taken by the ANC and the 
Nationalist Party (NP) before the GNU came to power in 1994. 
Yet the consensus is far from complete. 
The Nationalist Party and institutions such as SARB, on the one 
side, are clearly in favour of an orthodox growth maximizing 
strategy, in the expectation that the benefits of growth will even-
tually trickle down to the disadvantaged poor. This was originally 
illustrated by the specific targets put forward within the framework 
of the Normative Economic Model (NEM) (CEAS, 1993). More 
recently, as noted in Chapter 2, this position has also been argued 
on the basis of the view that there is no durable trade-off between 
inflation and output growth and unemployment, in combination 
with opposition to the government taking an active stance as 
regards policy interventions. The ANC, on the other side, has 
over the years held a more developmental position as expressed 
in its Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa (ANC, 
1992) and the more recent RDP (ANC, 1994). 
The base run established in Chapter 6 demonstrates that even 
substantial increases in government activity are not in contradic-
tion with the need to promote private sector activity and attain 
macro balance within the analytical frameworks used in this book. 
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Hence, escaping the vicious circle of the 1980s may be feasible, 
and an even stronger revival of economic activity cannot be 
excluded a priori. Yet government expansion can obviously be 
pushed too far in response to domestic social and political pres-
sures, crowding-out not only private but also public expense of key 
importance to the growth process. Thus, future prospects depend 
critically on the underlying assumptions, and it is justified to call as 
well for prudence in the assessment of future economic policy 
options. This chapter therefore presents both an optimistic and a 
more pessimistic assessment of medium-term perspectives. These 
two alternative scenarios are intended to highlight, in a quantitative 
manner, the broad macroeconomic confines within which future 
policy choices will have to be made. As such they can, we hope, 
serve as useful points of reference, together with the base run, in 
macroeconomic dialogue, the construction of an appropriate med-
ium-term expenditure framework, and the assessment of the many 
inherent trade-offs with which policy makers are faced. The two 
additional projections are asymmetrical in the sense that the 
changes in the relevant exogenous variables, parameters and policy 
instruments, summarized in Table 7.1, are not mirror images of 
each other. They have, instead, been constructed, based on insights 
from Chapter 5 and information from outside the models, so as to 
tell two different stories, with features which are distinct from 
those of the base run. However, the three projections share 
certain common characteristics in terms of their overall macro-
economic focus, and they were all developed on the basis of the 
analytical frameworks presented in Chapter 4. 
ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS 
Optimistic scenario 
In view of the difficult challenges South Africa will face in the 
coming years, it can certainly be argued that the base run is in many 
ways less than what might be hoped for from a social and political 
perspective. In addition, if South Africa could manage to emulate 
Chilean or East Asian success in terms of growth performance 
more could be achieved on the socio-economic front. Such an 
optimistic scenario would no doubt involve an increase in domestic 
savings and investment, while export demand needs to surge to 
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new heights and supply constraints are overcome in a flexible and 
expedient manner through appropriate government policies at 
macro, sector and micro levels. Another dimension might there-
fore be that additional unused capacity can be found. This would, 
ceteris paribus, lower investment requirements in the short-term to a 
more manageable level and be consistent with the need to allow 
private consumption to expand in per capita terms. To underpin 
such a scenario, a high degree of political stability will be necessary. 
Thus, the government must act in a competent and convincing 
manner in the management and restructuring of the country's 
economic and political affairs, promoting technological progress 
and employment creation. Nevertheless, the relatively peaceful 
political transition presently under way in South Africa is an 
important indication that the above combination of factors may 
indeed materialize. 
Thus, in the construction of the optimistic scenario, it was 
decided to add an extra 1.5 percentage points to the level of 
growth in aggregate and sectoral GDP and an additional two 
percentage points to the aggregate and disaggregated export 
growth rates. Accordingly, real GDP in the final year of the 
projection is 9 per cent higher in the optimistic scenario than in 
the base run. Moreover, the private sector saving propensity was 
set to increase steadily from 0.227 in the base year to 0.285 towards 
the end of the forecast in light of positive economic developments. 
The constant in the investment function was adjusted downwards 
in the early years to capture additional excess productive capacity 
and smooth out developments in the investment-consumption 
balances. 
On the side of government, it was assumed that real government 
investment and other government expenditures (i.e. transfers 
excluding interest payments) increase in line with GDP at a path 
which is about 1.5 percentage points above that of the base run so 
their shares of GDP remain the same; and that government 
revenue is reduced in nominal terms due to lower inflation, 
established in what follows. Nevertheless, real taxes were pitched 
in such a manner that the real rate of growth in government 
revenue in the optimistic scenario is at a path which is 0.9 
percentage points above that of the base run. Hence, while real 
taxes increase, the actual tax burden, as measured by the govern-
ment revenue to GDP ratio, drops from 29.0 to 28.0 per cent in 
the last year. 
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As far as financing the government deficit, it was built into the 
optimistic scenario that government refrains from using domestic 
credit expansion as a source of funding as was the case in the base 
run. It was, moreover, assumed that the government will reduce its 
external borrowing so the net government foreign debt in foreign 
currency terms grows along a path which is 3.6 percentage points 
below that of the base run. This would be consistent with a desire 
to limit the exposure to international capital markets, utilizing in 
this way part of the space opened up by the better growth and 
export performance. 
Regarding credit to the private sector, it was assumed that the 
South African government will find annual increases in real terms, 
which are 2.6 per cent above that of the corresponding path in the 
base run, acceptable. Taking account of the increase in the money 
stock due to GDP growth and an assumed reduction in the 
velocity of money circulation of 1 per cent annually, inflation can 
drop to 3 per cent on an annual basis. The change in money 
velocity is justified by people gaining improved expectations of 
the future and lower rates of interest, which imply that they will, in 
all likelihood, be willing to hold more monetary assets. Moreover, 
the drop in inflation would be in line with the SARB desires to 
reduce price increases to an annual rate below that of the base run. 
The nominal domestic interest rate is assumed to fall somewhat 
slower than the rate of inflation, reflecting the fact that the interest 
rate on existing debt is fixed. Hence, it decreases gradually from 
the level of 14 per cent in the base year to 9 per cent in the last year 
of the optimistic scenario, corresponding to a fall from 10 to 6 per 
cent in the real rate over the time horizon considered. Finally, the 
accumulation of foreign reserves was set so that the ratio of 
reserves to imports adjusts as before from two to three months 
of import coverage. This implies an average annual growth rate, 
which is 1.8 percentage points above that of the base run. 
Pessimistic scenario 
The social fabric of South Africa has been threatened for decades. 
Large groups of the population have felt they had a better chance 
of survival in conditions of anarchy than in conditions of stability, 
and to reorient the future course of the economy to the benefit of 
the discriminated majority is going to be an extremely difficult task. 
Hence, fundamental problems go deep, as pointed out in Chapter 
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2, and there is plenty of reason to remain cautious in the assess-
ment of the future prospects of South Africa. Consequently, while 
the threat of organized unrest has subsided rapidly in the last few 
years, violence and criminal behaviour could easily erupt and 
escalate if the depth and aptness of leadership weakens and 
unsurmountable internal conflicts and management problems 
occur. This would no doubt inhibit badly needed economic 
restructuring, limit the inflow of foreign capital and intensify 
capital flight. In turn, this would constrain import capacity, impair-
ing economic recovery, and depress domestic output and exports. 
Under such circumstances it would become increasingly difficult 
for the government to picture the existing high expectations as 
being in a process of fulfilment. A more pessimistic scenario 
should not, therefore, be discarded a priori. 
Such a scenario would from a macroeconomic point of view 
undoubtedly involve a worsening of savings and investment as 
well as output and export growth as compared to the base run. 
Consequently, the savings rate was reduced by one percentage point 
throughout the projection, and the aggregate and sectoral GDP 
growth paths were shifted downwards by 1.5 percentage points, 
implying an accumulated shortfall in the last year of the pessimistic 
scenario of 8.4 per cent of GDP in constant prices. In addition, the 
initial excess capacity assumed in both the base run and the 
optimistic scenario was removed by setting the constant in the 
investment function at its calibrated base year value based on the 
view that the use of South African capital does not become more 
efficient in the pessimistic scenario. The export performance pro-
jected is somewhat more positive than that of output growth, but 
under bleak conditions it will be difficult to avoid a downwards shift 
of about one percentage point as compared to the base run, due to 
domestic demand pressures. This is therefore the change used here. 
Export prices were set to grow at only 2 per cent annually as 
compared to 3 per cent in the base run to illustrate the risk of 
deteriorating terms of trade. The potential negative influence from 
developments in the world economy might also include the fact 
that South Africa captures a diminished share of international 
capital liquidity. Consequently, annual growth in the stock of net 
foreign debt by the private sector was reduced by an average of 
13.4 percentage points as compared to the base run and the 
optimistic scenario. This implies that the stock of net private 
foreign debt in the final year amounts to only slightly more than 
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half the debt stock in the other two scenarios. Foreign borrowing 
by the government was kept unchanged in dollar terms, however, 
based on the view that government will continue to have some 
access to international capital markets in the pessimistic scenario. 
Nevertheless, with economic performance below the level pro-
jected in the base run, government will certainly find it increasingly 
difficult to finance its activities. It was therefore decided to let 
government investment and other government expenditures 
decrease in line with economic performance in terms of growth. 
Thus, their growth paths are 1.5 percentage points below those of 
the base run, and their shares of GDP remain the same. Moreover, 
as issuance of additional domestic debt is unlikely to be a feasible 
response to the government financing constraints due to the 
detrimental effects this may have on the interest rate, government 
will have to rely on domestic credit expansion, in contrast to the 
situation in the base run and the optimistic scenario. Consequently, 
growth in real private sector credit will be squeezed in the pessi-
mistic scenario, reflected in annual rates of increase, which are 
between 1. 9 and 7. 9 percentage points below those of the base 
run. Thus, whereas the average annual growth of real private credit 
amounts to 3 per cent in the base run, real private credit drops on 
average by 3 per cent per year in the pessimistic scenario. 
Turning to government revenue, this variable will decrease in 
real terms in spite of considerable nominal increases, reflecting 
accelerating inflation, reaching an annual rate of 14.6 per cent in 
the final year. It was assumed here that the growth of real govern-
ment revenue is 2.1 percentage points below that of the base run 
except in the first year. Accordingly, the shortfall in real govern-
ment revenue amounts to 9.6 per cent in the last year of the 
pessimistic projection as compared to the base run. It can also 
be noted that the increasing rate of inflation is consistent with a 
velocity of money circulation and a level of foreign reserves, which 
are assumed to remain at their base run values throughout instead 
of respectively falling and increasing as in the optimistic scenario. 
Finally, the real domestic interest rate was assumed to remain at 
the first year level of 8 per cent in all years instead of falling 
gradually to 6 per cent as in the base run and the optimistic 
scenario. This implies a nominal annual rate that grows from the 
14 per cent level in the base year to 22. 7 per cent in the final year, 
when account is taken of inflation. 
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Table 7.1 Assumptions underlying the_ b¼se run and the alternative 
scenarios 
Variable .fymbol Base run Optimistic Pessimistic 
Real growth rates in per cent 
GDP GDP 3.5 +1.5 -1.5 
Exports X 4.6t +2.0 -1.0 
Government NG 3.1t +1.5 -1.5 
investment 
Government revenue TG 4.6t +0.9 -2.1t 
Other government 
expenditures GT 3.5 +1.4 -1.5 
Private sector credit DCP 3.ot +2.6 -5.st 
Growth rates in per cent 
Net foreign government 
20.1t debt NFDG -3.6 0.0 
Net foreign private debt NFDP 33_7t 0.0 -13.4t 
Foreign reserves R 18.9t +1.st 0.0 
Export price index XPI 3.0 0.0 -1.0 
Money velocity V 3.0 -1.0 0.0 
Levels 
Domestic interest rate§ IRD Year 1: 0.140 -0.010 +0.010 
Year 3: 0.135 -0.030 +0.042 
Year 6: 0.120 -0.030 +0.109 
Savings propensity§ 13 Year 1: 0.230 +0.010 -0.010 
Year 2: 0.245 +0.039 -0.010 
Constant in investment 
function§ KO Year 1: 0.124 -0.025 +0.018 
Year 4: 0.142 -0.005 0.000 
Year 6: 0.142 0.000 0.000 
Notes: • For the base run, actual values of annual growth rates and levels are 
shown, while it is the changes of these values that are shown for the 
optimistic and pessimistic scenarios. All figures are based on domestic 
currency values except net foreign government debt (NFDG), net foreign 
private debt (NFDP) and foreign reserves (R), which refer to foreign 
currency figures 
t The annual growth rate varies over the time horizon, and the value 
represents the average annual growth rate 
§ Selected years are listed to illustrate changes over time 
Summing-up 
In the construction of the alternative scenarios various modifica-
tions were made in the relevant exogenous variables, as set out in 
detail above (including the traditional target variables in the under-
lying analytical frameworks), parameters and policy instruments as 
compared to the base run. In Table 7.1, these alterations are 
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summarized together with the base run values of the variables and 
parameters involved. 
It is reiterated that the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios are 
not mirror images of each other. It can, in particular, be noted 
from Table 7.1 that foreign capital flows develop in distinct ways, 
and also the numerical magnitude of the effects involved are 
different. Finally, it is recalled that all variables were, in fact, 
treated as endogenous in the review process in line with the 
comments made in Chapter 4. Consequently, Table 7.1 should 
also be read in conjunction with the results to be discussed in 
the next section. 
RESULTS 
By way of introduction to the results of the alternative scenarios, it 
can be noted that they could be presented in the same way as the 
base run in Chapter 6. However, instead of summarizing the data 
in tabular form, it was decided to make use of a series of illustrative 
figures in this chapter to capture the relevant characteristics. All the 
necessary detailed background data are available in Appendices C 
and D. 
They show, first of all, that the terms-of-trade deterioration 
assumed in constructing the pessimistic scenario corresponds to 
a share of real GDP, which increases from 0.2 per cent in the first 
year to 1.5 per cent in the last year of the forecasting period. This is 
equivalent to 0.9 and 4.2 billion rand respectively in constant base 
year prices. Thus, whereas there is no difference between real GDP 
and real GDY in the base run and the optimistic scenario, the 
growth path of real GDY is below that of real GDP in the 
pessimistic scenario. The difference amounts to approximately 
0.25 of a percentage point. As far as real output growth is 
concerned, as pointed out in Chapter 6, it is difficult to make 
projections in the South African case. However, given the assump-
tions made in the above section, real GDY will develop as shown 
in Figure 7 .1, and it should be mentioned that the optimistic 
scenario ends up in the sixth year of the projection with a real 
GDY which is 17.2 per cent higher than the real GDY of the 
pessimistic scenario. 
Despite the increased need for investment to underpin the better 
growth performance of the optimistic projection, there is room to 
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Figure 1.1 Gross domestic income (constant 1994 prices) 
and 4.3 per cent respectively per year on average. Real private and 
government consumption in constant base year prices therefore 
reach levels in the final year which are 5.0 per cent and 1.5 per cent 
above their base run values. This corresponds to a difference of 
14.2 and 2.4 billion rand in constant prices as shown in Figures 7.2 
and 7.3. 
Also in the pessimistic scenario, there is initially room for an 
expansion of government consumption as compared to the base 
run, and this increase is actually larger than the boost in the 
optimistic scenario as shown in Figure 7.3. This is caused, how-
ever, by the more limited expansion of investment due to the lower 
growth performance. Hence, from the middle of the projection 
real government consumption drops below the level of the base 
run. As a consequence, the level achieved in the final year of the 
pessimistic scenario is only 17.3 per cent higher than in the base 
year. This implies practically no increase in per capita terms 
considering a population increase of around 2.6 per cent a year. 
This observation is put further into perspective by noting that it 
can be projected that real private consumption drops by 1.4 per 
cent per year on average in the pessimistic scenario. Hence, the 
implied real drop in per capita consumption (government and 
private) reaches 9.4 per cent by the final year of the projection. 
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Figure 7.4 Total investments (constant 1994 prices) 
the first critical years, and they are larger than the initial expansion 
in government consumption referred to above. 
Total real investment including both private and government 
investment is, as is clear from Figure 7.4, projected to increase 
in all of the projections put forward. Yet average growth rates and 
investment ratios are very different, corresponding largely with the 
deviations in terms of growth performance. Thus, while invest-
ment grows at an average annual rate of 10.8 per cent in the 
optimistic scenario, the corresponding figures in the base run 
and the pessimistic scenario are 6.8 per cent and only 2.5 per 
cent, respectively. Consequently, the optimistic scenario involves 
a very considerable expansion of real investment, reaching a level 
which is 24.6 per cent above the base run value in constant base 
year prices in the last year of the projection. The pessimistic 
scenario, on the other hand, ends up being 21.8 per cent below 
the base run level, reflecting, first of all, a serious drop in private 
investment. The cumulative difference in total real investment over 
the six-year period between the optimistic and pessimistic scenar-
ios is equal to no less than 233. 7 billion rand. This corresponds to 
53.8 per cent of total GDP in the base year. 
In this context it can also be highlighted that the investment 
expansion in the base run and the optimistic scenario is particularly 
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Figure 7.5 Imports (constant 1994 prices) 
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at a higher level where annual increases are more limited. In the 
pessimistic scenario, the initial expansion is hardly noticeable, so 
investment growth is almost constant. Moreover, while the invest-
ment ratio in the last year of the base run is 21.8 per cent of GDP, 
it drops to an obviously insufficient 18.5 per cent in the pessimistic 
scenario. In the optimistic projection, the investment ratio arrives 
at 24. 9 per cent, well above the base year level of 18 per cent. 
As far as real imports are concerned, they grow in all of the three 
scenarios presented in this study, as shown in Figure 7.5. Never-
theless, whereas the annual average rate of growth is 5.9 per cent in 
the base run, it amounts to 7.6 per cent and 2.6 per cent in the 
optimistic and pessimistic scenarios, respectively. In addition, while 
the difference between the base run and the pessimistic scenario is 
limited in the first year, the spread in import level between these 
two paths gradually opens up to 22.9 billion rand in constant prices 
in the last year. The difference between the optimistic and the 
pessimistic scenarios ends up amounting to 36.1 billion rand in 
constant prices. This is almost 40 per cent of total imports in the 
base year. 
Import growth is particularly high in the early years of the 
optimistic scenario and the base run, but the rate is brought 
down to a more sustainable level in the third year. Consequently, 
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Figure 7.6 External resource balance (per cent of GDP) 
both the base run and the optimistic scenario, but in the pessimis-
tic scenario this share is only 22.6 per cent. In the pessimistic 
projection, more constrained capital inflows and the assumed 
poorer export performance put a limit on available external 
finance. This causes the real exchange rate to depreciate, although 
the less satisfactory growth performance also corresponds with a 
relative drop in imports. 
The overall implication for the resource balance is that South 
Africa, as shown in Figure 7.6, will import less than is exported for 
the whole of the time horizon studied in the pessimistic scenario, 
and the resource balance is actually improving from the second 
year onwards. As regards the optimistic scenario, the resource 
balance remains positive except in the third year, but the surplus 
is much smaller than in the pessimistic scenario in response to the 
greater import demand and more favourable financing conditions. 
Consequently, while the trade surplus in foreign currency terms 
disappears quickly in the base run, it takes somewhat longer in the 
optimistic scenario, and in the pessimistic scenario the balance 
decreases to a positive 4.4 billion rand in the second year from a 
base year level of 8.3 billion before improving even further. 
However, the relatively more positive resource balance in the 
pessimistic scenario is actually a condition imposed by the inability 
to borrow in international capital markets, rather than being a 
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desired state of affairs. Thus, there is in the pessimistic scenario a 
considerable real resource outflow from South Africa amounting to 
between 0.5 per cent and 2.0 per cent of GDP per year. In contrast, 
the outflow quickly disappears in the base run, and in the last year of 
the optimistic scenario the outflow is limited to less than 0.7 per 
cent of GDP after a real resource inflow of 0.1 per cent of GDP in 
the middle of the period. In the circumstances facing South Africa 
there is a considerable need to ensure the availability of adequate 
real resources, so the very high positive trade balance in foreign 
currency terms could in the pessimistic scenario ignite inherent 
social difficulties and conflict. Hence, the trade and resource 
balance indicators must be interpreted with great care. 
Turning to prices and the exchange rate, it may be recalled from 
Chapter 6 that the real exchange rate was assumed to remain 
constant, and that the annual inflation rate was at 6 per cent 
throughout in the construction of the base run. Thus, after the 
transition from the base year to the first year, where inflation drops 
to its new level, annual nominal devaluations of 2.9 per cent are 
required for the rest of the period as shown in Figure 7.7. In 
relation to the optimistic scenario, annual inflation was, as pointed 
out above, limited even further to 3 per cent. This implies initially a 
minor appreciation of the real rate of exchange as compared to the 
base run, which is mainly caused by the additional foreign currency 
inflows due to increased exports. Yet the real rate subsequently 
depreciates slowly to a level just above the base run level in the last 
year of the optimistic projection. As shown in Figure 7.7, this 
development in the real rate requires a transition from the base 
year to a situation where the nominal exchange rate remains almost 
constant throughout. This is consistent with the fact that domestic 
inflation is similar to world price inflation. 
As regards the pessimistic scenario, it is assumed that the new 
government will have to finance a growing deficit through domes-
tic credit as the only available source of finance. If the government, 
in addition, maintains the extension of nominal credit to the private 
sector as shown in Table 7 .1, the implication is that annual inflation 
will gradually increase to 14.7 per cent. With the assumed rates of 
inflation in domestic and world prices, the pessimistic scenario 
requires annual nominal devaluations, which gradually grow to 
12.7 per cent, so the real exchange rate depreciates by approxi-
mately 12 per cent over the projection period. Due to the terms of 
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Figure 7.7 The exchange rate (annual changes in per cent) 
becomes necessary to distinguish between the real rate of exchange 
for exports and imports, calculated as the nominal exchange rate 
divided by the domestic price level and multiplied by the export and 
import price level, respectively. On this basis it can be noted that 
while the real exchange rate for exports gradually depreciates to a 
level which differs by 6.5 per cent from the base year rate, the real 
rate of exchange for imports depreciates by a total of 12.1 per cent. 
Developments in the resource balance were reviewed above, and 
it was noted that the trade balance in foreign currency terms is 
generally positive in the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios. How-
ever, due to interest payments, net factor payments and other 
transfers, the small deficit on the current account in the base 
year grows in all of the three scenarios as shown in Figure 7.8. 
The easy access to foreign borrowing in the base run is reflected 
in current account deficits, which reach a level of 4.4 per cent of 
GDP in the last year, while the optimistic and pessimistic levels are 
projected to end up at around 3.3 per cent and 2.6 per cent of 
GDP, respectively. The underlying story is that government is able 
to bring down the current account deficit in the optimistic scenario 
without impairing growth and real resource inflows. In the pessi-
mistic scenario, the deficit also appears under control, but in reality 
private foreign borrowing has become severely constrained. Simi-
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Figure 7.8 Current account (per cent of GDP) 
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interest payments will increase from 1.5 per cent of GDP in the 
base year to 3.7 per cent in the final year of the base run, whereas 
the corresponding shares in the optimistic and pessimistic scenar-
ios are 3.2 per cent and 3.5 per cent, respectively. 
As far as the government accounts are concerned, government 
domestic interest payments fall from 4.9 per cent to 4.0 per cent of 
GDP in the base run. They drop even further to only 3.0 per cent in 
the optimistic scenario, but increase to 6. 7 per cent in the pessi-
mistic scenario. Thus, taking account of foreign interest payments 
as well, total government interest payments as a share of GDP 
increase from 5.8 per cent of GDP in the base year to 5.9 per cent in 
the base run in the last year as shown in Figure 7.9. In the optimistic 
scenario total interest payments fall to only 4.5 per cent of GDP, 
whereas they increase in the pessimistic scenario to 9 per cent of 
GDP. This clearly reflects that while the government avoids the 
dangers of entering a debt trap in the base run and the optimistic 
scenario, this is certainly not the case in the pessimistic projection. 
In line with the above observations, the government deficit falls 
from 5.3 per cent to 4.3 per cent of GDP in the base run, and in 
the optimistic scenario it is feasible to bring down the deficit even 
further to 2.5 per cent of GDP in the last year, as shown in Figure 
7.10, without impairing growth. In contrast, the government 
deficit as a share of GDP increases to almost 8 per cent in the 
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Figure 7.9 Total government interest payments (per cent of GDP) 
pessimistic scenario, highlighting the very different characteristics 
of the three scenarios presented. Similarly, while the annual growth 
in the budget deficit stays at more than 15 per cent in the 
pessimistic scenario towards the end of the time horizon, it drops 
consistently in the optimistic scenario from the middle of the 
period, and in the base run the growth in the budget deficit is 
clearly under control, as discussed in Chapter 6. 
In accordance with the above developments, the government 
does not rely on domestic credit in the base run and the optimistic 
scenario, as shown in Figure 7 .11. The amount of real credit to the 
government in the latter scenario ends up at less than 15 billion 
rand, equivalent to around 2 per cent of GDP as compared to the 
base year level of 3.6 per cent. Yet in the pessimistic projection 
government will find itself forced to absorb a greater share of total 
domestic credit. Other sources cannot be tapped. Hence, govern-
ment credit will grow in real terms to around 60 billion rand, or 
12.2 per cent of GDP. 
Moreover, as demonstrated in Figure 7.12, credit to the private 
sector is squeezed in the pessimistic scenario. This is not the case 
in the other two scenarios. In fact, taking account of inflation, real 
credit to the private sector falls in the pessimistic scenario to only 
36.6 per cent of GDP, or 178.9 billion rand in real terms, as 
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Figure 7. 11 Government credit ( constant 1994 prices) 
year. In the base run and the optimistic scenario, real private credit 
increases to respectively 255.9 and 297.3 billion rand, correspond-
ing to 47.9 per cent and 51.1 per cent of GDP. Thus, while credit 
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Figure 7.12 Private sector credit ( constant 1994 prices) 
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share of GDP, despite the real increase in the amount of credit 
extended, the optimistic scenario makes it possible to let private 
credit grow as a share of GDP. 
Domestic debt finance involving the issuance of government 
debt decreases as a share of GDP in all three scenarios from the 
level of 4.1 per cent in the base year. The underlying reason in the 
optimistic scenario is that government does not need to rely as 
much on this financing source, so this source can fall to 1.5 per 
cent in the last year. The drop to 2.2 per cent in the pessimistic 
scenario reflects, on the other hand, an assumed inability to raise 
more funds through this mechanism without having to raise 
interest rates considerably. Finally, while increased foreign borrow-
ing is relied on to the extent feasible in the pessimistic scenario, 
government has the option of keeping this financing at a relatively 
low level in the optimistic scenario. 
With the assumed decrease of the velocity of money circulation, 
the growth in nominal GDP translates in the optimistic scenario 
into a nominal money supply amounting to almost 415 billion rand 
in the final year of the projection. This is to be compared to a 
nominal money supply of 244.2 billion in the base year. Accord-
ingly, as a share of GDP the money supply increases in the 
optimistic scenario from 56.2 per cent in the base year to 59.7 
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Figure 7.13 Money supply (constant 1994 prices) 
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run and the pessimistic scenario. The real increase in the money 
supply implied in the optimistic scenario is equal to 42.2 per cent 
over the six-year period in comparison with 22.9 per cent for the 
base run as illustrated in Figure 7.13. 
In the pessimistic scenario, the nominal money supply expands 
to 485.3 billion rand in the last year of the projection. This reflects 
an increase of almost 98.7 per cent. However, as a share of GDP, 
the money supply remains constant since the velocity of money 
circulation is kept unchanged, and the real increase in the money 
supply in the pessimistic scenario amounts to only 12.5 per cent 
due to inflation. This increase amounts to only around half the 
increase in the base run and between one-third and one-quarter the 
increase in the optimistic scenario. 
Finally, in relation to the composition of the money supply, it can 
be observed that the share of international reserves grows from 3.2 
per cent to around 6.3 per cent in both the base run and the 
optimistic scenario, whereas the share in the final year of the 
pessimistic scenario is 7.5 per cent. Thus, domestic credit expands 
slightly more in relative terms in the last scenario as compared to 
the first two. 
Together with the developments in the issuance of government 
domestic stock and net foreign borrowing by the government, total 
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Figure 7.14 Total government debt (per cent of GDP) 
in the base year to 53.4 per cent in the final year of the base run as 
shown in Figure 7.14. The corresponding debt/GDP ratios in the 
final year of the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios are 49.1 per 
cent and 62.1 per cent, respectively. Moreover, the composition of 
the debt among the three available sources of finance (i.e. domestic 
credit as well as government domestic foreign debt) is markedly 
different in the three scenarios. This reflects, inter alia, that the 
government is able to diminish its reliance on domestic financing 
in the optimistic scenario due to a favourable inflow of foreign 
capital. On the other hand, the pessimistic scenario presumes that 
government will find itself forced to absorb a greater share of total 
domestic credit. The reliance on domestic stock issues is 
constrained as is the access to foreign sources of finance. 
SUMMING-UP 
The implications of the alternative scenarios for the medium-term 
future in South Africa are, in sum, markedly different both from 
each other and from the macroeconomic conditions inherent in the 
moderately optimistic base run. The optimistic scenario involves 
a higher growth path in combination with more exports and an 
increased inflow of foreign capital resources. This inflow, 
together with more domestic savings, makes it possible to 
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expand investment as required in support of growth and devel-
opment. This can, moreover, be done without compressing 
government and private consumption, which expand in per 
capita terms, partly due to the fact that installed capacity is 
used more efficiently. In addition, such increases in consumption 
will in no way impair domestic macro balances, including the 
budget position of the government and the rate of inflation. On 
the contrary, inflation can drop to a level which is indeed very 
low by historic standards. The good news also includes the fact 
that credit extended to the private sector grows even further in 
real terms than in the base run. Hence, no crowding-out takes 
place, and both the government and the private sector can play 
an active role in the reconstruction of the country. The need for 
pursuing a well designed set of sectoral and microeconomic 
policies to maximize employment generation and income redis-
tribution would be much easier in such a favourable macroeco-
nomic context. 
The pessimistic scenario, on the other hand, illustrates that if 
internal conflicts and management problems get out of hand and 
economic growth falters, badly needed economic restructuring and 
social reconciliation may become infeasible. This would, no doubt, 
limit domestic savings as well as capital inflows and could intensify 
capital flight, impairing import capacity. This, in turn, would 
depress investments, domestic output and exports even further. 
The government would be hard pressed to try to counteract such a 
trend, but its budget could easily reach a clearly unsustainable level. 
Moreover, while total foreign debt might be increasing less than in 
the base run due to foreign borrowing constraints, the government 
would soon find itself in a complex debt trap in which debt service 
assumes significant importance due to the increase in the domestic 
interest rates. Even stricter fiscal and monetary restraint may 
therefore become necessary, and this could lead to a critical 
worsening of the perspectives for socio-economic development. 
Moreover, government reliance on domestic credit will in the 
above process become hard to avoid, and without growth, infla-
tion bounces upwards, squeezing real private credit even further, 
and impairing the contribution this sector can potentially make to 




This study took as its point of departure that aggregate models and 
quantified macroeconomic projections are indispensable tools in 
helping governments concerned with economic management and 
development planning. Moreover, when use is made of foreign 
finance in support of economic restructuring, recipient third 
world governments will have to relate to influential international 
financing institutions, including in particular the IMF and the 
World Bank. The two Bretton Woods organizations use a variety 
of analytical tools in their country economic work. Yet relatively 
little has been published on the Financial Programming (FP) and 
Revised Minimum Standard Modelling (RMSM) frameworks. This 
is so even though they have over the years been the two most 
common macroeconomic modelling frameworks used by IMF and 
World Bank staff in producing macro projections. This is unfortu-
nate. The influence of the IMF and the World Bank over domestic 
policy making has increased considerably in developing countries. 
At the same time, it would appear that the relationship between the 
Bretton Woods institutions and the African countries, in particular, 
has not been an entirely happy one during the 1980s and early 
1990s. There are many reasons for this (Tarp, 1993a), but the lack 
of transparency and capacity to elaborate independent macroeco-
nomic projections has no doubt played a critical role in this 
process. Putting the FP and RMSM analytical models squarely 
into the public domain in a practical and easily replicable manner 
as done in this book is therefore an attempt to help students of 
development and practitioners involved in country economic ana-
lyses to come to grips with the fundamental perceptions of 
macroeconomic causality that are often implicit in the economic 
policy advice given by the IMF and the World Bank, and at the 
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same time to assist in fostering a better balanced and more 
insightful policy dialogue in future. 
Hence, this study has developed and fully documented how the 
FP and RMSM frameworks can be used in a rigorous manner in a 
concrete country context (i.e. South Africa). This was done by 
taking the reader carefully through all the methodological and 
practical steps necessary to produce a set of internally consistent 
projections. Relevant country background was provided in Chapter 
2 from which it is clear that the debate on future economic policy 
and development strategy in South Africa has so far proven both 
controversial and complex as is the case elsewhere in the third 
world. Nevertheless, it is by now widely accepted that the priority 
issues to be addressed by the new government revolve around the 
possibilities for making the two objectives of growth and redis-
tribution compatible. Stagnation set in at the beginning of the 
1970s, and the South African economy has been on the decline 
for more than a decade. In addition, deep-seated structural weak-
nesses have developed alongside social imbalances. Inward-looking 
industrialization, based on the export of gold, and coupled with the 
exploitation of cheap black labour, was at the core of the economic 
plan of the apartheid regime. It was, moreover, the intention that 
South Africa should become a political and economic power house 
in a constellation of states in Southern Africa. Strategic rather than 
economic considerations were, therefore, allowed to play a major 
role in decision making. In addition, inefficiencies, generated by 
unviable project selection and a host of arbitrary apartheid laws and 
price controls, together with the extreme degree of conglomerate 
concentration, hindered an appropriate allocation of economic 
resources. Instead of concentrating on the development of its 
own economy, the apartheid regime initiated a destructive and 
extremely costly engagement in the region. Hence, the develop-
ment challenges faced by South Africa are enormous. They can, 
however, be articulated using insights from standard economic 
theory and practice, and the basic policy frameworks identified 
in Chapter 2 are not different in any fundamental way from those 
used to inform the policy debate in other country contexts. 
Having established, in Chapter 3, the necessary accounting 
framework and base year data set, the methodological step of 
this volume was to operationalise the FP and RMSM projection 
frameworks in Chapter 4. This was done in the computer program-
ming language called GAMS, using common notation to facilitate 
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comparisons. To be able to produce compatible and consistent 
medium-term projections on the basis of the two models, some 
modifications were introduced as compared to the very few stan-
dard presentations available in the literature. A few additional 
changes were necessary due to the specific South African con-
text. However, the overall properties of the models were kept 
intact, and all the necessary detail is available in Appendix A. 
What transpired from the analysis in Chapter 4 is that the FP and 
RMSM frameworks are very different in terms of content as well as 
focus. Yet what the two models have in common is that they are 
quite simple theoretical constructs. Simplicity implies that critical 
economic assumptions have been made in formulating the models, 
and due account must, at all times, be taken of these underlying 
presumptions in applied policy work if serious misjudgements are 
to be avoided. 
In the short-term FP framework there are only two behavioural 
relationships which explain money and import demand, respec-
tively, in addition to a number of equilibrium conditions relating to 
the money market and the balance of payments. The implication is 
an assumption that a single competitive, flex-price market for 
traded and non-traded goods exists. Hence, constraints and inflex-
ibilities, often present in developing countries, are ignored. More-
over, there is no link between real (full employment) GDP and 
monetary variables, despite the often observed negative supply-
side effects of a credit squeeze. In sum, important institutional and 
structural context is left to be specified by the analyst entirely 
outside the framework of the model. The policy advice, involving 
manipulations of domestic credit and the exchange rate, which can 
be derived from the FP framework, can as a consequence easily be 
both mistargeted and harmful unless great care is exercised. 
The RMSM model is a medium- to long-term fix-price model in 
the two-gap tradition. Hence, in contrast to the monetary focus of 
the FP model, the real sector of the economy is at the core of the 
RMSM. Consequently, it represents another theoretical extreme in 
the sense that changes in demand have no price effects affecting 
economic behaviour. The RMSM is therefore a planning tool, 
which can yield estimates of the levels of investment, imports 
and external borrowing needed to reach a targeted rate of real 
output growth. Yet issues related to the degree of utilization of 
installed capacity are - as was the case in the FP framework -
ignored. Similarly, distributional questions are not addressed within 
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the narrow confines of the models per se. Thus, the RMSM is not an 
economic policy model which the policy analyst can use to demon-
strate how policies should be changed to reach a desired growth 
path. To arrive at policy prescriptions, it is necessary to move 
outside the narrow confines of the model. 
It follows from the above that the FP and RMSM frameworks 
can, justifiably, be criticized for being theoretically too simple. As 
such they should not be used in a mechanistic manner for detailed 
policy analysis at country level to trace the effects of marginal 
changes in exogenous variables and parameters on the endogenous 
variables. This point also emerged as a major conclusion from -the 
policy experiments in Chapter 5. Yet the two models are certainly 
consistent and contain the central monetary and material national 
accounting identities, which any macroeconomic projection model 
must include. As such they can be used in a non-mechanistic and 
meaningful manner to produce illustrative medium-term scenarios, 
relying on additional qualitative and quantitative judgement from 
outside the models. This is so in particular when all variables are in 
fact treated as endogenous in scenario building, as has been done 
in this volume. Moreover, a good grasp of consistency is a mini-
mum requirement in macroeconomic analysis (Easterly, 1989). 
Simplicity is also a strength in the sense that the two models 
require relatively few data and are easy to use, while complex 
models are of little relevance if the needed data are not available 
or are unreliable. Thus it was demonstrated in Chapter 3 how a 
complete data set for the base year of the two modelling frame-
works can be compiled from official South African statistics. At the 
same time, a standard national accounting framework was outlined, 
and it was shown how it could be used to ensure the required 
consistency among the data originating from different sources. For 
this reason it is hoped that Chapter 3 could facilitate future 
updating of the analysis presented in this volume. 
Any model of how an economy actually works is based on a set 
of underlying assumptions regarding the mechanisms, which 
together with a particular set of parameters and exogenous vari-
ables determine the economic outcome within the chosen time 
horizon. Thus, to more fully understand these mechanisms and 
assess the importance of the different variables it is useful to 
implement model experiments. This can be done, first, by chan-
ging parameters and exogenous variables one by one and noting 
the impact on the value of the endogenous variables as compared 
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to what happens in the base run. In this context, the results from 
different models can also be compared with each other. Second, 
such individual experiments can be carried out under different 
closure rules, i.e. different sets of assumptions as to which vari-
ables take the necessary adjustments in the course of the experi-
ment. Such model experiments were implemented in Chapter 5, 
and it was, by way of introduction, noted that standard practice in 
applications of the FP model is to assume an endogenous exchange 
rate and exogenous capital flows, reflecting the perception of the 
exchange rate as a policy instrument. The RMSM, on the other 
hand, is normally specified with the opposite closure, i.e. with an 
exogenous exchange rate and endogenous external borrowing by 
the government. 
It can, on the basis of Chapter 5, be concluded that the choice of 
closure mechanism has significant influence on the properties of 
the two models. Moreover, while the closure rule in some experi-
ments had the same qualitative impact on selected endogenous 
variables in the two models, there are also examples where the 
opposite is true. The FP and· RMSM models do, as shown in 
Chapter 5, quite often lead to the same qualitative results as far 
as the endogenous variables are concerned, provided the closure 
rule is the same. Yet they also, at times, produce different eco-
nomic outcomes following the same change in a parameter or 
exogenous variable. This is critical, since it can lead to contra-
dictory policy advice. 
Thus, different results can be obtained about the same reality, 
depending on the model in question and on how it is specified. 
This underlines the importance of making explicit one's assump-
tions about how the economy works, so they can be verified. The 
overall conclusion, emerging from Chapter 5, is therefore that 
great caution must be exercised in clarifying the empirical condi-
tions relevant to the particular case in question, before models 
such as the FP framework and the RMSM are used to inform the 
macroeconomic policy debate. However, this is, as already noted 
above, mainly in relation to the analysis of marginal policy experi-
ments. Thus, only limited specific policy advice can be drawn up 
on the analytic basis provided by the models in focus here. This is 
highlighted by the fact that the FP and RMSM models have 
nothing to say about the different distributional and employment 
consequences which may result from different growth paths, and 
which are of great importance in most third world countries. 
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Nevertheless, the FP and RMSM models described in Chapter 4 
can be used sensibly in scenario building. They were therefore 
relied on together with the data set from Chapter 3 to generate 
the moderately optimistic base run in Chapter 6. It can in this 
regard be reiterated, first, that the base run was constructed 
through a consistent use of separate projections generated by the 
two underlying models. This is seldom - if ever - done in practice 
and serves to illustrate how a more complete picture can be 
obtained if the two approaches are merged. Second, the main 
conclusion of Chapter 6 is that the government of South Africa 
is not left without room for manoeuvre despite the critical pro-
blems listed in Chapter 2. The economy is potentially very rich, 
with a considerable human and physical infrastructure as well as a 
significant natural resource base, although gold might be a wasting 
asset. Moreover, installed capacity is probably not fully utilized, and 
South Africa's international debt is limited. 
More specifically, the medium-term base scenario illustrates that 
government consumption can be expanded from 21.0 per cent to 
21.8 per cent of GDP under moderately optimistic assumptions 
about the future. This corresponds to an increase in real terms of 
almost 25 billion rand over the six-year period. In addition, the 
public investment programme in the last year is about 20 per cent 
higher than in the base year. Thus, there is space for additional 
investments totalling 6 billion rancl in real terms over the six-year 
forecasting period as compared to the level of the base year. 
Moreover, some of the increase in government consumption can 
be directed to investment if this proves possible and desirable. 
Finally, private investment in constant prices in the base run is 
expected to increase from an annual 68. 7 billion rand in the base 
year to more than 104.8 billion at the end of the six-year forecast 
horizon. 
These are important conclusions, which are in contrast with the 
present government strategy where exclusive emphasis is put on 
financing RDP initiatives through budget reallocations within the 
context of the Budget Reprioritization Programme (BRP). The 
BRP approach is bound, however, to result in more limited 
amounts of financing as the room for manoeuvre within the 
existing budget frame is limited by commitments already made. 
Yet it is underlined that little was said in definitive terms in Chapter 
6 on the complex choices which the new South African govern-
ment will have to make in striking a balance between existing 
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competing - or maybe better, complementary - development 
strategies. Institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank argue 
for a development strategy based on export led growth (IMF, 1992; 
Fallon and Pereira de Silva, 1994). There are, however, other 
analysts, who focus their attention more on developing domestic 
markets and institutions (Padayachee, 1990; Zarenda, 1992; 
MERG, 1993). Nevertheless, it did transpire clearly from Chapter 
6, that there is room under moderately optimistic conditions for an 
active developmental state to start addressing the needs of poor 
South African people directly without disturbing macroeconomic 
balances or crowding-out private sector activity. 
In Chapter 7, a more optimistic as well as a more pessimistic 
scenario were established. The optimistic scenario involves a higher 
growth path made possible by increased exports in combination 
with more savings and investment. In addition to the higher level 
of government investment, private investment increases to a level 
which in the final year is more than 26 per cent higher than in the 
base run, and it is possible to expand both government and private 
consumption. This expansion does not impair domestic macro 
balances, including the budget position of the government and 
the rate of annual inflation, which can actually be brought down 
from 6 per cent to only 3 per cent. 
The pessimistic scenario, on the other hand, illustrates that if 
access to foreign borrowing becomes more stringent and real 
resource inflows and growth falter, not even considerable modera-
tion will be sufficient to maintain domestic macro balances. On the 
contrary, the government budget can easily reach an unsustainable 
level of almost 8 per cent of GDP, and government becomes more 
dependent on domestic credit. Without growth, inflation bounces 
upwards, and this will squeeze real private credit, so both govern-
ment and private investment fall as compared to the base run. 
Even stricter fiscal and monetary restraint may quickly become 
necessary, and this could lead to a further critical worsening of the 
state of the economy. 
The alternative scenarios in Chapter 7 were developed in the 
same manner as the base scenario contained in Chapter 6. Thus, 
the respective optimistic and pessimistic FP and RMSM projec-
tions are consistent with each other. This methodological approach 
made it possible to identify general reasons or circumstances which 
are behind the markedly different economic outcomes in terms of 
growth, inflation, the balance of payments and government 
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finances, delineated in the two scenarios. However, the alternative 
scenarios put forward in Chapter 7 are, together with the base run 
in Chapter 6, merely three out of the numerous projections, which 
could be made on the basis of the analytical frameworks presented 
in Chapter 4. It is, in fact, highly unlikely that actual developments 
in South Africa will in the coming years precisely reproduce one of 
these selected combinations of macroeconomic variables and 
parameters. Thus, the exact quantification of the parameters and 
the exogenous and endogenous variables undertaken in previous 
chapters should not be interpreted too literally in a real life context. 
Hence, nothing can be taken for granted. South Africa will have to 
be on the look out to avoid dangers such as those inherent in the 
pessimistic scenario, while searching at the same time for a way to 
the base run, or even better, the optimistic scenario. 
In this process, domestic and international players in the policy 
dialogue are well advised that similarly sized macroeconomic 
indicators may conceal very different underlying social and eco-
nomic realities, as is evident when comparing the three scenarios 
put forward in Chapters 6 and 7. This should not be taken as an 
argument to avoid quantification. On the contrary, qualitative 
statements have problems of their own, and it is believed that 
the three scenarios presented capture the essential macroeco-
nomic differences between the many possible directions which 
the South African economy may take. Actually, the scenarios 
identified are likely to cover a very substantial part of the range 
of probable economic medium-term outcomes in South Africa, in 
particular as each of them can be seen as a representative of a 
much larger sub-set of specific development paths. This together 
with the documentation provided in Appendices A-D, should 
facilitate not only further experimentation and updating, but also 
make it possible to interpret in a more coherent manner the overall 
macroeconomic framework within which the future development 
of South Africa will take place. 
In this regard, it is by way of conclusion reiterated that macro-
economic stability and economic growth will be critical precondi-
tions for development to succeed in South Africa as has been the 
case elsewhere. This is why these topics have been in focus in this 
study, which has in addition demonstrated how the FP and RMSM 
macro models can be applied in a relevant way. Nevertheless, issues 
such as employment, urban-rural divisions and income distribution 
as well as many non-economic factors are just as crucial measures 
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of the development process and for the well-being of the popula-
tion. To cover these issues in the analysis, applied macro models of 
the FP and RMSM kind are not appropriate tools. Instead, other 
analytical frameworks are required. It has been beyond the scope 
of the present study to cover these alternative modelling strategies, 
but their existence as well as the limitations of the FP and RMSM 
frameworks should be fully appreciated in any follow-up work 
based on the guidelines set out in this book. 
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Modelling frameworks in GAMS 
A.1 INTRODUCTION 
Both the Financial Programming (FP) framework and the Revised 
Minimum Standard Model (RMSM), which were described in 
Chapter 4, were programmed and solved using the software 
GAMS (Brooke et al., 1988). This appendix contains the GAMS 
programs used to generate the base run and the scenarios, analysed 
in Chapters 6 and 7, respectively. The programs for each model 
consist of three files, all of which are reproduced below, and the 
same structure is used in the FP and RMSM frameworks. There are 
one main program and two table programs. The table programs are 
included by a GAMS command in the main program and generate 
a range of tables for, respectively, the base run and the scenarios. 
The actual files are available on disks, which can be obtained from 
the authors. 
Whereas all programs are fairly straightforward given some 
knowledge of GAMS programming, a few comments are required 
as far as data inputs are concerned. Data are entered in step VII in 
the main programs of both models, beginning with the base year 
data described in Chapter 3. Thus in step VII.A, the necessary 
1993 values of lagged variables are defined, while step VII.B takes 
care of the 1994 values of all variables. The only notable feature in 
these steps is that some variable values are calculated from other 
data (e.g. interest rates). This method ensures that the right-hand 
sides of all model equations are exactly equal to the left-hand side 
value in the base year. Therefore, the two models reproduce 
precisely all base year data. In stage VII.C, initial values are 
specified for all endogenous variables in the forecast horizon. 
The next data input in both models, VII.D, is values of all 
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exogenous variables during the forecast horizon. An important 
element of the step is a table called iniexo, containing the values 
of most exogenous variables. They were either calculated outside 
the modelling frameworks from the specified assumption or 
obtained from the solution of the other model in order to ensure 
that the two models produce a consistent base run and scenarios. 
Consistency implies here that variables appearing in both models 
have identical values. This was achieved by applying an iterative 
procedure involving both frameworks. First, assumptions were 
made concerning the exogenous variables that enter the FP frame-
work, and their level values were calculated outside the program. 
Since most assumptions underlying the base run as well as the 
scenarios, cf. Chapters 6 and 7, have the form of a growth rate or a 
percentage of GDP, these calculations were straightforward. In the 
second step of the procedure, the FP framework was solved for its 
endogenous variables. Two types of assumptions were then 
imposed on the RMSM: (1) the values of variables, which are 
exogenous in both models, were entered in RMSM's iniexo table, 
and (2) the endogenous variables of the FP framework, which are 
exogenous in the RMSM, were taken from the solution of the FP 
framework and entered iniexo as well. To give an example, the 
exchange rate is endogenous in the FP framework, and its values 
were imported to RMSM, where the variable is exogenous. In the 
final step, the RMSM was solved and the results checked. Since the 
early attempts at constructing the base run as well as the scenarios 
did not give reasonable results for all variables, the procedure was 
repeated several times with modified assumptions until satisfactory 
outcomes were obtained. However, since only a limited number of 
decimals is used in the different data input tables, there are some 
minor deviations in variable values when the two models are 
solved. The last part of the data entry section of the frameworks 
concerns parameter values. They were either entered directly in 
tables or calibrated from base year data. 
Finally, in order to obtain consistency between the two model-
ling frameworks in the scenarios, tables corresponding to iniexo 
appear in the programs. They are named opprn in the optimistic and 
peppr in the pessimistic scenario. Besides values of exogenous 
variables, these tables also include the values of parameters, which 
were changed when the two scenarios were generated. 
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A.2 FINANCIAL PROGRAMMING FRAMEWORK 
Main program (FPSCEN.GMS) 
$offsymlist offsymxref 
* 
* FP - Financial Programming Framework 
* 








































Long time horizon 
Model time horizon 




Constant in import function 
GDP elasticity of import 
Real exchange rate elasticity of import 
Weight in price index 
Money velocity; 
Government borrowing requirement 
Government consumption 
Current account surplus 
Total domestic credit 
Government domestic credit 
Private domestic credit 
Nominal exchange rate 
Real GDP 
Nominal GDP 
Other government expenditures 
Government interest payments on domestic debt 
Government interest payments on foreign debt 
Private interest payments on foreign debt 
Domestic interest rate 




Import price index 
Money supply 
Net factor services from abroad 
Government net domestic debt 
Government net foreign debt 
Private net foreign debt 
Net other factor services 
Net transfers to government from abroad 












General price level 
Domestic price level 




Export price index; 
POSITIVE VARIABLES CG, E, GDP, GDPN, GT, M, MD, MPI, MS, NDDG, P, PD, TG, X, 
XPI; 
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Total domestic credit 
Money market equilibrium condition 
Government interest payments on foreign debt 
Government interest payments on domestic debt 
Government borrowing requirement 
Government finance constraint 
Import function 
Resource balance 
Private interest payments on foreign debt 
Net factor services 
Current account 
Balance of payments 
Objective function; 
* V Model equations 
* 
* A Prices and monetary sector 
* 
EQ0l(t) .. 
P(t) =8= (1 - theta)*PD(t) + theta*E(t)*MPl(t); 
E002(t) .. 
GDPN(t) =e= P(t)*GDP(t); 
EQ03(t) .. 
MD(t) =e= (1/v(t))*GDPN(t); 
EO04(tl-1) .. 
MS(tl) - MS(tl-1) =e= E(tl)*(R(tl) - R(tl-1)) + (DC(tl) - DC(tl-1)) + 
(E(tl) - E(tl-l))*R(tl-1); 
EQ05(t) .. 
DC(t) =e= DCG(t) + DCP(t); 
EQ06(t) .. 




* B Government accounts 
EQ07(tl-1) .. 
INFG(tl) =e= IRF(tl)*NFDG(tl-1); 
EQ0S(tl-1) .. 
INDG(tl) =e= IRD(tl)*NDDG(tl-1); 
EQ09(t) .. 
BRG(t) =e= P(t)*(CG(t) + IVG(t)) + GT(t) + INDG(t) + E(t)*INFG(t) -
TG(t) - E(t)*NTRG(t); 
EQ10(tl-1) .. 
BRG(tl) =e= (DCG(tl) - DCG(tl-1)) + (NDDG(tl) - NDDG(tl-1)) + 
E(tl)*(NFDG(tl) - NFDG(tl-1)); 
* C Balance of payments 
* 
EQ11(t) .. 
log(M(t)) =e= m0(t) + m1(t)*log(GDP(t)) + m2(t)*log((E(t)*MPl(t)/PD(t))); 
EQ12(t) .. 
RESBAL(t) =e= X(t)*XPl(t) - M(t)*MPl(t); 
EQ13(tl-1) .. 
INFP(tl) =e= IRF(tl)*NFDP(tl-1 ); 
EQ14(t) .. 
NETFSY(t) =e= NFP(t) - INFG(t) - INFP(t); 
EQ15(t) .. 
CURBAL(t) =e= RESBAL(t) + NETFSY(t) + NTRG(t) + NTRP(t); 
EQ16(tl-1) .. 
R(tl) - R(tl-1) =e= CURBAL(tl) + (NFDG(tl) - NFDG(tl-1)) + 
(NFDP(tl) - NFDP(tl-1)); 
* 
* D Objective 
* 
EQ99 .. 
OBJ =e= sum(t, GDP(t)); 
* VI Model definitions 
* 
MODEL FP Financial Programming Model/ all/; 
* 
* II Data 




























































































* C Initial values and bounds of endogenous variables in 








































* D Values of exogenous variables in forecast horizon 
* (calculated from assumptions outside model) 
* 
table iniexo(*,tf) Values of exogenous variables in forecast horizon 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
DCP 231.462 251.420 274.637 301.014 330.436 
GDP 449.445 465.175 481.456 498.307 515.748 
GT 16.918 18.561 20.363 22.341 24.510 
IRD 0.1404 0.1404 0.1354 0.1304 0.1254 
IRF 0.1413 0.1413 0.1413 0.1413 0.1413 
IVG 9.812 10.058 10.359 10.722 11.097 
MPI 1.0300 1.0609 1.0927 1.1255 1.1593 
NDDG 186.611 203.319 219.841 236.545 254.568 
NFDG 39.349 49.350 61.028 73.471 85.499 
NFDP 26.224 36.904 49.597 63.904 80.895 
NFP -4.509 -4.807 -5.125 -5.463 -5.824 
NTRG 0.290 0.309 0.329 0.351 0.374 
NTRP -0.071 -0.075 -0.080 -0.086 -0.092 
p 1.0600 1.1236 1.1910 1.2625 1.3382 
R 20.317 25.455 29.612 33.168 36.493 
TG 129.584 143.212 158.838 177.407 198.084 
X 105.762 109.993 114.943 120.690 127.328 
XPI 1.0300 1.0609 1.0927 1.1255 1.1593 
DCP.fx(tf) iniexo("DCP",tf); 
GDP.fx(tf) iniexo("GDP",tf); 
GT.fx(tf) iniexo("GT" ,tf); 
IRD.fx(tf) iniexo("IRD" ,tf); 







NTRG .fx(tf) iniexo("NTRG",tf); 
NTRP.fx(tf) iniexo("NTRP" ,tf); 
P.fx(tf) iniexo("P",tf); 
R.fx(tf) iniexo("R",tf); 



























* E Parameter values and calibration 
* 












* Import function parameters (Source for elasticities: Kahn et al., 1992) 
m1(t) 1.20; 
m2(t) = -0.73; 
m0('1994') = log(M.I("1994")) - m1('1994")*Iog(GDP.I("1994")); 
m0(tf) = inipar('M0",tf); 
* Weight in price index 
theta = 0.2; 
* Money velocity v(t) calibrated to fit base year data 
v(t) = GDPN.1("1994")/MD.1('1994"); 
* VIII Solve base run 
* 
OPTION SOLPRINT =off,LIMROW=0,LIMCOL=0; 
SOLVE FP MAXIMIZING OBJ USING NLP; 
* 




SETS r1 Government budget 
r2 Government finance 
r3 Balance of payments 
/G-REV,G-ROW,G-CON,G-INV,G-TRA,G-IND, 
G-INF,G-TOT/ 
r4 Money supply 
r5 Other assets 
r6 Prices 
r7 Other variables 

















Government budget - base run values 
Government budget - billion rand 
Government budget - per cent of GDP 
Government budget - growth rates 
Government budget - deviation from base run 
Government deficit finance - base run values 
Government deficit finance - billion rand 






































$include fpscent1 .gms 
* X Scenarios 
APPENDIX A 
Government deficit finance - growth rates 
Government deficit finance - deviation base run 
Balance of payments - base run values 
Balance of payments - billion rand 
Balance of payments - per cent of GDP 
Balance of payments - growth rates 
Balance of payments - deviation from base run 
Balance of payments - base run values 
Balance of payments - billion foreign currency 
Balance of payments - per cent of GDP 
Balance of payments - growth rates 
Balance of payments - deviation from base run 
Money supply - base run values 
Money supply - billion rand 
Money supply - per cent of GDP 
Money supply - growth rates 
Money supply - deviation from base run 
Other asset stocks - base run values 
Other asset stocks - billion rand 
Other asset stocks - per cent of GDP 
Other asset stocks - growth rates 
Other asset stocks - deviation from base run 
Prices - base run values 
Prices - 1994=1 
Prices - growth rates 
Prices - deviation from base run 
Other variables - base run values 
Other variables 
Other variables - growth rates 
Other variables - deviation from base run 
Material balance var. - base run values 
Material balance var. - constant 1994 rand 
Material balance var. - per cent of GDP 
Material balance var. - growth rates 
Material balance var. - deviation from base run 
Parameter values; 





gdpgr(t)$(ORD(t) GT 1) 
expgr(t)$(ORD(t) GT 1) 
ivggr(t)$(ORD(t) GT 1) 
GDP growth 
Export growth 
Government investment growth; 
GDP.l(t)/GDP.l(t-1) - 1; 
X.l(t)/X.l(t-1) - 1; 
IVG.l(t)/IVG.l(t-1) -1; 
* A The 'optimistic' scenario 
* 
* 1. GDP growth rates increased 
* 2. Export growth rates increased 
* 3. Government investment growth increased 
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* 4. Inflation rate reduced 
* 5. Nominal government revenue reduced 
* 6. Nominal other government expenditures reduced 
* 7. Domestic interest rate reduced 
* 8. Government external debt reduced 
* 9. Money velocity reduced 
* 10. Private credit reduced nominally 
* 11. Government domestic debt reduced nominally 
* 12. Foreign reserves increased 
loop(t$(ORD(tl GT 1), GDP.fx(t) 
loop(t$(ORD(t) GT 1 ), X.fx(t) 
loop(t$(ORD(t) GT 1), IVG.fx(t) 
(1 + gdpgr(t) + 0.015)*GDP.l(t-1);); 
(1 + expgr(t) + 0.020)*X.l(t-1);); 












iniexo("IRD",tf) - 0.03; 
iniexo("IRD","1995") - 0.01; 
iniexo("IRD","1996") - 0.02; 
NFDG.l(tf)*0.97**ORD(tf); 
v(tf)/(1.01 **ORD(tf)); 


















SOLVE FP MAXIMIZING OBJ USING NLP; 
$include fpscent2.gms 
* 









































* B The 'pessimistic' scenario 
* 
* 0. Price level made endogenous. Instead exogenous gov. consumption 
* 1. GDP growth rates reduced 
* 2. Export growth rates reduced 
* 3. Government investment growth reduced 
* 4. Private foreign debt reduced 
* 5. Growth in export price index reduced 
* 6. Government consumption reduced 
* 7. Private credit reduced 
* 8. Nominal other government expenditures increased 
* 9. Domestic interest rate increased 





loop(t$(ORD(t) GT 1), GDP.fx(t) 
loop(t$(ORD(t) GT 1 ), X.fx(t) 
loop(t$(ORD(t) GT 1 ), IVG.fx(t) 
(1 + gdpgr(t) - 0.015)*GDP.l(t-1);); 
(1 + expgr(t) - 0.010)*X.l(t-1);); 









table peprn(*,tf) Selected exogenous variables 
1995 1996 1997 1998 
CG 93.430 98.604 102.201 104.727 
DCP 227.148 238.872 251.359 266.913 
GT 16.673 18.185 20.184 22.798 
IRD .1404 .1497 .1686 .1878 
TG 129.584 141.580 157.976 180.639 
GT.fx(tf) peprn("GT" ,tf); 
IRD.fx(tf) peprn("IRD",tf); 
TG.fx(tf) peprn("TG" ,tf); 














Program generating base run tables (FPSCENT1.GMS) 
* This file calculates reporting values for the base run 























govbud3(r1 ,t)$(ord(t) GT 1) 
1 00*govbud 1 (r1 ,t)/GDPN.l(t); 
(govbud1(r1,t)/govbud1(r1,t-1) - 1)*100; 
govfin0("F-DCR",tl)$(ord(tl) GT 1) 
govfin0("F-BON",tl)$(ord(tl) GT 1) 
govfin0("F-FCR" ,tl)$(ord(tl) GT 1) 
govfin0("F-TOT",t) 
DCG.l(tl) - DCG.l(tl-1); 
NDDG.l(tl) - NDDG.l(tl-1); 











(govfin1(r2,t)/govfin1(r2,t-1) - 1)*100; 
E.l(t)*XPl.l(t)*X.l(t); 
-E.l(t)*MPl.l(t)*M.l(t); 
-E.l(t)*(INFG.l(t) + INFP.l(t)); 
baofpa0("B-FAC" ,t) 
baofpa0("B-CUA",t) 
baofpa0("B-GBO",tl)$(ord(tl) GT 1) = 
baofpa0("B-PBO",tl)$(ord(tl) GT 1) = 
baofpa0("B-RES",tl)$(ord(tl) GT 1) = 
E.l(t)*(NTRG.l(t) + NTRP.l(t)); 
E.l(t)*NFP.l(t); 
E.l(t)*CURBAL.l(t); 
-E.l(tl)*(NFDG.l(tl) - NFDG.l(tl-1)); 
-E.l(tl)*(NFDP.l(tl) - NFDP.l(tl-1)); 
E.l(tl)*(R.l(tl) - R.l(tl-1)); 
baofpa1(r3,t) 
baofpa2(r3,t) 




baofu s0( • 8-TRA • ,t) 
baofpa0(r3,t); 
1 00*baofpa 1 (r3,t)/G DPN.l(t); 




-(INFG.l(t) + INFP.l(t)); 
baofus0("B-FAC" ,t) 
baofus0("B-CUA",t) 
baofus0("B-GBO",tl)$(ord(tl) GT 1) = 
baofus0("B-PBO",tl)$(ord(tl) GT 1) = 
baofus0("B-RES" ,tl)$(ord(tl) GT 1) = 
NTRG.l(t) + NTRP.l(t); 
NFP.l(t); 
CURBAL.l(t); 
-(NFDG.l(tl) - NFDG.l(tl-1)); 
-(NFDP.l(tl) - NFDP.l(tl-1)); 
R.l(tl) - R.l(tl-1); 
baofus 1 (r3,t) 
baofus2(r3,t) 







1 00*E.l(t)*baofus 1 (r3,t)/GDPN.l(t); 









monsup3(r4,t)$(ord(t) GT 1) 
monsup0(r4,t); 
100*monsup1(r4,t)/GDPN.l(t); 






























othvar3(r7,t)$(ord(t) GT 1) 
matvar0("Z-GDP",t) 
matvar0("Z-CG",t) 














1 00*othass 1 (r5,t)/G DPN. l(t); 















(100*(othvar1(r7,t)/othvar1(r7,t-1) - 1))$ 












1 00*matva r1 (r8,t)/G DP. l(t); 
100*(matvar1(r8,t)/matvar1(r8,t-1) - 1); 
* In order to get some nice data in our tables, most table values are 




















round(govfinl (r2,t), 1 ); 
round(govfin2(r2,t), 1 ); 
round(govfin3(r2,t), 1 ); 
round(baofpa1(r3,t), 1); 
round(baofpa2(r3,t), 1 ); 
round(baofpa3(r3,t), 1 ); 
round(baofusl (r3,t), 1 ); 
round(baofus2(r3,t), 1 ); 
round(baofus3(r3,t), 1 ); 
round(monsup1 (r4,t), 1 ); 
round(monsup2(r4,t), 1 ); 














round(othass2(r5,t), 1 ); 
round(othass3(r5,t), 1 ); 
round(pritab1 (r6,t), 3); 
round(pritab3(r6,t), 1 ); 
round(othvar1(r7,t), 1 ); 
round(othvar3(r7,t), 1 ); 
round(matvar1 (r8,t), 1 ); 
round(matvar2(r8,t), 1 ); 
round(matvar3(r8,t), 1 ); 
option govbud 1: 1: 1: 1,govbud2: 1: 1: 1,govbud3: 1: 1: 1, 
govfin 1 :1: 1: 1,govfin2: 1 :1: 1,govfin3: 1: 1: 1, 
baofpa 1: 1: 1: 1,baofpa2: 1: 1: 1,baofpa3: 1: 1: 1, 
baofus1 :1 :1 :1,baofus2:1 :1 :1,baofus3:1 :1 :1, 
monsup 1: 1: 1: 1,monsup2:1: 1: 1,monsup3: 1: 1: 1, 
othass1: 1: 1 :1,othass2: 1 :1: 1,othass3: 1: 1: 1, 
pritab1 :3:1 :1,pritab3:1 :1 :1, 
othvar1 :1 :1 :1,othvar3:1:1 :1, 
matvar1: 1: 1: 1,matvar2:1: 1: 1,matvar3: 1 :1: 1, 
parame1:4:1:1; 
display govbud1,govbud2,govbud3,govfin1,govfin2,govfin3, 




Program generating scenario tables (FPSCENT2.GMS) 
* This file is used to generate report tables for scenarios 
* Note: It is necessary to run 'FPSCENT1.GMS" before this file to 
* calculate deviations from base run 
* 
govbud 1 ("G-REV' ,t) 
govbud 1 ("G-ROW" ,t) 
govbud1 ("G-CON",t) 
govbud1('G-INV",t) 
govbud 1 ('G-TRA" ,t) 
govbud1('G-IND',t) 
govbud1('G-INF' ,t) 












1 00*govbud 1 (r1 ,t)/GDPN .l(t); 
(govbud1(r1,t)/govbud1(r1,t-1) - 1)*100; 
(govbud1(r1,t)/govbud0(r1,t) - 1)*100; 
govfin1('F-DCR',tl)$(ord(tl) GT 1) 
govfin1('f-BON",tI)$(ord(tl) GT 1) 
govfin1 ("F-FCR",tl)$(ord(tl) GT 1) 
govfin1("F-TOT",t) 
DCG.l(tl) - DCG.l(tl-1); 
NDDG.l(tl) - NDDG.l(tl-1); 
E.l(tl)*(NFDG.l(tl) - NFDG.l(tl-1)); 
BRG.l(t); 
govfin2(r2,t) 




1 00*govfin 1 (r2,t)/GDPN.l(t); 
(govfin1(r2,t)/govfin1(r2,t-1) - 1)*100; 






-E.l{t)*{INFG.l{t) + INFP.l{t)); 
E.l{t)*{NTRG.l{t) + NTRP.l{t)); 
E.l{t)*NFP.l{t); 
baofpa 1 ("B-TRA" ,t) 
baofpa1("B-FAC",t) 
baofpa1("B-CUA",t) 
baofpa1("B-GBO",tl)$(ord(tl) GT 1) = 
baofpa1("B-PBO",tl)$(ord{tl) GT 1) = 
baofpa1("B-RES",tI)$(ord{tl) GT 1) = 
E.l{t)*CURBAL.l(t); 
-E.l{tl)*(NFDG.l{tl) - NFDG.l{tl-1 )); 
-E.l{tl)*(NFDP.l{tl) - NFDP.l(tl-1)); 
E.l{tl)*(R.l{tl) - R.l{tl-1)); 
baofpa2(r3,t) 
baofpa3(r3,t)$(ord(t) GT 1) 
baofpa4(r3,t) 
baofus1 ("B-EXP" ,t) 
baofus1 ("B-IMP" ,t) 
baofus1 ("B-INT",t) 
baofus1("B-TRA",t) 
1 00*baofpa 1 (r3,t)/GDPN. I (t); 
((baofpa1(r3,t)/baofpa1(r3,t-1) - 1)*100)$ 
baofpa1 (r3,t-1 ); 
((haofpa 1 (r3,t)/baofpa0(r3,t) - 1 )*100)$baofpa0(r3,t); 
XPl.l{t)*X.l(t); 
-MPl.l{t)*M.l{t); 
-{INFG.l(t) + INFP.l(t)); 
baofus1 ("B-FAC",t) 
baofus1("B-CUA",t) 
baofus1("B-GBO",tl)$(ord{tl) GT 1) 
baofus1("B-PBO",tl)$(ord(tl) GT 1) 
baofus1("B-RES",tl)$(ord(tl) GT 1) 
NTRG.l{t) + NTRP.l(t); 
NFP.l{t); 
CURBAL.l(t); 
-(NFDG.l(tl) - NFDG.l(tl-1)); 
-(NFDP.l(tl) - NFDP.l{tl-1)); 
R.l(tl) - R.l{tl-1); 
baofus2{r3,t) 




monsup1 ("M-CRE" ,t) 
monsup 1 ("M-GCR" ,t) 
monsup1 ("M-PCR",t) 
1 00*E.l(t)*baofus 1 (r3,t)/GDPN.l(t); 
((baofus1(r3,t)/baofus1(r3,t-1) - 1)*100)$ 
baofus1(r3,t-1); 






monsup2(r4,t) 100* monsup 1 (r4,t)/GDPN. l(t); 
monsup3(r4,t)$(ord(t) GT 1) = 100*(monsup1(r4,t)/monsup1(r4,t-1) - 1); 













pritab1 ("P-EXR" ,t) 
pritab1 ("P-RER",t) 








DCG.l(t) + NDDG.l(t) + E.l{t)*NFDG.l(t); 
E.l(t)*NFDP.l{t); 
1 00*othass1 ( r5,t)/GDPN .l(t); 
100*(othass1 (r5,t)/othass1 (r5,t-1) - 1 ); 







= 1 00*(pritab1(r6,t)/pritab1 (r6,t-1) - 1 ); 





othvar1 ("V-NFDP" ,t) 




othvar1 ("V-GDPN" ,t) GDPN.l(t); 
othvar3(r7,t)$(ord(t) GT 1) 
othvar4(r7,t) 
= 100*(othvar1(r7,t)/othvar1(r7,t-1) - 1); 
= (othvar1(r7,t)/othvarO(r7,t) - 1)*100; 
matvar1 ("Z-GDP" ,t) 
matvar1("2-CG",t) 
matvar1("Z-IVG",t) 








matvar3(r8,t)$(ord(t) GT 1) 
matvar4(r8,t) 
1 OO*matvar1 (r8,t)/GDP.l(t); 
100*(matvar1 (r8,t)/matvar1(r8,t-1) - 1 ); 
(matvar1(r8,t)/matvar0(r8,t) - 1)*100; 
parame 1 ("Q-MO" ,t) 









* In order to get some nice data in our tables, most table values are 





































round(govbud3(r1 ,t), 1 ); 
round(govbud4(r1 ,t), 1 ); 
round(govfin1(r2,t), 1); 
round(govfin2(r2,t), 1 ); 
round(govfin3(r2,t), 1 ); 
round(govfin4(r2,t), 1 ); 
round(baofpa1(r3,t), 1); 
round(baofpa2(r3,t), 1 ); 
round(baofpa3(r3,t), 1 ); 
round(baofpa4(r3,t), 1 ); 
round(baofus1(r3,t), 1 ); 
round(baofus2(r3,t), 1 ); 
round(baofus3(r3,t), 1 ); 
round(baofus4(r3,t), 1 ); 
round(monsup1(r4,t), 1); 
round(monsup2(r4,t), 1 ); 
round(monsup3(r4,t), 1); 
round(monsup4(r4,t), 1 ); 
round(othass1 (r5,t), 1 ); 
round(othass2(r5,t), 1 ); 




round(pritab4(r6,t), 1 ); 
round(othvar1 (r7,t), 1 ); 
round(othvar3(r7,t), 1 ); 
round(othvar4(r7,t), 1 ); 
round(matvar1 (r8,t), 1 ); 
round(matvar2(r8,t), 1 ); 
round(matvar3(r8,t), 1 ); 
round(matvar4(r8,t), 1 ); 
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option govbud1 :1 :1 :1,govbud2:1 :1: 1 ,govbud3: 1 :1 :1,govbud4: 1 :1 :1, 
govfin1: 1 :1 :1,govfin2:1: 1 :1,govfin3:1 :1 :1,govfin4:1 :1 :1, 
baofpa 1: 1: 1: 1,baofpa2: 1: 1: 1 ,baofpa3: 1: 1: 1 ,baofpa4: 1: 1: 1, 
baofus1 :1 :1 :1,baofus2:1 :1 :1,baofus3:1 :1 :1,baofus4:1: 1 :1, 
monsup1 :1 :1 :1,monsup2:1 :1 :1,monsup3:1 :1 :1,monsup4:1 :1 :1, 
othass1 :1: 1 :1,othass2:1 :1 :1,othass3: 1 :1: 1,othass4:1 :1 :1, 
pritab1 :3:1 :1,pritab3:1 :1 :1,pritab4:1: 1 :1, 
othvar1 :1 :1 :1,othvar3:1 :1 :1,othvar4:1 :1 :1, 
matvar1 :1 :1 :1,matvar2:1 :1: 1,matvar3: 1 :1 :1,matvar4:1 :1 :1, 
parame1:4:1:1; 
display govbud 1 ,govbud2,govbud3,govbud4,govfin 1 ,govfin2,govfin3,govfin4, 
baofpa 1,baofpa2,baofpa3,baofpa4,baofus 1 ,baofus2,baofus3,baofus4, 
monsup 1 ,monsup2,monsup3,monsup4,othass 1 ,othass2,othass3,othass4, 
pritab 1 ,pritab3,pritab4,othvar1 ,othvar3,othvar4, 
matvar1 ,matvar2,matvar3,matvar4,parame 1; 
A.3 REVISED MINIMUM STANDARD MODEL 
Main program (RMSMSCEN.GMS) 
$offsyml ist offsymxref 
* 
* RMSM - Revised Minimum Standard Model 
* 






















MET Basic metals and minerals 
0TH Other/ 
Long time horizon 





Private saving propensity 
Ratio of reserve changes to import changes 
Export growth rates 
Sectoral GDP growth rates 















































Constant in import function 
GDP elasticity of import 
Real exchange rate elasticity of import 




Current account surplus 
Nominal exchange rate 
Real GDP 
Sectoral real GDP 
Gross domestic saving 
Gross domestic income 
Other government expenditures 
Government interest payments on foreign debt 
Private interest payments on foreign debt 





Import price index 
Net factor services from abroad 
Government net foreign debt 
Private net foreign debt 
Net other factor payments from abroad 
Net transfers to government from abroad 
Net transfers to private sector from abroad 
Objective 
General price level 
Domestic price level 






Export price index 
Export by category 
Terms-of-trade adjusted export; 
POSITIVE VARIABLES C, E, GDP, GDPS, IV, M, P, PD, X, XS; 
* 










Total real GDP 
Sectoral GDP 
Total export 

























Terms-of-trade adjusted export 
Terms-of-trade adjustment 
Gross domestic income 
Gross domestic saving 
Resource gap 
Resource balance 
Government interest payments on foreign debt 
Private interest payments on foreign debt 
Net factor services 
Current account 
Balance of payments 
Foreign reserves 
General price index 
Objective function; 
* V Model equations 
* A Real sector 
EQ01(t) .. 
GDP(t) =e= sum(i, GDPS(i,t)); 
E002(i,tl-1) .. 
GDPS(i,tl) =e= (1 + gdpgr(i,tl))*GDPS(i,tl-1); 
E003(t) .. 
X(t) =e= sum(ie, XS(ie,t)); 
EQ04(ie,tl-1) .. 
XS(ie,tl) =e= (1 + expgr(ie,tl))*XS(ie,tl-1); 
EQ05(tl-1) .. 
IV(tl)/GDP(tl) =e= kO(tl) + k1(tl)*((GDP(tl) - GDP(tl-1))/GDP(tl)); 
EQ06(t) .. 
log(M(t)) =e= mO(t) + m1(t)*log(GDP(t)) + m2(t)*log(E(t)*MPl(t)/PD(t)); 
E007(t) .. 
C(t) =e= CP(t) + CG(t); 
EQ08(t) .. 
IV(t) =e= IVP(t) + IVG(t); 
E009(t) .. 
P(t)*CP(t) =e= (1 - b(t))*(P(t)*GDY(t) TG(t) + GT(t)); 
E010(t) .. 
C(t) =e= GDP(t) - IV(t) - X(t) + M(t); 
* B Income effects from terms-of-trade 
EQ11(t) .. 
XTTADJ(t) =e= X(t)*XPl(t)/MPl(t); 
EQ12(t) .. 




GDY(t) =e= GDP(t) + TTADJ(t); 
EQ14(t) .. 
GDS(t) =e= GDY(t) - C(t); 
EQ15(t) .. 
RG(t) =e= M(t) - XTTADJ(t); 
* 
* C Balance of payments 
* 
EQ16(t) .. 
RESBAL(t) =e= X(t)*XPl(t) - M(t)*MPl(t); 
EQ17(tl-1) .. 
INFG(tl) =e= IRF(tl)*NFDG(tl-1); 
EO18(tl-1) .. 
INFP(tl) =e= IRF(tl)*NFDP(tl-1); 
EO19(t) .. 
NETFSY(t) =e= NFP(t) - INFG(t) - INFP(t); 
E020(t) .. 
CURBAL(t) =e= RESBAL(t) + NETFSY(tl + NTRG(t) + NTRP(t); 
EQ21(tl-1) .. 
R(tl) - R(tl-1) =e= CURBAL(tl) + (NFDG(tl) - NFDG(tl-1)) + (NFDP(tl) - NFDP(tl-1)); 
E022(tl-1) .. 
R(tl) - R(tl-1) =e= (M(tl)*MPl(tl) - M(tl-1)*MPl(tl-1))/d(tl); 
EO23(t) .. 
P(t) =e= (1 - theta)*PD(t) + theta*E(t)*MPl(t); 
* D Objective function 
* 
EO99 .. 
OBJ =e= sum(t, C(t)); 
* VI Model definitions 
MODEL RMSM Revised Minimum Standard Model/ all/; 
* 
* VII Data 
* 
* 








































































































































































* D Values of exogenous variables in forecast horizon 
* (calculated from assumptions outside model) 
* 
table iniexo(* ,tf) Values of exogenous variables in forecast horizon 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
E 1.0291 1.0591 1.0899 1.1217 1.1544 
GT 16.918 18.561 20.363 22.341 24.510 
IRF 0.1413 0.1413 0.1413 0.1413 0.1413 
IVG 9.812 10.058 10.359 10.722 11.097 
MPI 1.0300 1.0609 1.0927 1.1255 1.1593 
NFDP 26.224 36.904 49.597 63.904 80.895 
NFP -4.509 -4.807 -5.125 -5.463 -5.824 
NTRG 0.290 0.309 0.329 0.351 0.374 
NTRP -0.071 -0.075 -0.080 -0.086 -0.092 
p 1.0600 1.1236 1.1910 1.2625 1.3382 
TG 129.584 143.212 158.838 177.407 198.084 
XPI 1.0300 1.0609 1.0927 1.1255 1.1593 
E.fx(tf) iniexo('E" ,tf); 
GT.fx(tf) iniexo("GT' ,tf); 
IRF.fx(tf) IRF.1("1994"); 
IVG.fx(tf) iniexo("IVG",tf); 




























*E Export and GDP growth rates in forecast horizon 
* 
table gdpgro(i,tf) Sectoral GDP growth rates in forecast horizon 
1995 1996 1997 1998 
AGR .0250 .0250 .0250 .0250 
MIN .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
MAN .0500 .0500 .0500 .0500 
0TH .0350 .0348 .0345 .0343 










1996 1997 1998 
.0200 .0200 .0200 
.0000 .0000 .0000 
.0350 .0400 .0450 
.0683 .0749 .0810 
GDPS.l(i,"1994")/GDPS.l(i,"1993") - 1; 
gdpgro(i,tf); 
XS.l(ie,"1994")/XS.l(ie,"1993") - 1; 
expgro(ie,tf); 












table inipar(*,*) Values of selected parameters in forecast horizon 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
B 0.2299 0.2328 0.2363 0.2397 0.2427 
D 2.0141 2.2312 2.4906 2.6580 3.0513 
KO 0.1243 0.1348 0.1403 0.1418 0.1418 
MO -2.6870 -2.6560 -2.6430 -2.6430 -2.6430 
* Private saving propensity 
b("1994") 
b(tf) 
1 - P.I("1994")*CP.1("1994")/ 
(P.1("1994")*GDP.1("1994") - (TG.1("1994") - GT.1("1994"))); 
inipar("B",tf); 
* Ratio of foreign reserve to import changes 
d("1994") 
d(tf) 
(M.1("1994")*MPl.1("1994") - M.1("1993")*MPl.1("1993'))/ 



















* Investment function parameters (Sources: Kahn et al., 1992, 
* and Fallon et al., 1993) 
2.25; k1(t) 
k0("1994") IV.1("1994")/GDP.I("1994") - k1("1994')*((GDP.I("1994") -
GDP.1("1993"))/GDP.1("1994")); 
k0(tfl inipar("K0",tfl; 
* Import function parameters (Source for elasticities: Kahn et al., 1992) 
m1(t) 1.20; 
m2(t) = -0.73; 
m0("1994") = log(M.1("1994")) - m1("1994")*Iog(GDP.1("1994")); 
m0(tf) inipar("M0",tf); 
* Weight in price index 
theta = 0.2; 
* 
* VIII Solve 
* 
OPTION SOLPRINT =off,LIMROW=0,LIMCOL=0; 
SOLVE RMSM MAXIMIZING OBJ USING NLP; 
* 
* IX Report definitions 
* 
SETS r1 Material balance 
r2 Sectoral GDP 
r3 Sectoral export 
r4 Balance of payments 
r5 Foreign assets 
r6 Prices 






























Material balance - base run values 
Material balance - constant 1994 rand 
Material balance - per cent of GDP 
Material balance - real growth rates 
Material balance - deviation from base run 
Sectoral GDP - base run values 
Sectoral GDP - constant 1994 rand 
Sectoral GDP - per cent of total 
Sectoral GDP - real growth rates 
Sectoral GDP - deviation from base run 
Sectoral export - base run values 
Sectoral export - constant 1994 rand 
Sectoral export - per cent of total 
Sectoral export - real growth rates 
Sectoral export - deviation from base run 
Balance of payments - base run values 
Balance of payments - billion rand 
Balance of payments - per cent of GDP 
Balance of payments - growth rates 






















Balance of payments - base run values 
Balance of payments - billion foreign currency 
Balance of payments - per cent of GDP 
Balance of payments - growth rates 
Balance of payments - deviation from base run 
Foreign asset stocks - base run values 
Foreign asset stocks - billion rand 
Foreign asset stocks - per cent of GDP 
Foreign asset stocks - growth rates 
Foreign asset stocks - deviation from base run 
Prices - base run values 
Prices - 1994 = 1 
Prices - growth rates 
Prices - deviation from base run 
Other variables - base run values 
Other variables 
Other variables - growth rates 




* X Scenarios 
* 
* 
* 0 Parameter defining government investment growth in base run 
* 
parameter ivggr(tl) Government investment growth in base run; 
ivggr(t)$(ORD(t) GT 1) = IVG.l(t)/IVG.l(t-1) - 1; 
* A The 'optimistic' scenario 
* 
* 1. GDP growth rates increased 
* 2. Export growth rates increased 
* 3. Private savings propensity increased 
* 4. Constant in investment decreased 
* 5. Government investment growth increased 
* 6. Inflation rate reduced 
* 7. Nominal government revenue reduced 
* 8. Nominal government expenditures reduced 
* 9. Nominal exchange rate reduced 










gdpgr(i,tf) + 0.015; 
expgr(ie,tf) + 0.020; 
b("1995") + 0.0099; 
b('1996") + 0.0195; 
b('1997') + 0.0290; 
b(' 1998") + 0.0363; 
b('1999") + 0.0414; 
b("2000") + 0.0391; 






k0("1996") - 0.0180; 
k0("1997") - 0.0110; 
= k0("1998") - 0.0050; 




















SOLVE RMSM MAXIMIZING OBJ USING NLP; 
$include rmsmsct2.gms 
* 





















* B The 'pessimistic' scenario 
* 
* 1. GDP growth rates decreased 
* 2. Export growth rates decreased 
* 3. Private savings propensity reduced 
* 4. Constant in investment function increased 
* 5. Government investment reduced 
* 6. Private foreign debt reduced 
* 7. Growth in export price index reduced 
* 8. Nominal exchange rate increased 
* 9. Inflation rate increased 
* 10. Nominal government revenue increased 








gdpgr(i,tf) - 0.015; 
expgr(ie,tf) - 0.010; 









k0(tf) = k0("1994"); 





table peprn(* ,tf) Selected exogenous variables and parameters 
1995 1996 1997 1998 
D 1.2482 1.4952 1.5005 1.4561 
E 1.0611 1.1158 1.1930 1 .2961 
GT 16.673 18.185 20.184 22.798 
p 1.0600 1.1335 1.2334 1.3658 














Program generating base run tables (RMSMSCTl.GMS) 
* This file calculates reporting values for the base run 































(matbal 1 (r1 ,t)/GDP.l(t) )* 100; 







(secgdp1 (r2,t)/GDP .l(t))* 100; 















(secexp1(r3,t)/secexp1(r3,t-1) - 1)*100; 
baofpa0("B-EXP' ,t) E. l(t)*XPl.l(t)*X.l(t); 
baofpa0("B-IMP",t) -E.l(t)*MPl.l(t)*M.l(t); 
baofpa0("B-INT",t) -E.l(t)*(INFG.l(t) + INFP.l(t)); 
baofpa0("B-TRA',t) E.l(t)*(NTRG.l(t) + NTRP.l(t)); 
baofpa0('B-FAC',t) E.l(t)*NFP.l(t); 
baofpa0('B-CUA",t) = E.l(t)*CURBAL.l(t); 
baofpa0("B-GBO",tI)$(ord(tl) GT 1) = -E.l(tl)*(NFOG.l(tl) - NFDG.l(tl-1)); 
baofpa0('B-PBO",tl)$(ord(tl) GT 1) = -E.l(tl)*(NFDP.l(tl) - NFDP.l(tl-1)); 
baofpa0('B-RES",tl)$(ord(tl) GT 1) = E.l(tl)*(R.l(tl) - R.l(tl-1)); 
baofpa1(r4,t) 
baofpa2(r4,t) 
baofpa3(r4,t)$(ord(t) GT 1) 
baofpa0(r4,t); 
(baofpa 1 (r4,t)/(P. l(t)*GDP.l(t)) )* 100; 








baofus0("B-GBO",tl)$(ord(tl) GT 1) 
baofus0("B-PBO",tl)$(ord(tl) GT 1) 
baofus0("B-RES",tl)$(ord(tl) GT 1) 
XPl.l(t)*X.l(t); 
-MPl.l(t)*M.l(t); 
-(INFG.l(t) + INFP.l(t)); 
NTRG.l(t) + NTRP.l(t); 
NFP.l(t); 
cu·RBAL.l(t); 
-(NFDG.l(tl) - NFDG.l(tl-1)); 
-(NFDP.l(tl) - NFDP.l(tl-1)); 
R.l(tl) - R.l(tl-1); 
baofus1(r4,t) 
baofus2(r4,t) 





















((baofus1 (r4,t)/baofus1 (r4,t-1) - 1 )*100)$ 















(100*(pritab1(r6,t)/pritab1(r6,t-1) - 1))$ 














othvar3(r7,t)$(ord(t) GT 1) 
othvar0(r7 ,t); 



















* In order to get some nice data in our tables, most table values are 
* rounded to 1 decimal. 
* 

























round(secgdp1 (r2,t), 1); 
round(secgdp2(r2,t), 1); 
round(secgdp3(r2,t), 1 ); 
round(secexp1(r3,t), 1); 
round(secexp2(r3,t), 1); 
round(secexp3(r3,t), 1 ); 
round(baofpa1(r4,t), 1); 
round(baofpa2(r4,t), 1 ); 
round(baofpa3(r4,t), 1); 
round(baofusl (r4,t), 1 ); 
round(baofus2(r4,t), 1 ); 




round(pritabl (r6,t), 3); 
round(pritab3(r6,t), 1 ); 
round(othvar1(r7,t), 1); 
round(othvar3(r7,t), 1 ); 
option matball :1 :1:1,matbal2:1:1 :1,matbal3:1:1:1, 
secgdpl: 1: 1 :1,secgdp2:1: 1 :1,secgdp3: 1: 1: 1, 
secexpl: 1 :1 :1,secexp2:1: 1: 1,secexp3: 1 :1: 1, 
baofpa 1 :1: 1: 1,baofpa2: 1: 1 :1,baofpa3: 1: 1: 1, 
baofus 1: 1 :1 :1,baofus2:1: 1 :1,baofus3: 1 :1 :1, 
othassl: 1: 1: 1,othass2: 1 :1 :1,othass3: 1: 1 :1, 
pritabl :3:1: 1,pritab3: 1 :1 :1, 
othvarl :1: 1: 1,othvar3: 1: 1 :1, 
parame1 :4:1 :1,gdpgr:4: 1: 1,expgr:4: 1 :1; 
display matbal 1,matbal2,matba I3,secgdp 1,secgdp2,secgdp3, 
secexp 1,secexp2,secexp3,baofpa 1,baofpa2,baofpa3, 
baofus 1,baofus2,baofus3,othass1 ,othass2,othass3, 
pritab 1,pritab3,othva rl ,othvar3,pa ra me 1,gdpgr,expg r; 
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APPENDIX A 
Program generating scenario tables (RMSMSCT2.GMS) 
* This file is used to generate report tables for scenarios 
* Note: It is necessary to run "RMSMSCT1.GMS" before this file 




matbal 1 ("M-IPR" ,t) 





matbal3(r1,t)$(ord(t) gt 1) 
matbal4(r1 ,t) 
secgdp1("G-AGR",t) 
secgdp1 ("G-MIN" ,t) 
secgdp1 ("G-MAN" ,t) 
secgdp1 ("G-OTH" ,tl 
secgdp1("G-TOT",t) 
secgdp2(r2,t) 
secgdp3(r2,t)$(ord(t) gt 1) 
secgdp4(r2,t) 
secexp1("E-AGR",t) 
secexp1 ("E-GOL • ,t) 




secexp3(r3,t)$(ord(t) gt 1) 
secexp4(r3,t) 
baofpa 1 ("B-EXP" ,t) 




baofpa 1 ("B-CUA • ,t) 
baofpa1 ("B-GBO" ,tll 
baofpa1 ("B-PBO" ,tll 
baofpa1 ("B-RES" ,tl) 
baofpa2(r4,t) 
baofpa3(r4,t)$(ord(t) GT 1) 
baofpa4(r4,t) 













(matbal1(r1,t)/matbal1(r1,t-1) - 1)*100; 







(secgdp1(r2,t)/secgdp1 (r2,t-1) - 1)*100; 
((secgdp1 (r2,t)/secgdp0(r2,t) - 1 )*100)$secgdp0(r2,t); 
XS.l("AGR" ,t); 





(secexp1(r3,t)/secexp1(r3,t-1) - 1)*100; 




-E.l(t)*(INFG.l(t) + INFP.l(t)); 
E.l(t)*(NTRG.l(t) + NTRP.l(t)); 
E.l(t)*NFP.l(t); 
E.l(t)*CURBAL.l(t); 
(-E.l(tl)*(NFDG.l(tl)-NFDG.l(tl-1)))$(ord(tl) GT 1); 
(-E.l(tl)*(NFDP.l(tl)-NFDP.l(tl-1)))$(ord(tl) GT 1); 
(E.l(tl)*(R.l(tl) - R.l(tl-1)))$(ord(tl) GT 1); 
(baofpa1(r4,t)/(P.l(t)*GDP.l(t)))*100; 
((baofpa1(r4,t)/baofpa1(r4,t-1) - 1)*100)$ 
baofpa 1(r4,t-1 ); 




-(INFG.l(t) + INFP.l(t)); 






baofus1 ("B-RES" ,tl) 
baofus2(r4,t) 
baofus3(r4,t)$(ord(t) GT 1) 
baofus4(r4,t) 
othass1("O-FBG" ,t) 
othass 1("O-FBP" ,t) 
othass1 ("O-RES",t) 
othass2(r5,t) 
othass3(r5,t)$(ord(t) GT 1) 
othass4(r5,t) 
pritab1 ("P-GEN" ,t) 
pritab1 ("P-DOM" ,t) 
pritab1 ("P-IMP",t) 
pritab1 ("P-EXP" ,t) 
pritab1 ("P-EXR" ,t) 
pritab1 ("P-RER" ,t) 














para me 1("P-K 1 ",t) 
parame1("P-M0",t) 
parame1("P-M1",t) 




-(NFDG.l(tl) - NFDG.l(tl-1))$(ord(tl) GT 1); 
-(NFDP.l(tl) - NFDP.l(tl-1))$(ord(tll GT 1); 
(R.l(tl) - R.l(tl-1))$(ord(tl) GT 1); 
(E. l(t)*baofus 1 (r4,t)/(P.l(t)*GDP.l(t)) )* 100; 
((baofus1(r4,t)/baofus1(r4,t-1) - 1)*100)$ 
baofus1(r4,t-1); 






1 00*othass1 (r5,t)/(P .l(t)*GDP .l(t) ); 
(100*(othass1(r5,t)/othass1(r5,t-1) - 1))$ 
othass1(r5,t-1); 







(100*(pritab1(r6,t)/pritab1(r6,t-1) - 1))$ 
pritab1(r6,t-1 ); 









(100*(othvar1(r7,t)/othvar1(r7,t-1) - 1))$ 
othvar1 (r7,t-1 ); 










* In order to get some nice data in our tables, most table values are 





round(matbal2(r1 ,t), 1 ); 






























round(matbal4(r1 ,t), 1 ); 
round(secgdp1(r2,t), 1 ); 
round(secgdp2(r2,t), 1 ); 
round(secgdp3(r2,t), 1 ); 
round(secgdp4(r2,t), 1 ); 
round(secexp1 (r3,t), 1 ); 
round(secexp2(r3,t), 1 ); 
round(secexp3(r3,t), 1 ); 
round(secexp4(r3,t), 1 ); 
round(baofpa1(r4,t), 1); 
round(baofpa2(r4,t), 1 ); 
round(baofpa3(r4,t), 1 ); 
round(baofpa4(r4,t), 1 ); 
round(baofus1 (r4,t), 1 ); 
round(baofus2(r4,t), 1 ); 
round(baofus3(r4,t), 1 ); 
round(baofus4(r4,t), 1 ); 
round(othass1(r5,t), 1); 
round(othass2(r5,t), 1 ); 
round(othass3(r5,t), 1 ); 
round(othass4(r5,t), 1 ); 
round(pritab1(r6,t), 3); 
round(pritab3(r6,t), 1 ); 
round(pritab4(r6,t), 1 ); 
round(othvarl (r7,t), 1 ); 
round(othvar3(r7,t), 1 ); 
round(othvar4(r7,t), 1 ); 
option matball :1: 1 :1,matbal2:1: 1 :1,matbal3:1 :1 :1,matbal4:1 :1 :1, 
secgdp1 :1 :1 :1,secgdp2:1 :1 :1,secgdp3:1 :1: 1,secgdp4:1 :1 :1, 
secexp1:1 :1 :1,secexp2:1 :1 :1,secexp3:1 :1 :1,secexp4:1 :1 :1, 
baofpa1 :1 :1 :1,baofpa2:1 :1 :1,baofpa3:1 :1 :1,baofpa4:1 :1 :1, 
baofusl :1 :1 :1,baofus2:1 :1 :1,baofus3:1 :1 :1,baofus4:1 :1 :1, 
othassl :1 :1 :1,othass2:1 :1:1,othass3:1 :1:1,othass4:1:1 :1, 
pritabl :3:1 :1,pritab3:1 :1 :1,pritab4:1 :1 :1, 
othvarl :1 :1 :1,othvar3:1 :1 :1,othvar4:1 :1: 1, 
paramel :4:1 :1,gdpgr:4:1 :1,expgr:4:1 :1; 
display matbal1,matbal2,matbal3,matbal4,secgdp1,secgdp2,secgdp3,secgdp4, 
secexp1 ,secexp2,secexp3,secexp4,baofpa 1,baofpa2,baofpa3,baofpa4, 







Table B. 1 Material balance 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Constant 1994 billion rand 
Private consumption 256.3 264.3 271.8 278.9 285.5 292.3 300.3 
Public consumption 91.3 93.2 96.9 101.3 106.4 111.7 116.1 
Private investment 68.7 80.3 88.1 93.8 97.8 101.3 104.8 
Public investment 9.6 9.8 10.1 10.4 10.7 11.1 11.5 
Export 102.7 105.8 110.0 114.9 120.7 127.3 134.4 
Import -94.4 -103.8 -111.6 -117.8 -122.8 -128.0 -133.3 
GDP 434.2 449.4 465.2 481.5 498.3 515.7 533.8 
Per cent of GDP 
Private consumption 59.0 58.8 58.4 57.9 57.3 56.7 56.3 
Public consumption 21.0 20.7 20.8 21.0 21.3 21.7 21.8 
Private investment 15.8 17.9 18.9 19.5 19.6 19.6 19.6 
Public investment 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 
Export 23.6 23.5 23.6 23.9 24.2 24.7 25.2 
Import -21.7 -23.1 -24.0 -24.5 -24.6 -24.8 -25.0 
GDP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Real growth rates in per cent 
Private consumption 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.7 
Public consumption 2.0 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.0 4.0 
Private investment 16.8 9.7 6.5 4.3 3.5 3.5 
Public investment 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Export 3.0 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 5.5 
Import 10.0 7.5 5.6 4.2 4.2 4.2 
GDP 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Table B.2. Sectoral GDP 
Year 0 Year 1 rear 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Constant 1994 billion rand 
Agriculture 18.9 19.3 19.8 20.3 20.8 21.3 21.9 
Mining 34.9 34.9 34.9 34.9 34.9 34.9 34.9 
Manufacturing 94.3 99.0 103.9 109.1 114.6 120.3 126.3 
Other 286.2 296.2 306.5 317.1 328.0 339.2 350.6 
Total 434.2 449.4 465.2 481.5 498.3 515.7 533.8 
Per cent of GDP 
Agriculture 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.1 
Mining 8.0 7.8 7.5 7.3 7.0 6.8 6.5 
Manufacturing 21.7 22.0 22.3 22.7 23.0 23.3 23.7 
Other 65.9 65.9 65.9 65.9 65.8 65.8 65.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Real growth rates in per cent 
Agriculture 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Mining 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Manufacturing 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Other 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 
Total 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Table B.3. Export Categories 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Constant 1994 bi/Jion rand 
Agriculture 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.1 
Gold 22.7 22.7 22.7 22.7 22.7 22.7 22.7 
Basic metals and minerals 33.1 34.1 35.3 36.7 38.4 40.1 41.9 
Other exports 40.6 42.6 45.5 48.9 52.9 57.6 62.7 
Total 102.7 105.8 110.0 114.9 120.7 127.3 134.4 
Per cent ef export 
Agriculture 6.1 6.1 6.0 5.8 5.6 5.5 5.3 
Gold 22.1 21.4 20.6 19.7 18.8 17.8 16.9 
Basic metals and minerals 32.2 32.2 32.1 31.9 31.8 31.5 31.2 
Other exports 39.6 40.3 41.4 42.5 43.8 45.3 46.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Real growth rates 
Agriculture 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Gold 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Basic metals and minerals 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Other exports 4.8 6.8 7.5 8.1 9.0 8.9 
Total 3.0 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 5.5 
Table B.4. Public sector budget 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year6 
Billion rand 
Domestic revenue 118.1 129.6 143.2 158.8 177.4 198.1 219.6 
Transfers from ROW 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 
Consumption -91.3 -98.8 -108.9 -120.6 -134.3 -149.4 -164.7 
Investment -9.6 -10.4 -11.3 -12.3 -13.5 -14.9 -16.3 
Transfers -15.4 -16.9 -18.6 -20.4 -22.3 -24.5 -26.9 
Domestic interest payments -21.2 -23.8 -26.2 -27.5 -28.7 -29.7 -30.6 
Foreign interest payments -3.9 -4.7 -5.9 -7.6 -9.7 -12.0 -14.4 
Budget surplus -23.1 -24.7 -27.3 -29.2 -30.7 -31.9 -32.8 
Per cent ef GDP 
Domestic revenue 27.2 27.2 27.4 27.7 28.2 28.7 29.0 
Transfers from ROW 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Consumption -21.0 -20.7 -20.8 -21.0 -21.3 -21.6 -21.8 
Investment -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 
Transfers -3.6 -3.6 -3.6 -3.6 -3.6 -3.6 -3.6 
Domestic interest payments -4.9 -5.0 -5.0 -4.8 -4.6 -4.3 -4.0 
Foreign interest payments -0.9 -1.0 -1.1 -1.3 -1.5 -1.7 -1.9 
Budget surplus -5.3 -5.2 -5.2 -5.1 -4.9 -4.6 -4.3 
Growth rates in per cent 
Domestic revenue 9.8 10.5 10.9 11.7 11.7 10.9 
Transfers from ROW 9.7 9.7 9.6 9.8 9.6 9.8 
Consumption 8.1 10.2 10.8 11.3 11.3 10.2 
Investment 8.1 8.7 9.2 9.7 9.7 9.7 
Transfers 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.7 
Domestic interest payments 12.1 10.3 5.1 4.1 3.5 3.3 
Foreign interest payments 20.8 25.3 29.1 27.3 23.9 19.8 
Budget surplus 6.6 10.7 7.1 4.9 4.0 2.9 
Table B.5. Public sector deficit finance 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Billion rand 
Domestic credit 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Domestic debt 17.8 17.4 16.7 16.5 16.7 18.0 19.3 
Foreign credit 4.8 7.2 10.6 12.7 14.0 13.9 13.5 
Total 23.1 24.7 27.3 29.2 30.7 31.9 32.8 
Per cent ef GDP 
Domestic credit 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Domestic debt 4.1 3.7 3.2 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.6 
Foreign credit 1.1 1.5 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.0 1.8 
Total 5.3 5.2 5.2 5.1 4.9 4.6 4.3 
Growth rates in per cent 
Domestic credit -100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Domestic debt -2.2 -4.1 -1.1 1.1 7.9 7.2 
Foreign credit 50.9 46.2 20.2 9.7 -0.5 -2.6 
Total 6.6 10.7 7.1 4.9 4.0 2.9 
Table B.6. Balance of Payments 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
Billion foreign currency units 
Export 102.7 108.9 116.7 125.6 135.8 147.6 160.5 
Import -94.4 -106.9 -118.4 -128.7 -138.2 -148.4 -159.2 
Interest payments -6.3 -7.1 -9.3 -12.2 -15.6 -19.4 -23.5 
Net transfers 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Other factor services -4.2 -4.5 -4.8 -5.1 -5.5 -5.8 -6.2 
Current account surplus -2.1 -9.4 -15.5 -20.2 -23.2 -25.7 -28.1 
Public sector borrowing -4.8 -7.0 -10.0 -11.7 -12.4 -12.0 -11.4 
Private sector borrowing -0.4 -8.5 -10.7 -12.7 -14.3 -17.0 -20.1 
Change in reserves 3.1 6.2 5.1 4.2 3.6 3.3 3.3 
Per cent of GDP 
Export 23.6 23.5 23.6 23.9 24.2 24.7 25.2 
Import -21.7 -23.1 -24.0 -24.5 -24.6 -24.8 -25.0 
Interest payments -1.5 -1.5 -1.9 -2.3 -2.8 -3.2 -3.7 
Net transfers 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other factor services -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 
Current account surplus -0.5 -2.0 -3.1 -3.8 -4.1 -4.3 -4.4 
Public sector borrowing -1.1 -1.5 -2.0 -2.2 -2.2 -2.0 -1.8 
Private sector borrowing -0.1 -1.8 -2.2 -2.4 -2.6 -2.8 -3.1 
Change in reserves 0.7 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.5 
Growth rates in per cent 
Export 6.1 7.1 7.6 8.2 8.7 8.7 
Import 13.3 10.7 8.7 7.3 7.3 7.3 
Interest payments 11.6 31.1 31.5 28.3 24.2 21.1 
Net transfers 6.8 6.8 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.7 
Other factor services 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 
Current account surplus 347.7 66.2 30.1 14.7 10.8 9.5 
Public sector borrowing 46.6 42.1 16.8 6.6 -3.3 -5.4 
Private sector borrowing 1985.3 25.2 18.8 12.7 18.8 18.0 
Change in reserves 99.1 -17.3 -19.1 -14.5 -6.5 -0.8 
Table B. 7 Money supply 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Billion rand 
Money supply 244.2 267.9 293.9 322.4 353.7 388.0 425.7 
Foreign reserves 14.1 20.9 27.0 32.3 37.2 42.1 47.3 
Total domestic credit 230.0 246.9 266.9 290.1 316.5 345.9 378.5 
Public sector credit 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 
Private sector credit 214.6 231.5 251.4 274.6 301.0 330.4 363.0 
Per cent of GDP 
Money supply 56.2 56.2 56.2 56.2 56.2 56.2 56.2 
Foreign reserves 3.2 4.4 5.2 5.6 5.9 6.1 6.2 
Total domestic credit 53.0 51.8 51.1 50.6 50.3 50.1 50.0 
Public sector credit 3.6 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.0 
Private sector credit 49.4 48.6 48.1 47.9 47.8 47.9 47.9 
Growth rates in per cent 
Money supply 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.7 
Foreign reserves 48.3 28.9 19.7 15.3 13.2 12.2 
Total domestic credit 7.3 8.1 8.7 9.1 9.3 9.4 
Public sector credit 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Private sector credit 7.9 8.6 9.2 9.6 9.8 9.8 
Table B.8 Other asset stocks 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Billion rand 
Public sector credit 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 
Public sector domestic debt 169.2 186.6 203.3 219.8 236.5 254.6 273.9 
Public sector foreign debt 32.3 40.5 52.3 66.5 82.4 98.7 115.1 
Total public sector debt 217.0 242.6 271.1 301.8 334.5 368.7 404.5 
Private sector foreign debt 17.7 27.0 39.1 54.1 71.7 93.4 119.9 
Per cent of GDP 
Public sector credit 3.6 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.0 
Public sector domestic debt 39.0 39.2 38.9 38.3 37.6 36.9 36.2 
Public sector foreign debt 7.4 8.5 10.0 11.6 13.1 14.3 15.2 
Total public sector debt 50.0 50.9 51.9 52.6 53.2 53.4 53.4 
Private sector foreign debt 4.1 5.7 7.5 9.4 11.4 13.5 15.8 
Growth rates in per cent 
Public sector credit 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Public sector domestic debt 10.3 9.0 8.1 7.6 7.6 7.6 
Public sector foreign debt 25.3 29.1 27.3 23.9 19.8 16.6 
Total public sector debt 11.8 11.7 11.4 10.8 10.3 9.7 
Private sector foreign debt 52.5 44.8 38.3 32.6 30.3 28.4 
Table B.9 Prices and exchange rates 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Index 1994 = 1.000 
General price index 1.000 1.060 1.124 1.191 1.263 1.338 1.419 
Domestic price level 1.000 1.060 1.124 1.191 1.263 1.338 1.419 
Import price level 1.000 1.030 1.061 1.093 1.126 1.159 1.194 
Export price level 1.000 1.030 1.061 1.093 1.126 1.159 1.194 
Nominal exchange rate 1.000 1.029 1.059 1.090 1.122 1.154 1.188 
Real exchange rate 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Growth rates in per cent 
General price index 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
Domestic price level 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
Import price level 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Export price level 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Nominal exchange rate 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 
Real exchange rate 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Table B.10 Other variables 
YearO Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Per cent 
Domestic interest rate 14.0 14.0 14.0 13.5 13.0 12.5 12.0 
Foreign interest rate 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.1 
Billion rand 
Nominal GDP 434.2 476.4 522.7 573.4 629.1 690.2 757.2 
Constant 1994 billion rand 
Public sector revenue 118.1 122.2 127.5 133.4 140.5 148.0 154.8 
Other public sector expenditure 15.4 16.0 16.5 17.1 17.7 18.3 19.0 
Terms of trade adjustment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Real GDY 434.2 449.4 465.2 481.5 498.3 515.7 533.8 
Billion foreign currenry units 
Public sector foreign debt 32.3 39.3 49.4 61.0 73.5 85.5 96.9 
Private sector foreign debt 17.7 26.2 36.9 49.6 63.9 80.9 100.9 
International reserves 14.1 20.3 25.5 29.6 33.2 36.5 39.8 
Growth rates 
Nominal GDP 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.7 
Public sector revenue 3.6 4.3 4.6 5.4 5.3 4.6 
Other public sector expenditure 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Terms of trade adjustment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Real GDY 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Public sector foreign debt 21.8 25.4 23.7 20.4 16.4 13.3 
Private sector foreign debt 48.2 40.7 34.4 28.8 26.6 24.8 




Table C 1 Material balance 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
Constant 1994 bi//ion rand 
Private consumption 256.3 265.2 273.7 281.9 290.4 300.2 314.5 
Public consumption 91.3 93.2 97.5 102.5 108.1 113.8 118.5 
Private investment 68.7 84.4 96.9 108.0 117.4 126.0 132.3 
Public investment 9.6 10.0 10.4 10.8 11.4 11.9 12.5 
Export 102.7 107.8 114.3 121.7 130.2 140.0 150.5 
Import -94.4 -104.6 -114.0 -122.3 -129.6 -137.7 -146.5 
GDP 434.2 456.0 478.8 502.7 527.8 554.2 581.9 
Per cent of GDP 
Private consumption 59.0 58.2 57.2 56.1 55.0 54.2 54.0 
Public consumption 21.0 20.4 20.4 20.4 20.5 20.5 20.4 
Private investment 15.8 18.5 20.2 21.5 22.2 22.7 22.7 
Public investment 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 
Export 23.6 23.6 23.9 24.2 24.7 25.3 25.9 
Import -21.7 -22.9 -23.8 -24.3 -24.6 -24.8 -25.2 
GDP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Rea/ growth rates in per cent 
Private consumption 3.5 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.4 4.8 
Public consumption 2.0 4.6 5.1 5.4 5.3 4.2 
Private investment 22.8 14.8 11.5 8.7 7.4 5.0 
Public investment 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Export 5.0 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 7.5 
Import 10.8 9.0 7.2 6.0 6.2 6.4 
GDP 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Table C 1 continued 
Year 0 Year 1 Year2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Deviations from base run in per cent 
Private conswnption 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.7 2.7 4.7 
Public conswnption 0.1 0.7 1.2 1.6 1.9 2.1 
Private investment 5.1 10.0 15.2 20.0 24.4 26.2 
Public investment 1.5 3.0 4.5 6.0 7.5 9.1 
Export 1.9 3.9 5.9 7.9 9.9 12.0 
Import 0.7 2.2 3.8 5.5 7.6 9.9 
GDP 1.4 2.9 4.4 5.9 7.5 9.0 
Table C2 Sectoral GDP 
YearO Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Constant 1994 billion rand 
Agriculture 18.9 19.6 20.4 21.2 22.1 23.0 23.9 
Mining 34.9 35.4 36.0 36.5 37.1 37.6 38.2 
Manufacturing 94.3 100.4 106.9 113.9 121.3 129.2 137.6 
Other 286.2 300.5 315.5 331.1 347.4 364.5 382.3 
Total 434.2 456.0 478.8 502.7 527.8 554.2 581.9 
Per cent of GDP 
Agriculture 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.1 
Mining 8.0 7.8 7.5 7.3 7.0 6.8 6.6 
Manufacturing 21.7 22.0 22.3 22.7 23.0 23.3 23.6 
Other 65.9 65.9 65.9 65.9 65.8 65.8 65.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Real growth rates in per cent 
Agriculture 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Mining 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Manufacturing 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 
Other 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.9 
Total 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Deviations from base run in per cent 
Agriculture 1.5 2.9 4.5 6.0 7.5 9.1 
Mining 1.5 3.0 4.6 6.1 7.7 9.3 
Manufacturing 1.4 2.9 4.3 5.8 7.3 8.9 
Other 1.4 2.9 4.4 5.9 7.5 9.0 
Total 1.4 2.9 4.4 5.9 7.5 9.0 
Table CJ Export categories 
rear 0 Year 1 rear 2 Year 3 rear 4 Year 5 Year 6 
Constant 1994 billion rand 
Agriculture 6.3 6.5 6.8 7.1 7.4 7.7 8.0 
Gold 22.7 23.1 23.6 24.0 24.5 25.0 25.5 
Basic metals and minerals 33.1 34.8 36.7 38.9 41.4 44.1 47.0 
Other exports 40.6 43.4 47.2 51.7 56.9 63.2 70.1 
Total 102.7 107.8 114.3 121.7 130.2 140.0 150.5 
Per cent of export 
Agriculture 6.1 6.1 6.0 5.8 5.7 5.5 5.3 
Gold 22.1 21.4 20.6 19.8 18.8 17.9 17.0 
Basic metals and minerals 32.2 32.2 32.1 31.9 31.8 31.5 31.2 
Other exports 39.6 40.2 41.3 42.5 43.7 45.2 46.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Real growth rates 
Agriculture 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Gold 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Basic metals and minerals 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 6.5 6.5 
Other exports 6.8 8.8 9.5 10.1 11.0 10.9 
Total 5.0 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 7.5 
Deviations from base run in per cent 
Agriculture 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.1 10.2 12.4 
Gold 2.0 4.0 6.1 8.2 10.4 12.6 
Basic metals and minerals 1.9 3.9 5.9 7.9 10.0 12.1 
Other exports 1.9 3.8 5.7 7.7 9.7 11.7 
Total 1.9 3.9 5.9 7.9 9.9 12.0 
Table C4 Public sector budget 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Billion rand 
Domestic revenue 118.1 127.0 137.5 149.5 163.6 179.1 194.5 
Transfers from ROW 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Consumption -91.3 -96.0 -103.5 -112.0 -121.6 -131.8 -141.5 
Investment -9.6 -10.3 -11.0 -11.8 -12.8 -13.8 -15.0 
Transfers -15.4 -16.7 -18.0 -19.5 -21.0 -22.7 -24.6 
Domestic interest payments -21.2 -22.1 -22.3 -21.0 -21.2 -21.2 -21.1 
Foreign interest payments -3.9 -4.6 -5.5 -6.7 -8.0 -9.3 -10.5 
Budget surplus -23.1 -22.3 -22.5 -21.2 -20.6 -19.5 -17.7 
Per cent of GDP 
Domestic revenue 27.2 27.0 27.1 27.2 27.5 27.9 28.0 
Transfers from ROW 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Consumption -21.0 -20.4 -20.4 -20.4 -20.5 -20.5 -20.4 
Investment -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 
Transfers -3.6 -3.5 -3.5 -3.5 -3.5 -3.5 -3.5 
Domestic interest payments -4.9 -4.7 -4.4 -3.8 -3.6 -3.3 -3.0 
Foreign interest payments -0.9 -1.0 -1.1 -1.2 -1.3 -1.5 -1.5 
Budget surplus -5.3 -4.8 -4.4 -3.9 -3.5 -3.0 -2.5 
Table C4 continued 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Growth rates in per cent 
Domestic revenue 7.6 8.3 8.7 9.5 9.4 8.6 
Transfers from ROW 7.8 6.9 6.7 6.7 6.3 6.2 
Consumption 5.1 7.8 8.2 8.5 8.5 7.3 
Investment 6.6 7.1 7.6 8.2 8.1 8.2 
Transfers 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1 
Domestic interest payments 4.1 1.3 -5.8 0.9 0.0 -0.6 
Foreign interest payments 18.7 18.5 21.9 20.0 16.5 12.4 
Budget surplus -3.5 0.6 -5.8 -2.6 -5.3 -9.5 
Deviations from base nm in per cent 
Domestic revenue -2.0 -4.0 -5.9 -7.8 -9.6 -11.4 
Transfers from ROW -1.8 -4.2 -6.7 -9.4 -12.1 -15.0 
Consumption -2.8 -4.9 -7.1 -9.5 -11.8 -14.1 
Investment -1.4 -2.8 -4.2 -5.5 -6.9 -8.2 
Transfers -1.5 -3.0 -4.4 -5.9 -7.3 -8.7 
Domestic interest payments -7.1 -14.7 -23.5 -26.0 -28.4 -31.1 
Foreign interest payments -1.8 -7.1 -12.3 -17.3 -22.2 -27.0 
Budget surplus -9.4 -17.7 -27.7 -32.8 -38.8 -46.2 
Table C5 Public sector deficit finance 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Billion rand 
Domestic credit 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Domestic debt 17.8 16.4 14.1 11.7 11.1 11.0 10.3 
Foreign credit 4.8 5.9 8.4 9.4 9.5 8.5 7.4 
Total 23.1 22.3 22.5 21.2 20.6 19.5 17.7 
Per cent of GDP 
Domestic credit 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Domestic debt 4.1 3.5 2.8 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5 
Foreign credit 1.1 1.3 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.3 1.1 
Total 5.3 4.8 4.4 3.9 3.5 3.0 2.5 
Growth rates in per cent 
Domestic credit -100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Domestic debt -7.8 -14.2 -16.6 -5.4 -0.9 -6.5 
Foreign credit 23.3 41.6 12.3 0.9 -10.6 -13.5 
Total -3.5 0.6 -5.8 -2.6 -5.3 -9.5 
Deviations from base run in per cent 
Domestic credit 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Domestic debt -5.8 -15.7 -28.9 -33.5 -38.9 -46.6 
Foreign credit -18.2 -20.9 -26.0 -31.9 -38.8 -45.6 
Total -9.4 -17.7 -27.7 -32.8 -38.8 -46.2 
Table C6 Balance of payments 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Billion fareign currenry units 
Export 102.7 111.1 121.2 133.0 146.6 162.3 179.8 
Import -94.4 -107.7 -121.0 -133.6 -145.9 -159.6 -174.9 
Interest payments -6.3 -7.1 -9.1 -11.8 -14.9 -18.2 -21.8 
Net transfers 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Other factor services -4.2 -4.5 -4.8 -5.1 -5.5 -5.8 -6.2 
Current account surplus -2.1 -8.0 -13.4 -17.2 -19.4 --21.1 -22.9 
Public sector borrowing -4.8 -5.9 -8.3 -9.3 -9.3 -8.4 -7.3 
Private sector borrowing -0.4 -8.5 -10.7 -12.7 -14.3 -17.0 -20.1 
Change in reserves 3.1 6.4 5.5 4.7 4.3 4.3 4.5 
Per cent of GDP 
Export 23.6 23.9 24.2 24.6 25.1 25.6 26.1 
Import -21.7 -23.2 -24.2 -24.7 -25.0 -25.2 -25.4 
Interest payments -1.5 -1.5 -1.8 -2.2 -2.5 -2.9 -3.2 
Net transfers 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other factor services -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 
Current account surplus -0.5 -1.7 -2.7 -3.2 -3.3 -3.3 -3.3 
Public sector borrowing -1.1 -1.3 -1.7 -1.7 -1.6 -1.3 -1.1 
Private sector borrowing -0.1 -1.8 -2.1 -2.3 -2.4 -2.7 -2.9 
Change in reserves 0.7 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.6 
Growth rates in per cent 
Export 8.1 9.2 9.7 10.2 10.7 10.8 
Import 14.1 12.3 10.4 9.2 9.4 9.6 
Interest payments 11.6 28.8 29.4 26.3 22.5 19.7 
Net transfers 6.8 6.8 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.7 
Other factor services 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 
Current account surplus 284.1 67.0 28.7 12.3 9.0 8.4 
Public sector borrowing 22.0 41.1 12.1 0.9 -10.4 -13.1 
Private sector borrowing 1985.3 25.2 18.8 12.7 18.8 18.0 
Change in reserves 103.9 -12.9 -14.9 -9.2 -0.5 4.6 
Deviations from base run in per cent 
Export 1.9 3.9 5.9 7.9 10.0 12.0 
Import 0.7 2.2 3.8 5.5 7.6 9.9 
Interest payments 0.0 -1.8 -3.4 -4.8 -6.1 -7.3 
Net transfers 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other factor services 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Current account surplus -14.2 -13.8 -14.7 -16.5 -17.9 -18.7 
Public sector borrowing -16.8 -17.4 -20.7 -24.9 -30.3 -36.1 
Private sector borrowing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Change in reserves 2.4 7.9 13.4 20.4 28.2 35.5 
Table Cl Money supply 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
Billion rand 
Money supply 244.2 266.7 291.3 318.2 347.6 379.7 414.7 
Foreign reserves 14.1 20.7 26.4 31.2 35.6 39.8 44.2 
Total domestic credit 230.0 246.0 264.9 287.0 312.0 339.8 370.5 
Public sector credit 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 
Private sector credit 214.6 230.5 249.4 271.5 296.5 324.3 355.0 
Per cent of GDP 
Money supply 56.2 56.8 57.4 57.9 58.5 59.1 59.7 
Foreign reserves 3.2 4.4 5.2 5.7 6.0 6.2 6.4 
Total domestic credit 53.0 52.4 52.2 52.2 52.5 52.9 53.3 
Public sector credit 3.6 3.3 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.2 
Private sector credit 49.4 49.1 49.1 49.4 49.9 50.5 51.1 
Growth rates in per cent 
Money supply 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 
Foreign reserves 46.7 27.5 18.4 14.0 11.9 10.9 
Total domestic credit 6.9 7.7 8.3 8.7 8.9 9.0 
Public sector credit 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Private sector credit 7.4 8.2 8.8 9.2 9.4 9.5 
Deviations from base run in per cent 
Money supply -0.4 -0.9 -1.3 -1.7 -2.2 -2.6 
Foreign reserves -1.0 -2.1 -3.2 -4.3 -5.4 -6.6 
Total domestic credit -0.4 -0.7 -1.1 -1.4 -1.8 -2.1 
Public sector credit 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Private sector credit -0.4 -0.8 -1.1 -1.5 -1.8 -2.2 
Table C8 Other asset stocks 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Billion rand 
Public sector credit 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 
Public sector domestic debt 169.2 185.6 199.7 211.4 222.5 233.6 243.9 
Public sector foreign debt 32.3 38.6 47.1 56.6 66.1 74.5 81.5 
Total public sector debt 217.0 239.7 262.3 283.5 304.2 323.5 340.9 
Private sector foreign debt 17.7 26.5 37.4 50.4 65.0 82.0 102.0 
Per cent of GDP 
Public sector credit 3.6 3.3 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.2 
Public sector domestic debt 39.0 39.5 39.3 38.5 37.5 36.4 35.1 
Public sector foreign debt 7.4 8.2 9.3 10.3 11.1 11.6 11.7 
Total public sector debt 50.0 51.0 51.6 51.6 51.2 50.4 49.1 
Private sector foreign debt 4.1 5.6 7.4 9.2 10.9 12.8 14.7 
Growth rates in per cent 
Public sector credit 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Public sector domestic debt 9.7 7.6 5.9 5.3 4.9 4.4 
Public sector foreign debt 19.4 22.1 20.2 16.8 12.6 9.5 
Total public sector debt 10.5 9.4 8.1 7.3 6.4 5.4 
Private sector foreign debt 49.8 41.2 34.7 28.9 26.3 24.3 
Deviations from base run in per cent 
Public sector credit 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Public sector domestic debt -0.5 -1.8 -3.8 -5.9 -8.3 -11.0 
Public sector foreign debt -4.7 -9.9 -14.9 -19.8 -24.5 -29.2 
Total public sector debt -1.2 -3.2 -6.1 -9.1 -12.3 -15.7 
Private sector foreign debt -1.8 -4.2 -6.7 -9.4 -12.1 -15.0 
Table C9 Prices and exchange rates 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Index 1994 = 1.000 
General price index 1.000 1.030 1.061 1.093 1.126 1.159 1.194 
Domestic price level 1.000 1.027 1.057 1.088 1.121 1.155 1.191 
Import price level 1.000 1.030 1.061 1.093 1.126 1.159 1.194 
Export price level 1.000 1.030 1.061 1.093 1.126 1.159 1.194 
Nominal exchange rate 1.000 1.011 1.014 1.016 1.017 1.014 1.010 
Real exchange rate 1.000 1.014 1.018 1.021 1.021 1.018 1.013 
Growth rates in per cent 
General price index 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Domestic price lFvel 2.7 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.1 
Import price level 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Export price level 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Nominal exchange rate 1.1 0.3 0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 
Real exchange rate 1.4 0.4 0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 
Deviations from base run in per cent 
General price index -2.8 -5.6 -8.3 -10.9 -13.4 -15.8 
Domestic price level -3.1 -5.9 -8.6 -11.2 -13.7 -16.0 
Import price level 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Export price level 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Nominal exchange rate -1.8 -4.2 -6.7 -9.4 -12.1 -15.0 
Real exchange rate 1.4 1.8 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.3 
Table C 10 Other variables 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Per cent 
Domestic interest rate 14.0 13.0 12.0 10.5 10.0 9.5 9.0 
Foreign interest rate 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.1 
Billion rand 
Nominal GDP 434.2 469.6 507.9 549.3 594.1 642.5 694.9 
Constant 1994 billion rand 
Public sector revenue 118.1 123.3 129.6 136.8 145.4 154.5 162.9 
Other public sector expenditure 15.4 16.2 17.0 17.8 18.7 19.6 20.6 
Terms of trade adjustment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Real GDY 434.2 456.0 478.8 502.7 527.8 554.2 581.9 
Billion foreign currency units 
Public sector foreign debt 32.3 38.2 46.4 55.7 65.0 73.4 80.7 
Private sector foreign debt 17.7 26.2 36.9 49.6 63.9 80.9 100.9 
International reserves 14.1 20.5 26.0 30.7 35.0 39.3 43.7 
Growth rates 
Nominal GDP 8.2 8.1 8.1 8.2 8.2 8.1 
Public sector revenue 4.4 5.2 5.5 6.3 6.2 5.5 
Other public sector expenditure 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 
Terms of trade adjustment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Real GDY 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Public sector foreign debt 18.1 21.7 20.0 16.8 12.9 9.9 
Private sector foreign debt 48.2 40.7 34.4 28.8 26.6 24.8 
International reserves 45.1 27.1 18.1 13.9 12.2 11.4 
Table C 10 Other variables continued 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
Deviations from base run in per cent 
Nominal GDP -1.4 -2.8 -4.2 -5.6 -6.9 -8.2 
Public sector revenue 0.9 1.7 2.6 3.5 4.3 5.2 
Other public sector expenditure 1.4 2.8 4.2 5.6 7.0 8.5 
Terms of trade adjustment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Real GDY 1.4 2.9 4.4 5.9 7.5 9.0 
Public sector foreign debt -3.0 -5.9 -8.7 -11.5 -14.1 -16.7 
Private sector foreign debt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 




Table D 1 Material balance 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Constant 1994 billion rand 
Private consumption 256.3 261.6 264.9 267.5 269.5 271.6 274.5 
Public consumption 91.3 93.4 98.6 102.2 104.8 106.4 107.1 
Private investment 68.7 72.7 74.3 75.7 77.3 78.8 80.4 
Public investment 9.6 9.7 9.8 9.9 10.1 10.3 10.5 
Export 102.7 104.7 107.9 111.7 116.1 121.4 126.9 
Import -94.4 -99.2 -103.6 -106.2 -107.7 -109.1 -110.4 
GDP 434.2 442.9 451.8 460.8 470.0 479.4 489.0 
Per cent of GDP 
Private consumption 59.0 59.1 58.6 58.1 57.3 56.7 56.1 
Public consumption 21.0 21.1 21.8 22.2 22.3 22.2 21.9 
Private investment 15.8 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 
Public investment 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 
Export 23.6 23.6 23.9 24.2 24.7 25.3 25.9 
Import -21.7 -22.4 -22.9 -23.1 -22.9 -22.8 -22.6 
GDP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Real growth rates in per cent 
Private consumption 2.1 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.8 1.1 
Public consumption 2.3 5.5 3.7 2.5 1.6 0.6 
Private investment 5.8 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Public investment 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Export 2.0 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 4.5 
Import 5.1 4.4 2.6 1.4 1.2 1.2 
GDP 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Deviations from base mn in per cent 
Private consumption -1.0 -2.5 -4.1 -5.6 -7.1 -8.6 
Public consumption 0.3 1.7 0.9 -1.5 -4.7 -7.8 
Private investment -9.4 -15.7 -19.2 -21.0 -22.2 -23.3 
Public investment -1.5 -2.9 -4.3 -5.7 -7.1 -8.4 
Export -1.0 -1.9 -2.9 -3.8 -4.7 -5.6 
Import -4.5 -7.2 -9.8 -12.2 -14.7 -17.2 
GDP -1.4 -2.9 -4.3 -5.7 -7.0 -8.4 
Table D2 Sectoral GDP 
Year 0 Year 1 Year2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Constant 1994 billion rand 
Agriculture 18.9 19.1 19.2 19.4 19.6 19.8 20.0 
Mining 34.9 34.4 33.9 33.4 32.9 32.4 31.9 
Manufacturing 94.3 97.6 101.0 104.5 108.2 112.0 115.9 
Other 286.2 291.9 297.7 303.5 309.4 315.3 321.2 
Total 434.2 442.9 451.8 460.8 470.0 479.4 489.0 
Per cent of GDP 
Agriculture 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.1 
Mining 8.0 7.8 7.5 7.2 7.0 6.8 6.5 
Manufacturing 21.7 22.0 22.4 22.7 23.0 23.4 23.7 
Other 65.9 65.9 65.9 65.9 65.8 65.8 65.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Real growth rates in per cent 
Agriculture 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Mining -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 
Manufacturing 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Other 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 
Total 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Deviations from base run in per cent 
Agriculture -1.5 -2.9 -4.3 -5.7 -7.1 -8.5 
Mining -1.5 -3.0 -4.4 -5.9 -7.3 -8.7 
Manufacturing -1.4 -2.8 -4.2 -5.6 -6.9 -8.3 
Other -1.4 -2.9 -4.3 -5.7 -7.0 -8.4 
Total -1.4 -2.9 -4.3 -5.7 -7.0 -8.4 
Table DJ Export categories 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Constant 1994 billion rand 
Agriculture 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.6 6.7 
Gold 22.7 22.4 22.2 22.0 21.8 21.6 21.3 
Basic metals and minerals 33.1 33.8 34.6 35.7 36.9 38.2 39.5 
Other exports 40.6 42.2 44.6 47.5 50.9 55.0 59.3 
Total 102.7 104.7 107.9 111.7 116.1 121.4 126.9 
Per cent of exporl 
Agriculture 6.1 6.1 5.9 5.8 5.6 5.4 5.3 
Gold 22.1 21.4 20.6 19.7 18.7 17.8 16.8 
Basic metals and minerals 32.2 32.2 32.1 31.9 31.8 31.5 31.2 
Other exports 39.6 40.3 41.4 42.6 43.8 45.3 46.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Real growth rates 
Agriculture 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Gold -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 
Basic metals and minerals 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Other exports 3.8 5.8 6.5 7.1 8.0 7.9 
Total 2.0 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 4.5 
Deviations from base run in per cent 
Agriculture -1.0 -2.0 -2.9 -3.9 -4.8 -5.7 
Gold -1.0 -2.0 -3.0 -3.9 -4.9 -5.9 
Basic metals and minerals -1.0 -1.9 -2.9 -3.8 -4.7 -5.6 
Other exports -1.0 -1.9 -2.8 -3.7 -4.6 -5.5 
Total -1.0 -1.9 -2.9 -3.8 -4.7 -5.6 
Table D4 Public sector budget 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Billion rand 
Domestic revenue 118.1 129.6 141.6 158.0 180.6 210.1 247.0 
Transfers from ROW 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 
Consumption -91.3 -99.0 -111.7 -126.0 -143.0 -163.7 -188.9 
Investment -9.6 -10.2 -11.1 -12.2 -13.8 -15.9 -18.5 
Transfers -15.4 -16.7 -18.2 -20.2 -22.8 -26.2 -30.7 
Domestic interest payments -21.2 -23.8 -27.9 -34.3 -41.3 -49.0 -57.8 
Foreign interest payments -3.9 -4.8 -6.2 -8.3 -11.2 -14.9 -19.5 
Budget surplus -23.1 -24.7 -33.2 -42.7 -51.0 -59.0 -67.9 
Per cent of GDP 
Domestic revenue 27.2 27.6 27.7 27.8 28.1 28.5 28.6 
Transfers from ROW 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Consumption -21.0 -21.1 -21.8 -22.2 -22.3 -22.2 -21.9 
Investment -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 
Transfers -3.6 -3.6 -3.6 -3.6 -3.6 -3.6 -3.6 
Domestic interest payments -4.9 -5.1 -5.5 -6.0 -6.4 -6.6 -6.7 
Foreign interest payments -0.9 -1.0 -1.2 -1.5 -1.7 -2.0 -2.3 
Budget surplus -5.3 -5.3 -6.5 -7.5 -7.9 -8.0 -7.9 
Growth rates in per cent 
Domestic revenue 9.8 9.3 11.6 14.3 16.3 17.5 
Transfers from ROW 13.1 12.0 13.8 15.9 18.0 20.2 
Consumption 8.4 12.8 12.8 13.5 14.5 15.4 
Investment 6.5 8.0 10.4 12.9 14.9 16.9 
Transfers 8.1 9.1 11.0 13.0 14.9 17.0 
Domestic interest payments 12.1 17.6 22.7 20.4 18.8 18.0 
Foreign interest payments 24.6 28.1 34.1 34.3 33.3 31.1 
Budget surplus 6.5 34.7 28.4 19.4 15.9 15.0 
Deviations from base run in per cent 
Domestic revenue 0.0 -1.1 -0.5 1.8 6.1 12.5 
Transfers from ROW 3.1 5.3 9.4 15.5 24.3 36.1 
Consumption 0.3 2.6 4.5 6.5 9.6 14.7 
Investment -1.5 -2.1 -0.9 2.0 6.8 13.8 
Transfers -1.4 -2.0 -0.9 2.0 6.9 14.0 
Domestic interest payments 0.0 6.6 24.5 44.0 65.3 88.7 
Foreign interest payments 3.1 5.3 9.4 15.5 24.3 36.1 
Budget surplus 0.0 21.7 45.9 66.1 85.1 106.7 
Table D5 Public sector deficit finance 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Billion rand 
Domestic credit 0.5 -0.2 5.3 12.2 18.1 23.8 30.2 
Domestic debt 17.8 17.4 16.7 16.5 16.7 18.0 19.3 
Foreign credit 4.8 7.5 11.2 13.9 16.1 17.3 18.4 
Total 23.l 24.7 33.2 42.7 51.0 59.0 67.9 
Per cent of GDP 
Domestic credit 0.1 0.0 1.0 2.1 2.8 3.2 3.5 
Domestic debt 4.1 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.2 
Foreign credit 1.1 1.6 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.1 
Total 5.3 5.3 6.5 7.5 7.9 8.0 7.9 
Growth rates in per cent 
Domestic credit nd nd 128.2 48.5 31.0 27.0 
Domestic debt -2.2 -4.1 -1.1 1.1 7.9 7.2 
Foreign credit 55.5 49.4 24.8 15.7 7.0 6.6 
Total 6.5 34.7 28.4 19.4 15.9 15.0 
Deviations from base run in per cent 
Domestic credit nd nd nd nd nd nd 
Domestic debt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Foreign credit 3.1 5.3 9.4 15.5 24.3 36.1 
Total 0.0 21.7 45.9 66.1 85.1 106.7 
Note: nd denotes values not defined 
Table D6 Balance of payments 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Billion foreign currency units 
Export 102.7 106.8 112.2 118.4 125.5 133.8 142.6 
Import -94.4 -102.2 -109.9 -116.1 -121.3 -126.5 -131.8 
Interest payments -6.3 -7.1 -8.9 -11.2 -13.7 -16.3 -18.8 
Net transfers 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 
Other factor services -4.2 -4.5 -4.8 -5.1 -5.5 -5.8 -6.2 
Current account surplus -2.1 -6.7 -11.2 -13.8 -14.7 -14.5 -14.0 
Public sector borrowing -4.8 -7.0 -10.0 -11.7 -12.4 -12.0 -11.4 
Private sector borrowing -0.4 -5.9 -6.3 -6.3 -5.8 -5.8 -5.9 
Change in reserves 3.1 6.2 5.1 4.2 3.6 3.3 3.3 
Per cent of GDP 
Export 23.6 24.1 24.4 24.8 25.3 26.0 26.7 
Import -21.7 -23.1 -23.9 -24.4 -24.5 -24.6 -24.7 
Interest payments -1.5 -1.6 -1.9 -2.4 -2.8 -3.2 -3.5 
Net transfers 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Other factor services -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.2 
Current account surplus -0.5 -1.5 -2.4 -2.9 -3.0 -2.8 -2.6 
Public sector borrowing -1.1 -1.6 -2.2 -2.5 -2.5 -2.3 -2.1 
Private sector borrowing -0.1 -1.3 -1.4 -1.3 -1.2 -1.1 -1.1 
Change in reserves 0.7 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.6 
Table D6 continued 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Growth rates in per cent 
Export 4.0 5.0 5.5 6.1 6.6 6.6 
Import 8.2 7.5 5.7 4.5 4.3 4.2 
Interest payments 11.6 25.9 25.9 22.6 18.7 15.5 
Net transfers 6.8 6.8 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.7 
Other factor services 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 
Current account surplus 222.2 65.7 23.6 6.3 -0.8 -4.0 
Public sector borrowing 46.6 42.1 16.8 6.6 -3.3 -5.4 
Private sector borrowing 1344.2 6.5 -0.4 -7.9 1.2 0.7 
Change in reserves 99.1 -17.3 -19.1 -14.5 -6.5 -0.8 
Deviations from base run in per cent 
Export -2.0 -3.9 -5.7 -7.6 -9.4 -11.1 
Import -4.5 -7.2 -9.8 -12.3 -14.7 -17.2 
Interest payments 0.0 -4.0 -8.1 -12.1 -16.0 -19.9 
Net transfers 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other factor services 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Current account surplus -28.0 -28.2 -31.8 -36.8 -43.4 -50.4 
Public sector borrowing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Private sector borrowing -30.7 -41.1 -50.7 -59.7 -65.6 -70.7 
Change in reserves 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Table D 7 Money supply 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Billion rand 
Money supply 244.2 264.0 287.9 319.5 360.8 414.6 484.9 
Foreign reserves 14.1 21.6 28.4 35.3 43.0 52.4 64.3 
Total domestic credit 230.0 242.4 259.5 284.2 317.9 362.3 420.6 
Public sector credit 15.5 15.3 20.6 32.8 50.9 74.7 104.9 
Private sector credit 214.6 227.1 238.9 251.4 266.9 287.6 315.7 
Per cent of GDP 
Money supply 56.2 56.2 56.2 56.2 56.2 56.2 56.2 
Foreign reserves 3.2 4.6 5.5 6.2 6.7 7.1 7.5 
Total domestic credit 53.0 51.6 50.7 50.0 49.5 49.1 48.8 
Public sector credit 3.6 3.2 4.0 5.8 7.9 10.1 12.2 
Private sector credit 49.4 48.4 46.7 44.2 41.6 39.0 36.6 
Growth rates in per cent 
Money supply 8.1 9.1 11.0 12.9 14.9 16.9 
Foreign reserves 52.8 31.7 24.4 21.7 21.8 22.9 
Total domestic credit 5.4 7.0 9.5 11.9 14.0 16.1 
Public sector credit -1.5 35.1 59.2 55.2 46.6 40.4 
Private sector credit 5.9 5.2 5.2 6.2 7.8 9.8 
Deviations from base run in per cent 
Money supply -1.5 -2.0 -0.9 2.0 6.9 13.9 
Foreign reserves 3.1 5.3 9.4 15.5 24.3 36.1 
Total domestic credit -1.8 -2.8 -2.1 0.4 4.7 11.1 
Public sector credit -1.5 33.0 111.9 228.8 382.4 577.1 
Private sector credit -1.9 -5.0 -8.5 -11.3 -13.0 -13.0 
Table D8 Other asset stocks 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Billion rand 
Public sector credit 15.5 15.3 20.6 32.8 50.9 74.7 104.9 
Public sector domestic debt 169.2 186.6 203.3 219.8 236.5 254.6 273.9 
Public sector foreign debt 32.3 41.7 55.1 72.8 95.2 122.7 156.6 
Total public sector debt 217.0 243.6 279.0 325.4 382.7 451.9 535.3 
Private sector foreign debt 17.7 25.0 33.3 43.1 54.3 68.5 86.7 
Per cent of GDP 
Public sector credit 3.6 3.2 4.0 5.8 7.9 10.1 12.2 
Public sector domestic debt 39.0 39.7 39.7 38.7 36.9 34.5 31.8 
Public sector foreign debt 7.4 8.9 10.8 12.8 14.8 16.6 18.2 
Total public sector debt 50.0 51.9 54.5 57.3 59.6 61.3 62.1 
Private sector foreign debt 4.1 5.3 6.5 7.6 8.5 9.3 10.1 
Growth rates in per cent 
Public sector credit -1.5 35.1 59.2 55.2 46.6 40.4 
Public sector domestic debt 10.3 9.0 8.1 7.6 7.6 7.6 
Public sector foreign debt 29.2 31.9 32.2 30.8 28.8 27.7 
Total public sector debt 12.3 14.5 16.7 17.6 18.1 18.5 
Private sector foreign debt 41.5 33.2 29.3 26.0 26.1 26.5 
Deviations from base run in per cent 
Public sector credit -1.5 33.0 111.9 228.8 382.4 577.1 
Public sector domestic debt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Public sector foreign debt 3.1 5.3 9.4 15.5 24.3 36.1 
Total public sector debt 0.4 2.9 7.8 14.4 22.6 32.4 
Private sector foreign debt -7.2 -14.7 -20.2 -24.2 -26.6 -27.7 
Table D9 Prices and exchange rates 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Index 1994 = 1.000 
General price index 1.000 1.060 1.133 1.233 1.365 1.538 1.763 
Domestic price level 1.000 1.052 1.121 1.216 1.342 1.507 1.722 
Import price level 1.000 1.030 1.061 1.093 1.126 1.159 1.194 
Export price level 1.000 1.020 1.040 1.060 1.081 1.102 1.124 
Nominal exchange rate 1.000 1.061 1.116 1.193 1.296 1.435 1.616 
Real exchange rate 1.000 1.039 1.056 1.072 1.087 1.104 1.121 
Growth rates in per cent 
General price index 6.0 6.9 8.8 10.7 12.7 14.6 
Domestic price level 5.2 6.6 8.5 10.4 12.3 14.3 
Import price level 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Export price level 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Nominal exchange rate 6.1 5.1 6.9 8.6 10.7 12.7 
Real exchange rate 3.9 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.6 1.6 
Deviations .from base run in per cent 
General price index 0.0 0.9 3.5 8.1 14.9 24.3 
Domestic price level -0.8 -0.3 2.1 6.3 12.6 21.4 
Import price level 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Export price level -1.0 -2.0 -3.0 -3.9 -4.9 -5.9 
Nominal exchange rate 3.1 5.3 9.4 15.5 24.3 36.1 
Real exchange rate 3.9 5.6 7.2 8.7 10.4 12.1 
Table D 10 Other variables 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 
Per cent 
Domestic interest rate 14.0 14.0 15.0 16.9 18.8 20.7 22.7 
Foreign interest rate 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.1 
Billion rand 
Nominal GDP 434.2 469.5 512.0 568.2 641.8 737.5 862.4 
Constant 1994 billion rand 
Public sector revenue 118.1 122.2 124.9 128.1 132.3 136.5 139.9 
Other public sector expenditure 15.4 15.7 16.0 16.4 16.7 17.0 17.4 
Terms of trade adjustment 0.0 -1.0 -2.1 -3.3 -4.6 -5.9 -7.4 
Real GDY 434.2 441.9 449.7 457.5 465.5 473.5 481.6 
Billion foreign currency units 
Public sector foreign debt 32.3 39.3 49.4 61.0 73.5 85.5 96.9 
Private sector foreign debt 17.7 23.6 29.9 36.2 41.9 47.8 53.6 
International reserves 14.1 20.3 25.5 29.6 33.2 36.5 39.8 
Growth rates 
Nominal GDP 8.1 9.1 11.0 12.9 14.9 16.9 
Public sector revenue 3.6 2.2 2.5 3.3 3.2 2.5 
Other public sector expenditure 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Terms of trade adjustment nd 105.0 54.5 38.0 30.0 24.8 
Real GDY 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 
Public sector foreign debt 21.8 25.4 23.7 20.4 16.4 13.3 
Private sector foreign debt 33.4 26.7 21.0 16.0 13.9 12.3 
International reserves 44.1 25.3 16.3 12.0 10.0 9.0 
De/Jiations from base run in per cent 
Nominal GDP -1.5 -2.0 -0.9 2.0 6.9 13.9 
Public sector revenue 0.0 -2.0 -4.0 -5.9 -7.8 -9.6 
Other public sector expenditure -1.4 -2.9 -4.3 -5.7 -7.0 -8.4 
Terms of trade adjustment nd nd nd nd nd nd 
Real GDY -1.7 -3.3 -5.0 -6.6 -8.2 -9.8 
Public sector foreign debt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Private sector foreign debt -10.0 -19.0 -27.1 -34.4 -41.0 -46.9 
International reserves 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Note-. nd denotes values not defined 
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